

Southern Historical Society Papers.

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GEN. R. E. LEE TO GEN. T. J. JACKSON.

Night of the Battle of Fredericksburg.

**Original Autograph Letter in the possession of the Secretary of the
Southern Historical Society.**

H'd. Q'ts., 13 Dec'r. '62.

Gen'l.

Will you direct your Ordnance Officer, Major Bier, to send to Guinney's depot *immediately* all the empty ordnance wagons he can, to be replenished with ammunition, for which they must remain there till loaded. To obtain as many wagons as possible, let him empty all he can in replenishing the ammunition of men and batteries.

Very resp'y,

R. E. LEE.

P. S. —I need not remind you to have the ammunition of your men and batteries replenished to-night—every thing ready by daylight to-morrow. I am truly grateful to the Giver of all victory for having blessed us thus far in our terrible struggle. I pray he may continue it.

R. E. L.

Gen'l Jackson.

THE HOUSE OF BROKEN SWORDS.

On one side marshes met the snarling sea,
And on the other, three gaunt mountain peaks
Shot up mid screaming eagles; and between,
Beetling above an inky tarn, upclomb
That hostelry.

Cloud-high it loomed and dark
As Amazonian forests. Far o'erhead
Its shadowy roof, sometimes was spindrift dim,
Sometimes was heaven, with lucent twilight skies
Besprent with stars; and round each echoing hall
From carven ambrys quaint, old storied arms
Blazoned the walls. There on Goliath's blade
Goliath's blood still rusted; there sea-born
Excalibur flaunted his wizard hilt,
And Soldan's yataghan and Richard's brand
Hung with the baton that in Caesar's grasp
Dispeopled nations.

But the loftiest nave
In that strange house was hung with broken swords,
Whereof the chiefest three had shields beneath,
Scrolled each with shining names. One shield was his
Who long time humbled Rome, and one, blood-red,
Recalled the Corsican; and last, a shield
Now wet with old men's tears, proclaimed the chief
Whose ramparts moulder mid Virginian pines.
Untenanted the place, to casual eyes,
And silent; but anon began afar
Onset of armed feet, and thunders rolled,
(Thunders or battle), and a hand unseen

Lifted a veil; and Lo! a marching host
Swept through the aisles, while on amazed ears
Sea-like uprose The Prayer of Beaten Men.

"We are the fallen, who with helpless faces
Hid in the dust, in stiffening ruin lay,
Felt the hoofs beat, and heard the rattling traces,
As o'er us drove the chariots of the fray.

"We are the fallen, who by ramparts gory
Awaiting death, heard the far shouts begin,
And with our last glance glimpsed the victor's glory
For which we died, but dying might not win.

"We were but men. Always our eyes were holden,
We could not read the dark that walled us round,
Nor deem our futile plans with thine enfolden—
We fought, not knowing God was on the ground.

"Give us our own; and though in realms eternal
The potsherd and the pot, belike, are one,
Make our old world to know that with supernal
Powers we were matched, and by the stars o'erthrown.

"Aye, grant our ears to hear the foolish praising
Of men—old voices of our lost home-land,
Or else, the gateways of this dim world raising,
Give us our swords again—and hold thy hand!"

Thus prayed they; and no spoken answer fell,
But whoso watched, saw the dark roof again
Flash into sudden heaven aglow with stars
That aimed their rays, straight as God's glances, on
Those shields alone beneath the broken swords.

—William Hervey Woods, *Scribner* for March, 1910.

GENERAL RICHARD S. EWELL.

U. S. ARMY.

Ewell, Richard Stoddert, Virginia, Cadet Mil. Academy July 1, 1836. Brevet, 2d lieut of 1st dragoons Aug. 1, 1840, 2d lieutenant Nov. 1, 1840. 1st lieut Sept. 18, 1845. Captain Aug. 4, 1849. Brevet Captain Aug. 20, 1847 for gallant and meritorious conduct at the battles of Contreras and Cherubusco, Mexico. Resigned May 7, 1861.

CONFEDERATE ARMY.

Lieut-Col. Corps of Cavalry C. S. A., Mar. 16, 1861. Brig-Gen'l P. A. C. S. June 17, 1861. Major Gen'l P. A. C. S. Jany. 24, 1862. Lieut-Gen'l P. A. C. S. May 23, 1863. Died at Spring Hill, Tenn, 1874.

[Mistake, died at Spring Hill Jan. 25th, 1872. I was in the house at the time.—H. A. TURNER.]

Letter of General R. S. Ewell to General Grant.

April 16, 1865,
Fort Warren.

General:

You will appreciate I am sure the sentiment which prompts me to address you. Of all the misfortunes which could befall the Southern people or any Southern man, by far the greatest in my judgment would be the prevalence of the idea that they could entertain any other than feelings of unqualified indignation and abhorrence for the assassination of the President of the U. S., and the attempt to assassinate the Secretary of State. No language can adequately express the shock produced upon myself in common with the other General Officers of the Con-

federate Army, confined with me, by the occurrence of this appalling crime, and by the seeming tendency in the public mind to connect the South and Southern men with it.

Need we say that we are not assassins, nor the allies of assassins, be they from the North or from the South; and that coming as we do from most of the States of the South, we would be ashamed of our own people, were we not assured that they will universally repudiate this crime.

Under the circumstances I could not refrain from some expression of my feelings. I thus utter them to a soldier who will fully comprehend them. The following officers, Maj. Gen's. Edward Johnson, of Virginia, and Kershaw of S. C., Brig. Gen's. Barton, Corse, Hunton and Jones of Va. Du Bose and H. R. Jackson of Ga., Frazier of Ala., Smith and Gordon from Tenn., Cabell from Arkansas, and Marmaduke of Mo. and Commodore Tucker of Va. all heartily concur with me in what I have said.

R. S. EWELL,
Lieutenant Gen. of C. S. Army.

To Gen. Grant. Lieutenant Gen. of the U. S. Army.

Letter of Colonel Thomas H. Carter.

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA.

CHARLOTTESVILLE, VA., April 14, 1899.

MY DEAR MRS. TURNER:

I am much obliged to you for copies of your interesting letter to Lieut. Col. Henderson, and the Examiner's Article. I entered the service under General Ewell at Sangster's Cross Roads with my Battery, the King Wm. Artillery, and soon formed a sincere admiration and affection for him. I never knew a more honest, frank and modest man with equal parts; indeed he never did himself justice in his opinion of himself, and was always reluctant to press his views as to the advis-

ability of his own plans. As an executive officer he was unsurpassed. He advised me in the beginning of my career with him, always, of course, to obey orders, but never to volunteer to do anything. The battle of Gettysburg was lost by Longstreet's failure to attack early in the morning of the second day, when we were up and ready (except General Lawton's Brigade, which arrived at 11 A. M. and Pickett's Division, which came too late for that day) and the enemy was scattered for twenty-five miles. He (Longstreet) attacked at 4 P. M. and naturally encountered the whole army before the evening closed, which had, during the unpardonable delay, taken possession of Little Round Top (the key) with Artillery, as well as all other available defensive points. Had he attacked early in the morning, nothing earthly could have saved the enemy from defeat, and there would have been no third day at Gettysburg.

The salient at Spottsylvania Court House, May 12th, was lost, as you state, by my Artillery being ordered out the evening before, under the supposition that the enemy was moving by flank, as reported by the Cavalry. Hancock told General Harry Heth he had 30,000 troops in the attack—the point being selected because of a notable white house on his side, as a central point. He was not aware of the salient. He also expressed the opinion that he could have carried the salient, even though the Artillery had been in position, when he attacked. It would be a sufficient reply to his surmise to say that neither he nor any one else ever saw a line of Artillery of the Army of Northern Virginia intrenched, supported by Infantry, and with open front, carried by front attack. I challenge the citation of a single instance during the war, no matter what the number of lines and troops in the attacking column—when the front lines go down those in rear are not eager to come along—the moral effect being many times greater than the physical.

General Ewell was a superb rider. His physical condition was greatly impaired by the loss of his leg. I recall most vividly his pale and anaemic face both at Gettysburg and Spottsylvania Battles. His courage was of the most constant and

undying character; nothing could demoralize it. He was devoted to fruit of any kind, especially after meals—"to take the taste of *grease* out of his mouth" he would tell me. My couriers, Percy Hawes and Powel Page, have climbed many a cherry, green apple, even mulberry tree, to get him fruit. We all admired and loved him.

Again thanking you, I am,

Sincerely yours,

(Signed): THOS. H. CARTER.

“MISSIONARY RIDGE.”

By the Rev. P. D. STEPHENSON, D. D., Private 13th Arkansas
Infantry and 5th Company Washington Artillery.

A word or two by way of introduction.

First. The “occasion” of this address is the contemplated visit of this Camp, along with the hundreds of other veterans of the Army of Northern Virginia, to Chattanooga, Tenn., to attend the reunion of the United Confederate Veterans next May. The conspicuous objects before your eyes every day while there will be Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge. Many Federal soldiers live in Chattanooga, numbers of whom probably were in the battles on those lofty heights, and no doubt some of them will delight to refer to that conflict, and even invite you to go with them and let them show you the scene of their glory and of Southern shame. While admitting the defeat and the shame of it, yet I think I can say something which will help you to meet misrepresentations and soothe the sensitiveness which your Southern blood will naturally feel while hearing their side of that sad story, for I assume that the followers of the incomparable Lee learned from him not only to make a record almost matchless in all history for heroic and victorious achievement in battle, but learned also how to catch his noble sympathy and magnanimity for the victims of adversity, especially when those victims of adversity were of their own blood, nay, brothers-in-arms, in the same cause.

Second. My first account of this battle was written immediately after the war, when every detail was vivid, like a fiery photograph before my eyes. This particular paper is substantially a copy of that account, and in its original form was a letter to two Virginia girls, who wrote me after visiting the battlefield and expressed a wish that I had been with them to explain the fight to them. When even young girls showed such a curiosity to have it explained while having the site of

that war tragedy before their very eyes, it is no wonder that President Roosevelt exulted in galloping with Prince Henry of Germany along Missionary Ridge, pointing out the steepness and height of its lofty sides and dilating on the incomparable, irresistible assault the Federals must have made in sweeping up it and scattering the Rebels from its summit in 1863. Indeed, no battlefield in America has excited more interest, and, to all who visit it, more perplexity. The universal feeling of casual observers, North or South, is amazement that an army, and especially a Southern army, could be driven from such a position as that.

A certain infallible and divine authority warns us, "judge not by appearances." In war the counsel is peculiarly apt. Take Harper's Ferry, for instance. Well do I remember the satisfaction felt in the South at the beginning of the war when our troops seized and occupied Harper's Ferry. "Impregnable position," etc., but when General Joseph E. Johnston went there he pronounced the place untenable. And when Stonewall Jackson a year or so after invested the place, he effectually demonstrated it to be so by capturing it and catching as in a trap 11,000 or more Federal troops, with immense store of war material, and by killing, in addition, their commander-in-chief and a large number of his men and wounding a still greater number.

The mere being on a hill, or even a mountain, does not guarantee security, as any old soldier knows. The real question is, "Can that hill or that mountain be flanked? And has the enemy men enough to do it?" "Thermopylae" has been useful, 'tis true, for firing the blood of school boys in fervid declamations, but if the Persians had flanked it in the first place, as they eventually did, they could have taken it without any loss at all worth mentioning.

Now, that is the way the Confederates lost Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge. They were "flanked" from both, and by overwhelmingly superior numbers of the enemy. It was foolish for General Bragg to put his men in a similar trap at Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge. But let me turn directly to my story.

Third. "Chickamauga," one of the fiercest, bloodiest battles of our war (compare list of casualties there with any of Napoleon's battles, or with any of Lee's), was fought September 19th and 20th, 1863. It was a magnificent victory for our army, a complete rout for the Federals, in which they were saved from utter destruction or capture only through the timidity of Bragg, our leader. Forrest, our chief of cavalry, implored Bragg to "follow them up," describing at the same time the enemy's thorough demoralization and disorganization, both of men and officers, even to corps commanders. Bragg refused, yet about 6,000 fresh reinforcements were reported as having arrived for him just after his foe broke and turned to fly. On such things the fate of armies and nations and the coloring of the future often depend. The two armies were about equally matched, the Federals somewhat superior in numbers.

"Missionary Ridge," a rout equally complete as that of the enemy at Chickamauga, and one of the most disgraceful that Southern arms sustained, was fought just a little over two months after, viz: on November 25th and 26th, 1863, and by the same Southern army that almost demolished their foe at Chickamauga.

How can such an astonishing paradox be explained? The explanation, after all, is simple, although made up of several elements. First, it was the sickly season, and the bulk or a large part of our army spent those intervening "two months" in the swampy "bottom" of the Chickamauga River, one of the crookedest of streams, making miles of "bottom land," which heavy rains could convert into a vast morass or quagmire. This, in fact, is just what happened. The heavy rains came, making sickness worse, making our bivouacs bogs, making roads impassable, cutting off supplies of every kind from us, and reducing us by November 25th and 26th to an army of half-sick (even those "fit for duty"), half-starved, half-clothed men, our ranks thinned by the thousands under medical care. To put this picture nakedly before you I give one fact, well known at the time, and a fact I can take my oath on, for I saw it myself, incredible as it may seem. Just as you drew near to

our bivouac (we had no tents or shelter save "booths" of tree branches and little "fly tents"), in the middle of the main road (which was a lake of mud 50 or 60 feet or more wide) a long stake stuck up with a board sign on it. On the board was written, "Mule underneath here." A mule had actually sunk out of sight in the mud at that spot.

Imagine, then, if you can, the state of all the camps throughout that vast bog and the condition of the men after two months' sojourn there! The wonder is that there was any fight left in any of us at all.

Confirmation of the sickliness of "Chickamauga Bottom" came in the Spanish-American War in 1898, when even in that late day the "camp of instruction" established there became one vast hospital.

"Why did we not camp on 'Mission Ridge,' at the foot of which we lay?" Answers are many; one is sufficient. There was no water. An army must have water, and plenty of it. A few men were on the Ridge all the time, and when Bragg, our leader, was compelled to change from the "offensive" to the "defensive," he, toward the end of the "two months," 'threw up a slight breastwork of logs, rails, etc., here and there along the Ridge, and put his half-sick, disgusted and demoralized army behind these shabby defences. That is, he put what was left of his army behind them! And this brings me to reason No. 2 for our defeat, namely:

General Bragg committed the fatal and astounding blunder of weakening his already much-reduced force (reduced by sickness, etc), weakening it by sending from one-third to nearly one-half thereof, under General Longstreet, far away, to Knoxville, to invest and capture that place; did this in the face of the ever-increasing numbers of the enemy (which it would have been criminal for him to have been ignorant of), and in face also of the fact that his position on Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain was untenable save by a large army. This is seen easily by anyone familiar with the ground. For instance, the distance to be defended was vast. Lookout Mountain itself,

separated from Missionary Ridge by a wide valley (a half mile or so wide), had an enormous area to defend, and could easily be "turned" (*i. e.*, taken from the rear) unless held by a force large enough to meet attack from all points of its great area. And once "taken," it practically "enfilades" the Ridge, commanding completely its left end, much of its center and also the valley between it and the Ridge. In other words, "Lookout," once taken, the battle practically was won; that is, against the little force Grant must have known Bragg had reduced himself to. Now, that is exactly what happened. Bragg could spare for the defense of that huge Lookout Mountain the pitiful little force of about three or four thousand men. Grant's army when it attacked had grown to 100,000 men or more. He first "flanked" by a heavy column our little force off from "Lookout" and gained it. There was but desultory, feeble fighting, but little opportunity or occasion for fighting, and but few casualties. They gained our rear with ease, attacking at the same time in front, and our handful of men had great difficulty in escaping capture. Many, indeed, were captured.

"The Battle in the Clouds" Northern historians call it. The term excites a smile with all who know the facts. Our men fought until they saw fighting meant being surrounded, captured and sent to a Northern prison. The enemy behaved well, showed themselves to be soldiers in doing what they did; but, as to fighting, it wasn't the thing to do. The thing to do was to hold our men engaged in front while their flanking force gained their rear and edged them off of the mountain or captured them. Most of our men escaped, but they secured the mountain, which was, of course, their main object.

General Grant next day used the same strategy as to Missionary Ridge and our main army, then, posted thereon. Here, too, the distances to be defended were even greater, viz: just as long as the Ridge itself to where there is a "pass" or "gap," which afforded an opportunity to "flank" or "turn" our position. This distance, possibly, is from four to six miles. The "Ridge" at the far right (as you stand on it and face Chatta-

nooga) breaks up into steep hills, almost mountains, and furnishes chances for "flanking." Now, this whole long distance had to be covered by what was left of our army.

Consider, then, the picture presented on the second and decisive day. The two armies faced each other: one (ours) on Missionary Ridge; Grant's, in the valley or low ground, a mile or so outside of Chattanooga, toward us (the bulk of it, that is), in a line curving around our left up on top of Lookout Mountain and enfilading "our left" and stretching at the other end (opposite "our right") far beyond our right and threatening to turn that flank also. What a spectacle of power they presented, two solid black lines, one behind the other, each in two ranks, stretching, each end out of sight, clear beyond the whole length of the valley! A spectacle of power, emphasized, indeed, to our eyes as we dropped them to look, by contrast, to our own line, scanty and full of gaps, along the ridge. They had 100,000 men and over; we had about 25,000 or 26,000 enfeebled men, thinned out (to cover that long distance) to such attenuation that there was but one "rank" of us, and in places this single rank was made up of men five to seven or eight feet apart. Such was the picture when morning broke into a lovely winter day, the 26th of November, 1863.

Grant attacked, and his move was a move on both flanks, our left and our right (four to six miles apart, possibly). On our left he sent General Hooker, with a flanking column of many thousands ("40,000" was the camp talk after the battle) right through that wide valley between Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge. We had little more than a skirmish line there, if that. We had not men enough to put there. Hooker hardly fired a shot, for he met but few men to fire at. He simply walked through that valley, then, turning around upon the rear of our left and center, he halted and awaited orders. Those orders came in the afternoon, when, by preconcerted signal, he and the army along the front of our left and center were to charge at one and the same time and coop up our entrapped men in a certain destruction or capture.

And that charge took place. It was well planned and gallantly executed. But was there any "fighting" worthy of the name? Very little. Our men knew the trap they were in, saw the "Yankees" close in on them on front flank and rear. They fought, and fought well, until that fact was unmistakable, and then they "broke" and ran out of the "trap." That charge on our left and center (from front flank and rear) was made about 4 P. M. Up to that time no "fighting" of any general or sustained character occurred in that section of the field at all. Moore's Alabama Brigade, Bates' Tennessee Brigade and a number of our batteries resisted desperately in the "center" when the "big charge" came, but the most of our men made but a feeble stand. They saw the "trap," and refused to stay in it. I do not blame them. To realize how literally true this is, take the testimony of Dana, Lincoln's Attorney-General, who was back near Chattanooga, watching events. Says he, in his book: "The frontal attack began at 4 P. M., and took just 40 minutes" (by his watch, held open in his hand). Why? His men met with little or no resistance. Our troops were preparing to leave that trap. That frontal attack would never have gained the crest at all had not our men known that a force much larger than our whole army was already in their rear.

These facts explode the commonly accepted idea that "Missionary Ridge" was a "magnificent illustration of Yankee heroism." Beyond losing their breath in pulling up the steep ridge (several hundred feet in height), the chargers suffered little inconvenience. The slight casualties reported (slight for such an army and such a charge) and the absurd shortness of time taken to gain the crest both tell the story.

And again, I say, our men did right in leaving such a palpable trap.

Was there no "blame" anywhere, then? Oh, yes! But not on our men. The blame was on our General for egregious blunders committed, the culminating one being his getting his army in such a position. Bragg, indeed, after letting his opportunity slip at Chickamauga, seemed to lose his head. The whole two

months afterward were marked by blunder after blunder. Far better would it have been had he evacuated Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain without any fight at all.

While our left and center were thus defeated, what was our “right wing” doing?

We come now to the only creditable part of the battle of Missionary Ridge—the conduct of the “right wing.” The “right wing” was held by Hardee’s Corps, and the most of it, about 8,000 men, was commanded by Major-General Pat R. Cleburne in person. This force formed the extreme right of the “right wing” (and of the whole army), and held the crucial position, for it covered our communications. This position the enemy did its best to “turn.” General W. T. Sherman commanded them in person, and had 25,000 men. (See his own book.) He hurled these thousands against us in charge after charge all day long, but they were routed every time, with heavy loss. In some places they got to our lines (for instance, in front of the “Second Arkansas” of our Govan’s Brigade), but our men, out of ammunition, fought them back with stones and clubbed muskets, and ran them down the hill. Some 2,000 prisoners were in our hands on the “right wing” when the day closed. I give “camp talk” after the battle. I saw several hundred myself. Their canteens and those of the dead and wounded were filled with whiskey, except what they had drunk. This may explain their recklessness. When night came we on “the right” were rejoicing over our “great victory,” not knowing what had befallen our “center and left.” About 10 o’clock that night we were told that we must fall back and form the rear guard of the rest of our army, which had been defeated! The enemy was between us and them, and we had to make a great detour and march all night to reach our retreating army. We did so, saving them thereby, and most of our wagon train. The enemy followed, but timidly. On the early morning of the 28th (I think) they grew bolder, and at Ringgold, Ga., we gave them a bad and bloody beating. We had just forded, whilst deep, the Chickamauga River, and the battle afforded us

exercise sufficient to dry our clothes! The Federals let us alone after that! We stood in line on Taylor's Ridge (where we fought) four hours, offering battle. Then fell back a half mile or so to another ridge until 10 or 11 o'clock that night, but they came not. Then, in utmost leisure, after wagon trains and army were perfectly secure, we retired to Tunnell Hill, Ga., where we spent the winter, the army itself being six miles behind us at Dalton, Ga. Such is the plain, unvarnished account of "Missionary Ridge." The truth as to that shameful disaster is that General Bragg, and not his army, was to blame. It was a case of glaring outgeneralship as to our commander, not of cowardice as to our men. Bragg was a good officer in some respects, but had not "military genius" nor capacity for handling great bodies of men. He was brave and a Christian gentleman, but a "routine man," not equal to emergencies.

Only a few months after, in May, 1864, General Joseph E. Johnston took the same army, terribly demoralized by sickness, hardship, shame and humiliation over defeat, and with it fought the superb, unsurpassed Dalton-Atlanta campaign against an enemy two and one-half times his size, inflicting losses on him equal to the strength of his whole army, as testified to by their own newspapers, and never losing a gun or a wagon in any of the constant and bloody engagements that occurred. Such was the story I told the two young Virginia girls. In order to stir to thought others of our young people whose eyes may fall upon this sketch, I beg to add my closing words to them: "You are of the few young people who now take any interest in the war between the North and South. In the name of every old Confederate veteran and of the State that bore you, whose soil was soaked with their sacrificial blood, so freely shed for you, I take off my hat to you! I thank you!"

CONCLUSION.

In closing, indulge me, won't you please, while I present to you the following considerations:

First. The finest army in the world can be ruined by the incompetency or unfitness of its commander.

When Washington arrived on that battlefield where he found General Charles Lee leading his army in a shameful flight from before the face of the British, he ordered Lee sternly to the rear, took charge of the routed army himself, faced them about, checked the pursuit, and at least saved them from destruction. Why? The men were the same. But their leader had been changed. Under Albert Sidney Johnston, at Shiloh, the impetus he gave to the Army of Tennessee lasted even after his death; nay, did not cease until they formed their line of battle for a last charge to push their routed foe into the Tennessee River. That foe, which that morning was a magnificent army, far superior to themselves in numbers and equipment, they now looked down on from the ridge they stood on as a great mob, cowering, all disorganized and whipped, huddled together like sheep in a little triangle formed by the river and Shiloh Creek. Why did they not go forward and complete their work? Alas! they had changed commanders! And their new commander ordered them to halt and retire! And lo! the victory was lost! Just at the very moment when certain destruction at their hands awaited the army of General Grant! What was the matter? The men were the same! Ah, but their leader had been changed! Bedford Forrest's men got "rattled" once, and came hustling around him, crying, "They're in our rear! They're in our rear!" "Well," said Forrest, "aren't we in their rear, too? Get in line, there, and come on!" Suppose Forrest had fallen! Suppose that dauntless, unconquerable soul had been removed! What effect, think you, would it have had upon his men?

The Army of Tennessee, comrades, was ruined by the incompetency of its commanders. All, except one; nay, two—the two Johnstons. The first Johnston, alas, fell under the shadow of death early, at Shiloh, in his first battle; the second had an even sadder fate. He lived, but only to struggle vainly under the shadow of his President's deep distrust, if not dislike, and to have set before him tasks impossible for him to perform. It

is not my purpose here to go into all this. But suffer one question: Is it not strange that Robert E. Lee, nor Dabney H. Maury, nor Stephen D. Lee, nor any other man borrowed by us from your State or from the Army of Northern Virginia ever lost confidence in Joseph E. Johnston? Nay, nor in the Army of Tennessee while under his command? As to Johnston, did not the Government itself retract its distrust at the last, and in the most desperate moment of its existence lean to him for succor and salvation, along with General Lee? Who were the right and left arm of Davis and the Confederacy in the last extremity? Those two Virginians, Joseph E. Johnston and Robert E. Lee. Who held the back door of the Confederacy against the hordes of Sherman whilst Lee held you of the Army of Northern Virginia facing Grant at Petersburg? Joseph E. Johnston. What army was that which he led? The battered remnant of the unfortunate, discredited old Army of Tennessee, in large part, that had washed its hands in the waters of the Ohio, or fought its way through the gaps of East Tennessee or West Virginia, or sent its men to defend Vicksburg, Miss., and Baton Rouge, La., or the city on the Gulf of Mexico itself, Mobile, Ala.: who spared thousands of its men even at one time to save the trans-Mississippi States! And now behold it! Fighting its *last* battle far east, on *North Carolina soil!* Truly, no "pent-up Utica" was ours! Almost the whole vast Confederacy, outside of Virginia, herself, heard the rattle of our musketry, the thunder of our guns and the unconquered yell of our ragged, barefooted men! Such was the territory we were drawn from from time to time to defend. That last battle, Bentonville, N. C., found the Army of Tennessee 12,000 strong, *i. e.*, fit for duty. These, added to Hardee's men, made Joseph E. Johnston's last army a little army of 22,000 men. He hurled them at Sherman's 90,000, taking them by surprise, fighting them for two days and pushing back their left wing over a mile. Their very last battle act was a successful charge. The news of Lee's surrender alone put an end to the fighting of the Army of Tennessee. Their presence in North Carolina

so far east, so far from their homes, which half or more of them had not seen for years, that, too, when they knew that all was lost, attests their fidelity, does it not? But does it not, incidentally, do more? It was a tribute to their unbounded confidence in and devotion to Johnston. Men from Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, Missouri, Mississippi, Tennessee, Kentucky, etc., went thousands of miles from their homes *at the call of their old commander!* What nobler, more convincing proof can you give me of a man's capacity to command? Could an "incompetent" man command men's hearts and wills and actions and loyalty and lives like that?

Second. General Bragg was a stranger to his men to the last. He commanded the Army of Tennessee the most of its corporate existence, viz: from the last of May, 1862, to about December 1st, 1863. Kept over us, I have always thought, by President Davis. From first to last he was unpopular with the men and a stranger to them. Soon after assuming command he had a man shot for stealing a chicken. This has been denied, but I remember well the report, and that it was believed universally by the men. Austere, morose, rarely showing himself, known only to his men by his military orders, the feeling toward him grew into positive dislike. And yet that army followed him, followed and obeyed him, endured hunger, hardships, rags and nakedness for him, fought repeated battles for him, and, in two especially, among the largest and bloodiest of the war, Murfreesboro and Chickamauga, that army performed deeds of valor never surpassed anywhere, and yet *in all and through all*, with no love for *him* and little confidence *in him*. In both of these battles last mentioned they felt their failure to deliver a crushing blow to the enemy was due *to him*. 'Tis said the Southern soldier would not take discipline. What was it, then, kept the long-suffering Army of Tennessee following a man they neither liked nor had confidence in? If not discipline, it was something nobler, grander, was it not? Yea, verily, it was patriotism! One of the sublimest object lessons on patriotism the world ever saw. It is not surprising when

on Missionary Ridge these men saw those two lines of the enemy extending unbroken and two ranks deep from one end of the valley to the other until both ends were lost to view and learned from reliable sources that heavy columns were in their rear, and then, when the attack came, had it verified by the actual firing behind them; little wonder, I say, it is that the patience of that army with their commander was exhausted and they refused to remain in the trap and go to prison for him.

Third. You and I, my comrades, are getting old. Life, this life, mostly, is behind us! What have we found in it, after all (except those of us who have found a Saviour and fought a still more glorious fight under Him); what, I say, have we found in this life in itself *comparable to the Glory of our Youth!* That war, despite its horrors, made us a "chosen generation!" It found us boys and made us men! It awakened in our hearts and exhibited in our lives the noblest emotions and motives and virtues that human nature is capable of. It developed in us tireless energies, a nobler contempt for danger, a calm and cheerful fortitude, an unconquerable patience and perseverance in surmounting difficulties and privations, a fearless familiarity with battle, peril and death, an unselfish sharing of all we had with comrades, even to the last crumb of bread or drop of water; a devotion to an ideal, even to self-effacement; a scorn for meanness, desertion, selfishness, faithlessness to duty; it made us true judges of human nature, with power to distinguish the true from the false, despite conventionalities; it packed the pages of history with our deeds; it will make us live in song and story; it trained us for the longer and more corrupting battle which came after, the battle with the world, the battle we have been in ever since, and it helped us to play a good part in this fight also, for the Confederate soldier has made a good name for himself in peace as well as in war!

Fourth. Nor must we in our review of that war and its prominent actors, make the common mistake of going to extremes. We must not, in our estimate of General Bragg, allow his defects as a commander to blind us to his virtues as a

man. A man of pure life, a man of high character and incorruptible principle, a patriot loyal to the core, high-minded and self-sacrificing to the very end. One of the glories of the Southern army is that no Benedict Arnold was developed from among all of its hundreds, nay thousands, of generals from first to last of that fearfully trying war. It is ungrateful and insulting to even associate the thought with the stainless name of Braxton Bragg. Bragg, at the end, is found fighting desperately in that last battle at Bentonville, N. C., fighting as a subordinate officer, a voluntary subordinate officer, not merely under Johnston, but under his own old corps commander, General Hardee! Noble and illustrious object-lesson of the spirit that actuated everyone, both of the officers and men, who can say, with honest pride, *"I was in at the death, I was at my post of duty when the surrender came; when my stricken, exhausted country breathed her last, I was there, at her side, faithful to her! Faithful to the very end! That is better than victories! That is better than the victor's pension!"*

Blessed is the rule you have, my comrades, in this Camp, viz: of exacting from every applicant but one inflexible test: "Were you a good soldier? Were you faithful to your oath? Did you stay at your post? Did you keep faith and do your duty?" That exalted rule, my comrades, kept inflexibly, makes of us a band of brothers indeed, illustrious by reason of the tie that binds, by reason of the records that verify it, by reason of the memories that on an occasion like this bridge the whole past intervening 50 years and bring back into our hearts the surging tumultuous emotions of our youth, the high resolves and purposes and deeds, the flushed cheek and flashing eye, the honest ennobling affections one for another, the vanished faces and forms of comrades cut down by our sides, the dauntless daring and doing, the loving sharing of our all one with another, the buoyant, hopeful, joyous, careless, confident enthusiasm of our immortal youth! Therefore, my comrades, although of another army, I feel myself one of you; I feel myself among a band of brothers. It may be some of you differ from me in some

things I have said. If so, all right. If, nevertheless, I have thrown some light on the subjects brought before you, and especially on the battles of Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, I am content; my object has been gained.

Thank you, comrades and friends, for your patient and kind attention.

CONFEDERATE GOLD.

Thrilling Experience of Major Joseph M. Broun, to whom
was entrusted some Hundreds of Thousands
of Confederate Money.

To the *Chattanooga Times*:

I hand you for publication the following interesting papers:

1. Letter to me from W. E. B. Byrne, dated Feb. 8.
2. Statement of Maj. Joseph M. Broun, "The Last Confederate Pay-roll."
3. "Biographical Sketch of Maj. Broun, Confederate Military History, Vol. II."

These papers are corroborative of the story printed in many papers in which I gave an account of the capture by some rebel soldiers, after the surrender, of the gold wagon train on its return journey to Richmond.

Very respectfully,

LEWIS SHEPHERD.

Feb. 18, 1914.

Dear Sir:—Having seen in the Literary Digest of the 7th of February, 1914, your account of the disappearance of the "Confederate treasure," my attention was called to a statement relative to the subject made by Maj. Joseph M. Broun, deceased. Maj. Broun died in this city on the 6th day of December, 1868, and after his death there was found among his papers the statement in his own handwriting, a copy of which I take the liberty of enclosing. I also enclose the biographical sketch of Maj. Broun, copied from Volume I, "Confederate Military History."

Thinking it likely that these documents might throw some additional light upon the subject and that they would be of interest to you, it occurred to me to send them for such use as you may see fit to make.

Yours very respectfully,

W. E. R. BYRNE.

THE LAST CONFEDERATE PAYROLL.

In April-May, 1865, while President Davis and cabinet, with Gens. Braggs, Breckenridge and others, and some twenty-five hundred troops, were between Abbeville, S. C., and Washington, Ga., Gen. Toombs' home, I (as a bonded quartermaster), was ordered to receipt for the gold and specie estimated at about \$150,000, then in the wagon train with the president. This gold had been brought from Richmond, Va., in special charge of a company of naval cadets, as I was informed. The enemy was still around us. Our own boys had become demoralized about this gold. They said if they didn't take it, the quartermaster or the Yankees would. That was one time it was not pleasant or safe to be a quartermaster. Discipline was gone. But Gen. Breckenridge, in his mature manhood, was equal to the occasion. In an old Kentucky hunting jacket, he appeared before the men, now almost a mob. He told them they were Southern gentlemen and Confederate soldiers. They must not become highway robbers. They knew how to die bravely; they must live honorably.

He promised them an orderly distribution of enough of the gold to help each one on his way, whether to his home or to the trans-Mississippi department, where good fighting might yet be done. The men were readily controlled and became quiet and content.

Gen. Bragg, a few of his staff and I, then went to the "gold train" (which we usually tried to conceal). Under Gen. Bragg's directions each of us took about a quart of gold coin and tied it

up in his handkerchief, as if it were of no great value, so as not to arouse the suspicion of the boys we would pass. With this treasure uncounted we proceeded back to the town of Washington (some miles), where I opened a pay office, Gen. Bragg still present and superintending the payment. Each soldier, as he presented himself at the window, received a \$20 gold piece and receipted to me therefor. When the soldiers ceased coming, there remained on the table two twenties and one ten. Gen. Bragg, turning to me said: "Captain, you estimate closely. Receipt to yourself for what is left and close the account." I pocketed the \$50 and signed the payroll therefor. Immediately after this payment we all disbanded, each man going his way. This was the last act of the Confederate Government so far as I know. The following night President Davis was captured by the Federal soldiers.

Gen. Bragg and other officers had previously started my receipt list at \$20 each. This payroll I gave as a souvenir to Mrs. William A. Pope, the wife of my intimate friend, William A. Pope. We had been schoolboys together at Frank Minor's Ridgeway Academy, 1851-2, near Charlottesville, Va., and I, when a student, '55-6, at Georgia University, had visited him. I had been stationed at Washington, Ga., January, '65. I had seen leather belts for carrying specie made by the ladies of Washington, Ga. These I had understood were for the use of those Confederate officers who desired prompt flight from their country; and I was informed that Gen. Toombs and others, to aid their escape, did take with them, very properly, as much of this gold as they could conveniently carry in their respective belts. The residue of this gold (I was informed), was deposited in a bank vault at Washington, Ga. Shortly after the surrender some bankers of Richmond, claiming this gold as their private property, and denying that it ever had been Confederate property, undertook to transport it back to Richmond, Va., overland in wagons, before the railroads had been restored to operation. This gold train en route was partly robbed a time or two, when finally the United States Government took

charge of the gold, some one hundred thousand dollars, and deposited it in the treasury at Washington, where it still remains, unsettled as to the ownership.

JOSEPH M. BROWN.

When the Confederate Government abandoned Richmond as its capital all its archives and treasures were sent, under strong military escort, to Charlotte, N. C. The banks of Richmond sent away their treasure under protection of the same escort; President Davis and his Cabinet also came to Charlotte and established temporary headquarters.

Before they reached Charlotte, Richmond and Petersburg had fallen and General Lee had surrendered, and in a very few days Sherman and Johnston had agreed upon an armistice by their celebrated paper under which it was proposed that peace should be made and that the seceding States should resume their relations to the Government. This treaty, if it had been carried out, would have obviated reconstruction, under what is known as the Reconstruction Acts of Congress, for it covered the entire subject of restoration of peace and return of the Southern States to the Union and of their Senators and Representatives to Congress. This armistice was repudiated by President Johnson and his Cabinet, on the ground that these military commanders had exceeded their powers in undertaking to settle the terms on which the erring States might resume their political functions with the general Government.

It may be admitted that these generals went a little further than they had the right to go, but it can not be denied that they displayed a profound statesmanship in their comprehensive yet terse settlement of a question which afterward so sorely disturbed Congress, so nearly caused the conviction upon impeachment of the President, and so completely bankrupted the Southern States.

Mr. Davis, being advised that President Johnson had brought an end to the armistice and repudiated the Sherman-Johnston treaty, immediately began efforts to prevent the capture of him-

self and the treasures of the Confederacy. The gold and silver of the Confederacy and that of the Richmond banks were loaded into wagons, and the President of the Confederate States, with his Cabinet Ministers, started South with it, guarded by three brigades of cavalry—Dibrell's, Vaughan's, and Dyke's. When we arrived at Washington, Ga., it became apparent to Mr. Davis that he could not with such a retinue escape the vigilance of the Federal cavalry, which was rapidly closing in on him from every direction, so the money kegs and boxes belonging to the Confederate Government were opened and the silver divided among the boys, each, without regard to rank, receiving \$22.50, and they were granted indefinite furloughs. Mr. Davis and his family pushed on further South, and was a few days afterward captured by the Federals.

Meanwhile the officers of the banks sought the aid of the Federal commander to return their specie to Richmond, and from them obtained a permit and also a guard of soldiers to protect it on its return trip. Some of the officers and men of Vaughan's brigade became apprized that a train of specie was being carried North under Federal escort, and they jumped to the conclusion that it was the property of the Confederate Government which the Federals had captured. They concluded that their four years of hard service for the Confederacy entitled them to a share of this gold and silver, provided they could succeed in securing it from the Federal guard. With them the war was not yet over, and they acted upon the idea that anything is fair in war. They organized an expedition with the view of capturing this money and followed the train until a favorable opportunity of attack presented itself. They charged the train, captured and disarmed the guard, and proceeded at once to knock the heads out of the kegs and the lids off the boxes containing the coin and to fill their forage sacks with ten and twenty-dollar gold pieces. Several of them got away with as much as \$60,000; some were content with \$25,000, and still others with less amounts, depending upon the carrying capacity of their sacks and saddle-bags.

One man began to fill his sack out of the first keg he came to, which proved to be a keg of silver. He was happy when he lugged off his bag of silver dollars, but when he met his companions later in the rendezvous, where they stopped to count their money, he found that he had only about \$4,000, while his companions had secured several times that sum in gold, while his was in silver. He became greatly disturbed over his ill-luck and insisted that his more fortunate brothers divide their gold with him. This they refused to do, and he then determined to turn informer. He was as good as his word, and upon the information furnished by this silver king, several of the gold-bugs were apprehended and forced to give up their booty. But a number of them were wise enough to keep going until they got safe from the scene of their capture.

I personally know several of the men who got some of the swag. Two of these men went with their money, amounting to more than \$120,000, to Kansas City, Mo., where they engaged in business, becoming men of large wealth. Two others went to California, and with something more than \$100,000 they embarked in business. One of the wealthiest planters in Texas got his start with money secured from those kegs, and still another in the same State has made good as a stockman, being now a cattle king.

FROM CONFEDERATE MILITARY HISTORY.

(Vol. II.)

Capt. Joseph M. Broun, of Charleston, W. Va., was born at Middleburg, Va., Dec. 23, 1835, a descendant of William Broun, a Scotchman of French descent, who settled in Westmoreland county and practiced law in the colonial period. He was educated at the Ridgeway Academy, the University of Virginia in 1853-'54, and the University of Georgia in 1855. During 1857 he was with the command of Col. Joseph E. Johnston, employed in marking the thirty-seventh parallel between Kansas and Indian Territory, and in 1850 he was engaged in teaching at

Bloomfield Academy, near the University of Virginia, under his brother, Prof. William LeRoy Broun, now a distinguished educator residing at Auburn, Ala. He studied law at the University during 1859 and 1860, and in the fall of the latter year entered the practice with his brother, Maj. T. L. Broun, at Charleston, Kanawha county. At that place, previous to the war, he became a member of the Kanawha Rifles, under Capt. George S. Patton, and in December, while using one of the flintlock muskets with which the company were equipped, was badly crippled in the left arm by the explosion of the piece. For this reason he was not mustered in with the company in the spring of 1861, but in July of that year he accompanied his brother and a force of Boone and Logan county volunteers up the Big Coal river, meeting Gen. Wise at White Sulphur Springs. Subsequently he was appointed by Gen. Wise captain and assistant quartermaster of the Third Wise Legion, which upon the reorganization under Gen. Lee, became the Sixtieth regiment, Virginia infantry. In December following he accompanied the regiment, under Gen. Lee's command, to Pocotaligo, S. C. In May, 1862, the regiment was with the army of Gen. J. E. Johnston before Richmond, but in June Capt. Broun was again ordered to South Carolina and stationed at Georgetown. Remaining in this department, he was transferred, in 1864, to Augusta, Ga., where he remained until early in the spring of 1865, when he was ordered to report in person to the quartermaster at Richmond. Starting upon the journey, notwithstanding the interference of Gen. Sherman with safe and comfortable travel at that time, he proceeded in company with Maj. Hill, a wounded Georgia soldier, in a wagon drawn by mules, until he reached Abbeville, where he learned the fate of Richmond, the surrender of Lee and the assassination of President Lincoln. Near this point President Davis had arrived, escorted by a body of mounted Kentuckians and Tennesseans, chiefly Duke's, Vaughan's and Dibrell's brigades, with whom Capt. Broun and Maj. Hill turned back to Georgia. Quartermaster-General Lawton placed Capt. Broun in charge of the specie wagon train, and

the dangerous and delicate trust was faithfully executed. President Davis, foreseeing that the large escort would invite attack from the enemy, directed the troops to break up into small squads and make their way through the country to the department commanded by Gen. Kirby Smith. At first the men refused to leave the President. One Texan, who enjoyed a remarkable resemblance to Mr. Davis, urged him to exchange personality in order to facilitate his escape, proposing to take the risk of the Confederate Presidency and turn over to Mr. Davis his ranger's uniform. But the President refused, declaring that he would assume no disguise during his retreat to the West. Capt. Broun was informally promoted major by the president and continued in charge of the specie until it was finally disposed of under orders, undergoing not a few perils in this duty. After separating from Mr. Davis, he accompanied Maj. Hill to Athens, surrendered at Augusta, and finally returned to his home in Virginia. Resuming the practice of law at Charleston, he has become distinguished in his profession.

THE BATTLE OF BOONSBORO GAP OR SOUTH MOUNTAIN.

By Judge **GEORGE D. GRATTAN**, *Harrisonburg, Va.*, Captain
and **A. A. G. Staff of General Colquitt.**

The interest centered upon the battle of Sharpsburg, which is generally conceded to have been the bloodiest and most stubbornly contested battle of the Civil War, has served to almost obliterate the memory of the minor engagement of Boonsboro Gap, or South Mountain as it is called in all the official reports of the Federal officers. For this reason I am moved to call to mind some facts in connection with the Boonsboro Gap fight, with the hope that fuller justice may be done to General D. H. Hill, and the brave men who fought with him on that day.

In order that the importance of that battle may be known and appreciated, it is necessary to recount some of the events and circumstances connected with it. Without entering into a discussion of the much mooted question as to who was responsible for the loss of the copy of General Lee's order directing the movements of his troops for the capture of Harper's Ferry, which fell into the possession of General McClellan on the morning of the 13th of September, 1862, it is sufficient to say that this order, which gave full information as to the movements of the several commands of Lee's army for some days to come, was fully appreciated by General McClellan, and afforded him the best opportunity of dividing the Confederate army and defeating it in detail, which could have been hoped for, and if he and his men had been more active and efficient and the Confederates less watchful and courageous, the result might have been disastrous. This order (a copy of which can be seen in the Official Records of the War, Vol. 10, part I, page 603) informed General McClellan that more than half of Lee's

army would be with General Jackson engaged in surrounding and capturing Harper's Ferry, while General Longstreet with part of his command, and Hill's Division, would be between Boonsboro and Hagerstown, with the Potomac River separating them from General Jackson. McClellan was not slow to see the opportunity the information he had by good fortune obtained, gave him to strike Lee's army in detail: while General Lee calculating upon McClellan's usual caution, did not expect any attack before General Jackson could accomplish the capture of Harper's Ferry and rejoin him on the north side of the Potomac.

At 12 M. on the 13th, McClellan, in the exuberance of his joy in securing the order, telegraphed President Lincoln from his headquarters at Frederick, Md., as follows: "I think Lee has made a great mistake, and that he will be severely punished for it. The army is in motion as rapidly as possible. I hope for a great success if the plans of the rebels remain unchanged. We have possession of Catoclin. I have all the plans of the rebels, and will catch them in their own trap, if my men are equal to the emergency. I now feel that I can count on them as of old. My respects to Mrs. Lincoln. Will send you trophies. All well and with God's blessing will accomplish it." General G. B. McClellan shortly afterward sent a more extended telegram to General Halleck, in which he spoke of this order, and said that there was no doubt about its genuineness.

He had already ordered General Franklin with the 6th corps to attack McLaws at Crampton's Gap, as soon as he heard the guns open the fight at Boonsboro Gap, where he told General Franklin he was sending the rest of his troops to carry that position.

Franklin was also directed, after driving McLaws from Crampton's Gap, to push through and relieve Miles at Harper's Ferry, and uniting Miles' large force with his own, to destroy the bridges on the Potomac River, and to press on to Sharpsburg and Williamsport. This order to Franklin concludes as follows: "My general idea is to cut the enemy in two, and beat him in detail. I ask of you at this important moment all your

intellect and the utmost activity that a general can exercise." The telegram to Lincoln and the orders to Franklin and other commanders are set forth in full in the Official Records of the War, Series No. I., page 231, and in McClellan's official report, Vol. 19, page 49.

It is plain to see with what importance General McClellan viewed his attack at Boonsboro Gap, and with what hope and spirit he commenced this battle with his whole army, except Franklin's corps, which was engaged at the same time at Crampton's Gap, in the same general purpose. General Lee in his official report of the capture of Harper's Ferry and operations in Maryland, speaking of this battle, says: "The resistance that had been offered to the enemy at Boonsboro, secured sufficient time to enable General Jackson to complete the reduction of Harper's Ferry." If he had known when he wrote that report what is so plain to us now, he could well have added, "and foiled General McClellan's ambitious purpose 'to cut the enemy in two, and beat him in detail.'"

Believing that full enough has been said in reference to the circumstances under which this battle was fought, to demonstrate its importance, and effect, I proceed to give account of the battle itself. My opportunity for personal knowledge of most of the movements of the troops in this engagement arises from the fact that I, a lieutenant in the 6th Georgia Regiment, had been called by Colonel Colquitt to serve as his Aide, while in command of the brigade, afterwards known as Colquitt's Brigade, and at that time forming a part of the division of General D. H. Hill.

This brigade was the first on the field, having been ordered by General Hill to occupy the pass on the evening of the 13th, at which time I was with Colonel Colquitt, when he made an examination of the ground. I was also with him early the next morning when in company with General Hill he again went over the field, and as our brigade held the road in the center of the line, and was not vigorously attacked until about four o'clock in the afternoon of the 14th, I in carrying messages be-

tween Colonel Colquitt and General Hill was necessarily in all parts of the field, and had a good opportunity to observe most of the movements of the different troops.

On the afternoon of the 13th, while in camp near Boonsboro, the town situated on the west side of the South Mountain, and not far from the pass, Colonel Colquitt received an order from General Hill to move his brigade to the top of the mountain to guard the pass, where the pike leading from Frederick City to Hagerstown crosses the South Mountain, known as Boonsboro or Turner's Gap.

We reached the top of the mountain with the head of the line, at about the same time General Stuart, with his cavalry falling back from Frederick City, got there. The infantry was ordered to move to the side of the road while the cavalry passed down the West side of the mountain, and as this was being done, Colonel Colquitt had a conference on the road-side with General Stuart, at which I, as his aide, was present, and heard what General Stuart said in regard to the advance of the enemy. My distinct recollection is that General Stuart reported that there were no troops following him but cavalry and that Colonel Colquitt would have no difficulty in holding the pass with his brigade. I remember that Colonel Colquitt requested that two companies of Cavalry might be left with him for picket duty, but General Stuart thought it unnecessary, and declined to leave them. Colonel William Allan, in his "Account of the Sharpsburg Campaign," says that General Stuart learned from a friendly citizen of Maryland, on the afternoon of the 13th, that the lost order had come into the possession of McClellan, and so informed General Lee. Colonel Allan is generally remarkably accurate in all his statements, but I am very sure that in this he was mistaken. Certainly General Stuart, at sundown on the 13th, when he met Colonel Colquitt, had no such information, and General Hill in his official report says that General Stuart afterwards, on the same evening, told him that "only two brigades of cavalry were following him, and that one brigade of infantry could hold the pass.

Neither General Stuart nor General Lee mentioned any such fact in their official reports, and I am constrained to think that for once Colonel Allan was wrongly informed. After General Stuart's cavalry had passed down the mountain, Colonel Colquitt moved his brigade to the east side of the mountain and formed a line of battle about half day down and across the Frederick and Hagerstown pike.

By this time it was growing dark, and as the enemy did not make any attack, the brigade was ordered to move for the night back to the top of the mountain, and pickets were sent out in advance, and also on the two narrow mountain roads leading from the Mountain House at the pass; one to the right and south at Fox's Gap, and the other to the left and north to a narrow pass over the South Mountain. General Hill in his report says that he ordered the brigades of Colquitt and Garland to hold the pass on the afternoon of the 13th. If General Garland was ordered to the pass on the afternoon of the 13th, I am very sure he did not reach the top of the mountain until sunrise the next morning. I had never met General Garland and was anxious to see him, because I had heard that he was engaged to be married to a very dear friend of mine, and I can hardly be mistaken in my very distinct recollection, that the first and only time I ever saw him in life, was when he rode up about sunrise on the morning of the battle, to the front of the Mountain House where we were eating a hurried breakfast, and Col. Colquitt asked him to get down and take a cup of coffee, which he did while his brigade was filing by. Hardly two hours afterwards, at the request of General Hill, I was bearing an order to him, and met some of his men carrying his body from the field.

In the next place Colonel McCrae, who took command of General Garland's brigade after his fall, says in his official report, that "the brigade reached the Mountain House at the top of the mountain about sunrise on the morning of the 14th." In the last place, if General Garland had been present at the pass during the night of the 13th, he would have been the ranking

officer and in command of all the troops and would have given his own brigade position on the pike in the center, and Col. Colquitt would have been relieved of the responsibility, which I am sure rested heavily upon him, when during the night he saw the whole Middletown Valley lighted with camp-fires far in excess of what would have been necessary for the two brigades of cavalry which General Stuart had reported as the only troops following him. When these camp-fires continued to increase as the night advanced, Col. Colquitt became satisfied that there was a very large force in his front, and he sent a courier with a note to General Hill, giving this information. Before daylight General Hill appeared on the mountain top, and being soon convinced that Colonel Colquitt's information was correct, sent orders to the other brigades of his division to come to his aid in the defense of the pass, and also informed General Lee of the situation.

Three brigades had been posted to hold the several roads leading through the valley lying west of the South Mountain, known as Pleasant Valley, to prevent the escape of troops at Harper's Ferry in that direction, and at the same time to guard General Lee's wagon and artillery trains parked in the neighborhood of Boonsboro.

General Hill says he was slow to order these brigades to leave their important positions, but the fact that he was confronted by a very large force of the enemy compelled him to call them to his support. After giving these orders, General Hill, with Colonel Colquitt to assist him, made a hurried examination of the pass he was to defend. Colquitt's brigade was already in position on the pike, nearly halfway down the side of the mountain, the left of the 28th Georgia Regiment resting against a steep cliff of the mountain, around which it was very difficult for any troops to pass, and the 23rd Georgia on the right of the 28th, its line extending to the pike and both regiments resting for the most part behind a stone fence which ran perpendicular to the pike. On the south side of the pike the 6th Georgia was in position with its left on the road and extending

in a perpendicular direction to the road, with the 27th Georgia next, the 13th Alabama still further to the left, but not reaching to the base of the mountain spur, on the south side of the road. In order to prevent any flank movement on that south side, the sharpshooters or skirmishers of Colquitt's brigade, consisting of one company from each regiment, trained for that work, under the command of Captain Arnold, of the 6th Georgia, were deployed on the left of the 13th Alabama.

The whole of the ground in front, except just near the road, was covered with heavy timber, and in front of the 28th and 23rd Georgia Regiments it was rough and rocky. Captain Lane's battery, which on that day was attached to Colquitt's brigade, was placed in position in an open space on the mountain side in rear of the 23d and 28th Georgia Regiments, and fired at intervals at the Federal troops forming in the valley and on the side of the mountain south of the pike, but such a concentrated fire was poured upon it from Gibson's heavy battery at the foot of the mountain, and the Federal batteries at Fox's Gap, that it was forced to retire to the crest of the mountain early in the day.

In a magazine article written by General Hill, in 1886, he says that when he reached the Gap on the morning of the battle, he found Colquitt's brigade stationed at the foot of the mountain on the east side, and that he moved it back near the top of the mountain, and on the map which he gave with his article, he placed Colquitt's brigade just in front of the Mountain House. In this I am satisfied General Hill's memory is at fault. He made no such statement in his official report, written but a few days after the battle of Sharpsburg, and I am sure that I can't be mistaken in the position the brigade held, and from which position General Hill says "it was not moved an inch during the whole day." About the first of July, 1899, I received a letter from General Carman, of the "Antietam Battle Field Board," asking if I could help to locate the position of General Colquitt's brigade on the battlefield of South Mountain, of which his board was preparing a map, and stating that they had

examined the field after carefully reading all the official reports of the officers engaged in the fight, and had been unable to fix the ground held by his brigade. Although I had not visited the field since the battle on the 14th of September, 1862, I had such a distinct recollection of it that I made a somewhat rude sketch of the ground as I remembered it, marking the position held by the brigade about half way down the east side of the mountain on both sides of the Hagerstown pike, as above stated, and sent this sketch to General Carman with a note of explanation, and in due time I received a letter from him, which I still have in my possession, in which he says: "Yours of the 7th instant received, and we thank you for the information therein contained. There have been many changes in the fence lines on the South Mountain field, but your sketch enables us to locate the one behind which were the 23rd and 28th Georgia."

This gives me assurance that my recollection is correct about the location of the brigade, and that it was not moved back by General Hill to the top of the mountain, but remained in the same line where Colonel Colquitt had placed it. A very important place it occupied and though furiously assailed several times during the afternoon by largely superior numbers, it was never driven from it, and when we fell back that night we brought off all our wounded.

As soon as General Hill discovered that the enemy were moving in heavy force towards Fox's Gap, on his right, he sent General Garland with his brigade and Bonbrant's battery out on the narrow mountain road leading from the Mountain House, to the top of the mountain at Fox's Gap, about three quarters of a mile south of the pike.

At this point the road upon which General Garland marched connects with the Old Sharpsburg road, by which the Federal division of General Cox had reached the mountain top some little time in advance of Garland, and here the fight commenced between 8 and 9 o'clock in the morning. General Garland had little time to put his regiments in position before he was at-

tacked by the brigade of Scammon and Crook, the first Federals to gain the summit. In this first attack General Garland was killed, and his brigade was somewhat broken and divided. The part that rallied on the north side of the mountain road was gathered under the command of Col. Ruffin of the 5th North Carolina Regiment, and the remnants of the other three regiments on the south of the road being rallied under Col. McCrae, who was the officer next in rank to Gen. Garland. At the beginning of this fight General Garland had attempted to bring Bondurant's battery into play, but owing to the roughness of the ground on the mountain side, and the sudden attack of the Federals, it was not able to render effective service, and it was soon compelled to retire.

It appears from the report of General Scammon that the fight was opened on the Federal side by the 23rd Ohio, deployed as skirmishers under Lieut. Col. R. B. Hayes, afterwards President of the United States, who was severely wounded in the fight. Col. McCrae and Col. Ruffin, with their small detachments separated and demoralized by the sudden attack, and the death of their gallant General, held their ground as long as they could, but were finally forced to retire, Col. Ruffin falling back towards the Mountain House, and Col. McCrae retiring on the north side of the Old Sharpsburg road, and when some distance down the mountain, he joined Col. Rosser who had been sent by Gen. Stuart, without the knowledge of Gen. Hill, with a regiment of cavalry, and Capt. Pelham's Battery of Horse Artillery, to guard the approach to Pleasant Valley by that road.

After this successful assault of the Federals, it is difficult to see why they did not follow it up by pushing their whole force down, either on the road to the Mountain House, or on the Old Sharpsburg road to Pleasant Valley. Gen. Hill says that at this crisis he ordered two guns of a battery to move forward and open fire on the enemy, and that he organized a support for these guns from staff officers, teamsters, cooks, and stragglers, but this small force could easily have been swept away.

Cox's division had cleared Garland's command from its front, and it was followed by three other divisions under Wilcox, Sturgis, and Rodman, and this overwhelming force could have marched upon either road, with little opposition, for Gen. Hill had nothing but his little show of troops to meet them. Fortunately for us, their evident timidity caused them to delay, and in the meantime General Anderson arrived on the scene with his brigade of North Carolinians, and was immediately sent to the rescue. His first attack was repulsed, but charging again with more determination, and with the help of the skirmishers of Colquitt's brigade, under Capt. Arnold, on the enemy's right flank, they succeeded in driving the Federals back over some of the lost ground, and held them in check. It seems that General Ripley's brigade reached the field about this time, and was sent to Anderson's assistance, but by some mishap lost its way in thick brush, and never rendered any service unless perhaps in its marching around from place to place, it was seen by the Federals from the mountain top, and gave the impression that there was a large force in their front. Certainly the Federal force, alarmed by the attack of Anderson in front, and the fierce attack of Captain Arnold on the flank, and the appearance of Ripley's moving on the mountain side, fell back to the original line of Fox's Gap, and the whole of Gen. Reno's corps remained idle there, until the advance all along the Federal line was ordered by McClellan about three o'clock in the afternoon. During this attack in the morning at Fox's Gap, there was no advance on our center or left, but about three o'clock in the afternoon General McClellan ordered an advance of all his troops, and General Hooker's corps was moved to the right from the Hagerstown pike, and formed along the base of the mountain. Meade's division on his right, supported by Ricketts' division, was ordered to attack the left of our line, held by General Rodes and his brigade of Alabamians, only about 1,200 strong, and extended so far that his troops constituted not much more than a heavy skirmish line. Fortunately this brigade had arrived on the field in time to occupy the top of the

mountain, which was not so thickly covered with woods as the rest of the battlefield, but was filled with ledges of limestone rock affording fairly good cover for such experienced sharpshooters as composed this gallant brigade. As Meade moved cautiously up the east side of the mountain, supported by Ricketts, they were met with a most disastrous fire from the men on top, and if the numbers had been more nearly equal, they would have been easily repulsed, but Meade's large division extended far beyond Rodes' line and Col. John B. Gordon, commanding the 6th Alabama, on the left, was obliged to reform his line, to meet the Federals, who unopposed had reached the top of the mountain beyond him. This, General Rodes says in his report, Gordon did, in the coolest and most skillful manner, under a heavy fire, "handling his men in a way he had never seen surpassed."

While Meade with two divisions was pressing Rodes in this unequal and desperate fight, General Hatch was moving his division to attack the right of the position held by General Rodes on the mountain.

General Gibbon's brigade on the left of Hatch's division rested on the Hagerstown pike, and was in front of the 23rd and 28th Georgia Regiments of Colquitt's brigade lying between the pike and the abrupt end of the mountain on the top, of which Rodes was fighting; Gibbon's whole brigade being opposed to these two regiments. At the same time General Reno was advancing at Fox's Gap with his whole corps.

Fortunately, between three and four o'clock, the advanced brigades of General Longstreet's command had reached the field, and Kemper's brigade and Pickett's brigade under Col. Garnett, as they arrived, were sent to the left to help Rodes, who was at that time desperately struggling with five times his number, and they were formed to attack Hatch's division just coming to the top of the mountain on Rodes' right. The brigades of Drayton and Law, followed later by Hood, were sent to the left to meet the attack of Reno's corps.

For some reason our artillery seemed almost useless during

this whole day; the fire from the mountain top down into the valley appeared to have little effect, while the heavy batteries of the Federals on the north side of the pike at the foot of the mountain, and from the mountain top at Fox's Gap, threw their shells with great accuracy and effect into our troops as they came to the top of the mountain on the pike, and marched to the right and left to take position on the field of battle. The report of General Wilcox, however, shows that the artillery fire of some of the batteries did more execution than we at the time observed. As the sun was going down the fight became general along the whole line.

General Reno being killed on the mountain near Fox's Gap about this time, the pressure there was not so strong, but the divisions of Wilcox and Sturgis continued to move forward through the wood on the north slope of this mountain. Every advance, however, was met and repulsed by Hood's troops and the part of Colquitt's brigade on the south of the pike. On the top of the mountain on our right the fight raged more fiercely. Kemper, and Garnett, and Evans held their ground stubbornly, but were finally driven back a short distance by Hatch's division, where they made a last stand until after dark, while Rodes on the left fought the whole of Meade's division and a part of Rickett's with unfaltering courage, and though forced back by the overwhelming numbers almost surrounding him, yet yielded so slowly and orderly that when night closed the battle, he still held a position not far from the top of the mountain he and his brave men having covered themselves with glory.

At the same time that these attacks were made on the right and left of our lines, Gibbon's brigade again and again rushed upon the 23rd and 28th Georgia Regiments in the fiercest assaults, hoping to break through our center and continuing the assaults sometimes after the firing had ceased on other parts of the field. General Burnside, who was personally commanding the attack on the center, in his report, says that General Gibbon supported by Campbell's battery "had a most brilliant engagement after nightfall, pushing the enemy to the crest of

the mountain." The attack after nightfall was certainly brilliant, but they never succeeded in pushing these two regiments one foot from the ground they had held during the whole day.

In this last assault Col. Grabill, of the 28th Georgia, finding that the ammunition of his men was exhausted, mounted a large stone and in the darkness, shouted at the top of his voice, "fix bayonets." Immediately there was a lull in the Federal firing in his front, and soon the enemy ceased firing altogether, and withdrawing, gave up the fight. Thus ended McClellan's grand effort to force his way through Boonsboro Gap and cut Lee's Army in two. When we remember the disparity in the forces engaged, and the issue involved in this battle, no one ought to withhold from General D. H. Hill and the brave men who fought with him that day, the praise due them for holding McClellan's army at bay, from early morning until half-past three in the afternoon, when the first Longstreet's men arrived to assist. Not over 4,000 men beating back for nearly eight hours more than ten times that number of the enemy, as is fully shown by their own official records.

In the light of the cold facts established by these published records, it is somewhat amusing to hear the estimate given by the Federal officers of the number of troops opposing them in this battle. General McClellan, in his official report, says: "It is believed that the force opposed to us at Turner's Gap consisted of D. H. Hill's Corps (15,000), and a part, if not the whole of Longstreet's Corps, and perhaps a part of Jackson's, probably some 30,000 in all. We went into action with about 30,000 and our losses amounted to 312 killed, 1,234 wounded and 22 missing; total 1,568."

General Hooker, with characteristic boastfulness, says: "When the advantages of the enemy's position are considered, and the preponderating numbers, the forcing of the passage of South Mountain will be classed among the most brilliant and satisfactory achievements of this army, and its principal glory will be awarded to the first corps. With shameful effrontery, this field was heralded from the rebel capital as a victory." While

we do not claim that this was a great victory, yet we can justly claim that this fight served the purpose of holding McClellan in check until Harper's Ferry was captured, and General Lee was enabled to bring his divided forces together for the great battle at Sharpsburg, where D. H. Hill's division held the center of the Confederate line, and again illustrated the heroism of Southern soldiers, when, from sunrise until dark, they repulsed every attempt of superior numbers to break through our lines on this historic field.

PAPERS OF CONVENTION BETWEEN SHERMAN
AND JOHNSTON.

From the Papers of Col. B. S. Ewell.

Memorandum or basis of agreement made this 18th day of April, A. D., 1865, near Durham's Station in the State of North Carolina, by and between General Joseph E. Johnston, Commanding the Confederate Army, & Maj. Gen'l. Wm. T. Sherman, Commanding the Army of the United States in North Carolina, both present:

First. The contending Armies now in the field to maintain the "status quo" until notice is given by the Commanding General of any one to its opponent, and reasonable time, say forty-eight (48) hours, allowed.

Second. The Confederate Armies now in existence to be disbanded and conducted to their several State Capitols, there to deposit their arms and public property in the State Arsenal; and each officer and man to execute and file an agreement to cease from acts of war and to abide by the action of both State & Federal authority. The number of arms and munitions of war to be reported to the Chief of Ordnance at Washington City, subject to the future action of the Congress of the United States, and in the meantime to be used solely to maintain peace and order within the borders of the States respectively.

Third. The recognition by the Executive of the United States of the several State Governments, on their Officers & Legislatures taking the oaths prescribed by the Constitution of

the United States, and where conflicting States Governments have resulted from the War, the legitimacy of all shall be submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States.

Fourth. The re-establishment of all the Federal Courts in the several States with powers as defined by the constitution and laws of Congress.

Fifth. The people and the inhabitants of all the States to be guaranteed, so far as the Executive can, their political rights & franchises, as well as the rights of person and property as defined by the Constitution of the United States and of the States respectively.

Sixth. The Executive authority of the Government of the United States not to disturb any of the people by reason of the late war, so long as they live in peace & quiet, abstain from acts of armed hostility, and obey the laws in existence at the place of their residence.

Seventh. In general terms, the war to cease, a general amnesty so far as the Executive of the United States can command, on condition of the disbandment of the Confederate Armies, the distribution of the arms, and the resumption of peaceful pursuits by the officers & men hitherto composing said Armies.

Not being fully empowered by our respective principals to fulfill these terms, we individually and officially pledge ourselves to promptly obtain the necessary authority, and to carry out the above programme.

(Sgd) W. T. SHERMAN, Maj.-Gen'l,
Com'd'g Army of the U. S., in N. C.

(Sgd) J. E. JOHNSTON, General,
C. S. Army in N. C.

Official,

KINLOCH FALCONER,
A. A. Gen'l.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

In the Field, Raleigh, N. C., April 19th, 1865.

Special Field Orders,
No. 58.

The General Commanding announces to the Army a suspension of hostilities and an agreement with General *Johnston* and other high officials which, when formally ratified will make peace from the Potomac to the Rio Grande. Until the absolute peace is arranged, a line passing through Tirrells Mount, Chapel Hill University, Durham Station and West Point on the Neuse River will separate the two Armies.

Each Army Commander will group his camps entirely with a view to comfort, health and good police. All the details of military discipline must still be maintained and the General hopes and believes that in a very few days it will be his good fortune to conduct you all to your homes.

The fame of this Army for courage, industry and discipline is admitted all over the world! then let each officer and man see that it is not stained by any act of vulgarity, rowdyism or petty crime.

The Cavalry will patrol the front line.

General *Howard* will take charge of the District from Raleigh up to the Cavalry; Gen'l *Slocum* to the left of Raleigh; and Gen'l *Schofield* in Raleigh, its right and rear.

Quarter Masters and Commissaries will keep their supplies up to a light load for their wagons, and the Railroad Superintendent will arrange a depot for the convenience of each separate Army.

By order of Maj. Gen'l W. T. Sherman.

S. M. DAYTON,
Asst. Adgt.-Gen'l.

H'D Q'R MILITARY DIVISION OF MISSISSIPPI.

In the Field, Sep. 21st, 1865.
Raleigh, N. C.

Gen'l J. E. Johnston.

Gen'l.

I send you a letter for Gen'l Wilson, which if sent by telegraph, and courier will check his course. He may mistrust the telegraph, and therefore better send the original for he cannot mistake my handwriting with which he is familiar. He seems to have his blood up, and will be hard to hold. If he can buy food & rations down about Fort Valley it will obviate the necessity of his going up to Rome or Dalton. It is reported to me from Cairo that Mobile is in our possession but it is not minute or official.

Gen'l B— sent into me wanting to surrender his army, on the theory that the whole Confederate army had surrendered. I explained to him & to his Staff Officer the exact truth, & left him to act as he thought proper. He seems to have disbanded his men, deposited a few arms about 20 miles from here & himself awaits your action. I will not hold him, his men, or army subject to any condition other than the final one we may agree on. I shall look for Major Hitchcock back from Washington on Monday, & shall promptly notify you of the result. By the action of Gen'l Weitzel in relation to the Va. Leg: I feel certain we will have no trouble in the sense of reorganizing existing State governments. It may be the Lawyers will want us to define quite minutely what is meant by the guarantee of Rights of Pensions, & Property. It may be construed into a compact for us to undo the past as to the rights of slaves, and leases of Plantations in the Mississippi, if vacant & abandoned plantations. I wish you would talk to the best men you have on these points, & if possible in the final convention make those points so clear as to leave no room for angry controversy. I believe if the South would simply, & publicly declare what we all feel that slavery is dead, that you would inaugurate an era

of peace & prosperity that would soon efface the ravages of the past four years of war. Negroes would remain in the South and afford you an abundance of cheap labor which otherwise will be driven away, & it will save the country the senseless discussions which have kept us in hot water for fifty years. Although strictly speaking this is no subject of a military convention yet I am honestly convinced that our simple declaration of a result will be accepted as good law everywhere. Of course I have not a single word from Washington on this or any other point of an agreement but I know the effect of such a step by us will be universally accepted.

I am with great respect, your ob't servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,
Maj. Gen. U. S. Army.

Terms of a Military Convention entered into this twenty-sixth (26th) day of April, 1865, at Bennett's House near Durham's Station, N. C., between General Joseph E. Johnston, Commanding the Confederate Army and Major General W. T. Sherman, Commanding the United States Army in North Carolina.

1. All acts of war on the part of the troops under General Johnston's Command to cease from this date.

2. All arms and public property to be deposited at Greensboro, and delivered to an Ordnance Officer of the United States Army.

3. Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate, one copy to be retained by the Commander of the troops and the other to be given to an officer to be designated by General Sherman. Each officer and man to give his individual obligation in writing not to take up arms against the Government of the United States until properly released from this obligation.

4. The side arms of officers and their private horses and baggage to be retained by them.

5. This being done, all the officers and men will be permitted to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by the United States Authorities so long as they observe their obligation and the laws in force where they may reside.

(Sgd) W. T. SHERMAN, Maj. Gen'l.
Com'd'g U. S. Forces in N. C.

(Sgd) J. E. JOHNSTON, General,
Com'd'g C. S. Forces in N. C.

Official,

KINLOCH FALCONER,
A. A. Gen'l.

H'D Qr's ARMY OF TENN.

Near Greensboro, N. C.,
April 27, 1865.

General Orders,
No. 18.

By the terms of a Military Convention made on the 26th inst., by Major Gen'l W. T. Sherman, U. S. A., and Gen'l J. E. Johnston, C. S. A., the officers and men of this Army are to bind themselves not to take up arms against the United States until properly relieved from that obligation, and shall receive guarantees from the United States Officers against molestation by the United States authorities, so long as they observe that obligation, and the law in force where they resided.

For these objects, duplicate muster rolls will be made immediately, and, after the distribution of the necessary papers, the troops will march under their officers, to their respective states, and there be disbanded, all retaining personal property.

The object of this Convention is pacification to the extent of the authority of the Commander, who made it. Events in Virginia, which broke every hope of success by war, imposed on its General the duty of sparing the blood of this gallant Army,

and saving our country from further devastation, and our people from ruin.

(Signed) J. E. JOHNSTON,

Official,

General.

KINLOCH FALCONER,

Major & A. A. G.

LT. COL. A. P. MASON,

A. A. Gen'l.

HEAD QUARTERS, MIL. DIV. OF THE MISS.

"In the Field,"

Raleigh, N. C., April 27, 1865.

Special Field Orders,

No. 65.

The General Commanding announces a further suspension of hostilities and a final agreement with General Johnston, which terminate the war as to the Armies under his command and the country east of the Chattahoochee.

Copies of the terms of convention will be furnished Maj. Gen'ls Schofield, Gillmore, and Wilson, who are specially charged with the execution of its details in the Dept. of N. C., Dept. of the South, and at Macon and Western, Ga.

Capt. Jasper Myers, Ordnance Dept., U. S. A., is hereby designated to receive arms &c., at Greensboro, and any Commanding Officer of a Post may receive the arms of any detachment and see that they are properly stored and accounted for.

General Schofield will procure at once the necessary blanks, and supply the Army Commanders, that uniformity may prevail and great care must be taken that the terms and stipulations on our part be fulfilled with the most scrupulous fidelity, whilst those imposed on our hitherto enemies be received in a spirit becoming a brave and generous army.

Army Commanders may at once loan to the inhabitants such of the captured mules, horses, wagons, and vehicles as can be

spared from immediate use, and the Commanding Generals of Armies may issue provisions, animals, and any public supplies that can be spared, to relieve present wants, and to encourage the inhabitants to renew their peaceful pursuits, and to restore the relations of friendship among our fellow-citizens and countrymen.

Foraging will forthwith cease and when necessity, or long marches compel the taking of forage, provisions, or any kind of private property, compensation will be made on the spot, or, when the disbursing officers are not provided with funds, vouchers will be given in proper form, payable at the nearest Military depot.

By order of Maj. Gen'l W. T. Sherman.

(Signed) L. M. DAYTON,
A. A. Gen'l.

Official:

KINLOCH FALCONER,
A. A. Gen'l.

"Copy."

H'D. Q'RS. MIL. DIV'N OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

"In the Field,"
Raleigh, N. C., April 27, 1865.

General Johnston,
Com'd'g Confederate Armies, &c.,
Greensboro.

General:

I herewith enclose you Copies of my Field Orders No. 65, which give Gen'l Schofield full & ample powers to carry into effect our Convention, and I hope, at your personal interview with General Schofield, you satisfied your mind of his ability, and kind disposition towards the inhabitants of North Carolina.

In addition to the points made at our interview of yesterday, I have further instructed General Schofield to facilitate what

you & I and all good men desire, the return to their homes of the officers & men composing your Army; to let you have of his stores ten days rations for twenty five thousand men. We have abundance of provisions at Morehead City, and if you send trains here, they may go down with our trains, and return to Greensboro with the rations specified. Col. Wright did intend to send his construction train up to-day, but I did not get up his carpenters in time.

The train with square timber, & carpenters will go up in the morning, and I think by the morning of the 29th, your trains could run down on the road, and fall in with ours of the 30th. I can hardly estimate how many animals fit for farm purposes will be "loaned" to the farmers; but enough, I hope to ensure a crop.

I can hardly commit myself how far Commerce will be free, but I think the Cotton still in the country and the crude turpentine, will make money with which to procure supplies. General Schofield, in a few days, will be able to arrange all such matters.

I wish you would send the enclosed parcel for General Wilson, as it contains the orders 65 & 66, & instructions to release all his prisoners on the conditions of our convention.

Now that war is over, I am as willing to risk my person and reputation as heretofore, to heal the wounds made by the past war, & I think my feeling is shared by the whole Army. I also think a similar feeling actuates the mass of your Army, but there are some unthinking young men, who have no sense or experience, that, unless controlled, may embroil their neighbors. If we are forced to deal with them, it must be with severity, but I hope they will be managed by the people of the South.

I am, with respect,

Y'r ob't serv't.,

(Signed) W. T. SHERMAN,
Maj. Gen'l. U. S. A.

Official:

KINLOCH FALCONER,
A. A. G.

CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA,
QUARTERMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE,

Richmond, Octo. 27, 1863.

General J. E. Johnston,
Meridien, Miss.

General:

I responded by telegraph to your dispatch of — inst., simply to say that I would reply by letter. It is clearly intimated in this dispatch, that the efforts which I made to secure to Stevenson's Division the funds that had been received by Maj. Barbour—your Ch'f Q'r M'r for that organization, constituted an interference with your prerogative as a military commander. I should indeed be mortified, if I had so far mistaken my duty, and so far forgotten the consideration due to you, as to trench upon your powers and privileges, in the least possible degree. As this Bureau is responsible for the supply of funds for the pay, clothing, transportation, &c., of the army; and neither the army nor the country look to the commander in the field for the needful supply—the requisitions being made and funds furnished by correspondence between this Bureau and the respective Q'r Masters, without the assistance or intervention of the military commanders, I had thought it my duty to see that the distribution of these funds, *in bulk*, at least, was properly made, nor have I felt myself *authorized* to claim the service, in this behalf, of the commanding Generals, except when invited by them to do so. Not many weeks have elapsed since I took my seat in this office; and, in that short time, I have not attempted to establish different relations between the Chief of this Bureau and the officers of the Dept. (nor between the former and the Generals in the field), from those which I found recognized by the officers about me, and sustained by the War Dept and the Executive. I respectfully submit, that in this instance, I have not transcended the limits prescribed by those relations; nor furnished you with any just cause of complaint. As you invite direct correspondence with you in reference to

Major Barbour's transactions, and his relations to this Dept., I take great pleasure in laying the facts before you; and earnestly ask that they may receive more attention and consideration than have ever been given by Maj. Barbour himself to any communications from this office.

Then why did I direct Major Barbour to turn over to Major Orme funds in his hands received by him for Stevenson's Division? Maj. Barbour's estimate for funds (Q'r M.) for July and August was (in brief) as follows:

For Bragg's Army.....	\$2,000,000
For Pemberton's Army.	1,000,000
For Johnston's Army.	2,000,000
Contingencies West'n Dept.	1,500,000
<hr/>	
Total Estimate.	\$6,500,000

Where was Stevenson's Division at the beginning of that period? Without discussing the question whether Pemberton's Army formed part of yours, *both* of them were estimated for by Maj. Barbour, and to whom else could I refer Major Orme, when pressing me for the funds due that Division, for those months? You must perceive therefore that I made no "mistake" as to the position of Stevenson's Division, as claimed in your dispatch. The other order on Maj. Barbour, given in favor of Maj. Paxton, was also justified by his estimate. Under the special orders of the War Dept., Maj. Paxton had been assigned to the special duty of purchasing horses, mules, wagons, &c., in that region of country most exposed to the enemy, and for the use of the very troops covered by Major Barbour's estimates. It is intended to commit the purchase of field transportation entirely to officers selected exclusively for that purpose. If we had but one army in the field, the entire direction of these matters might well be committed to the commanding General, through the medium of his staff officers. But, with nearly a dozen armies and extremely limited resources some portion of the control must be retained at the center; or our cause must soon languish

under the effects of hunger and nakedness. Confident that I desire no more power than is necessary to discharge the onerous and responsible duties imposed upon me, I would be obliged by a free expression of your views as to the limits which define that power.

Permit me to trespass further on your time, and to express in decided terms, the opinion that the business of the Q'r Mr Dept., within the limits of your command, can never be conducted in a satisfactory manner so long as Maj. Barbour is at the head of it. I have earnestly desired to confer with you on this subject, and the present occasion seems to open the door.

Major Barbour has never settled his accounts fully for a single quarter during his long service in the Army of Northern Virginia; though he had abundant opportunity for doing so during the many months while you were retired from active service by a disabling wound. And the reputation for loose management and utter disregard of the public interest, which he has left in Richmond and throughout the country that constituted the field of his operations, is such as attaches, to no other disbursing officer in the broad limits of the Confederacy who wields like power, and necessarily destroys confidence in his present and future efficiency as public officer. And the records of this office show that this impression is not made by mere "public clamor."

Nor has the official conduct of Maj. Barbour in the South West been such as to improve the character he had established for looseness and inefficiency. His transactions and correspondence with this Bureau are more unsatisfactory than those of any other officer of this Dept. holding a position of the least consequence, and though he has received twenty millions of money since April last, he has rendered no accounts to this Bureau. The complaints from disbursing officers who are entitled to receive funds from him are equal to all the others in the Confederacy put together; and his "estimates" furnish no such information and details as enable this Dept. to form any just notion of his necessities. He has now sent in one for Sept. &

Oct., on which no money can be paid, for he simply asks for five millions of Dollars, without any specification or explanation. Major Barbour sends in no Monthly Summary Statements, nor gives any account of persons and articles hired & employed, as required by Regulations. He has made large purchases and merely given certificates, which have been paid by other Quarter Masters. These purchases he has never taken up on his returns, and of course his accounts cannot be settled. There have been perhaps twenty letters addressed to Major Barbour, to which he has made no replies, although all the time within mail communication. More than three months since, copies of these were made and forwarded to him by private hand, and still there have been no replies.

I beg leave, General, most earnestly to call your attention to this condition of things, and respectfully to enquire whether it is just to you, to this Dept., or to the Government, that it should be submitted to any longer? I have taken the liberty to write in a plain and decided manner, and shall be most happy to have your co-operation, as it will be my pleasure to give you any assistance in my power.

Very respectfully, Y'r most ob't servant,

A. R. LAWTON,
Q'r. M'r. Gen'l.

Head Quarters,

DEPARTMENT OF SOUTH CAROLINA, GA. & FLA.

Charleston, S. C., May 15th, 1863.

General Jos. E. Johnston,
Com'd'g Jackson, Missi.

Dear General.

I am sure you will appreciate the motives which induce me to offer for your consideration, the following general views on the coming summer campaign, which, if they coincide with your

own, might, if not already done, be submitted by you to the War Dep't.

Certainly the surest way to relieve the State of Mississippi & the Valley of the Mississippi from the presence of the Enemy's Army, is suddenly & boldly to take the offensive in Tennessee & Kentucky; for which purpose, all available forces (from other commands held strictly on the defensive), should be concentrated under you; the forces now in Tennessee being thus reinforced by 25,000 or 30,000 men, at the most favorable strategic point for the offensive, Rosecrans could be suddenly attacked & would be either totally destroyed, or the remnant of his forces would be speedily driven beyond the Ohio. A force of at least 10,000 men in Tennessee & 20,000 in Kentucky, would doubtless be then raised and with about 20,000 of the reinforcements received from Virginia and elsewhere, could be left to hold those two States--the rest of the Army, say about 60,000 or 70,000 men, should cross the Cumberland & Tennessee rivers, to Columbus or Fort Pillow, so as to command the Mississippi River, & thus cut off Grant's communications with the North. The latter (should he have delayed thus long his retreat North of those two points) would then find himself in a very critical condition; that is compelled to fight his way thro' a victorious army, equal to his own in strength, on it's own selected battlefield, in position to be reinforced for the occasion from the forces left in Kentucky, and the result could not be doubtful for an instant.

As a matter of course, advantage would be taken of the low stage of water in the Cumberland & Tennessee Rivers, to obstruct thoroughly their navigation and fortify their banks strongly at the point where they come close together, known as the "Neck." Immediately after the destruction of Grant's Army, sufficient forces could be thrown from the Army in Mississippi into Louisiana in aid of Kirby Smith, and into Missouri to the assistance of Price, or from Kentucky into Virginia to reinforce the troops left there, should they be hard pressed; but that is not to be dreaded, considering the terrible

lesson the Enemy has just had at Chancellorsville, and that a large part of his Army is to be disbanded during the present month to be replaced, if at all, by raw Yankee recruits.

Meanwhile a sufficient number of Cap't Lee's *Torpedo Rams could be constructed in England, & the navigation of the Mississippi River resecured, thereby Enabling us to retake New Orleans & Capture Bank's Army.

Wishing you success in your Department, I remain,

Your's very truly,

(Signed) G. T. BEAUREGARD

"A True Copy."

A. N. TOUTANT BEAUREGARD,
A. D. C.

*This is a sea-going vessel, of great speed, shot-proof & carrying a Torpedo in it's bow, 7 feet below water mark, which explodes on striking, another one can be put in position in a few moments.

PLAN OF CAMPAIGN PROPOSED TO GEN. JOS. E. JOHNSTON,
CHARLESTON, S. C., MAY 15th, 1863.

June 21st, 1863.

Note.

It is evident also, that the quickest way of relieving Vicksburg, would be, after defeating Rosecrans at Murfreesboro, to march at once on Memphis & Fort Pillow, & establish our lines of Communication with Tennessee by the Memphis R. R. with Ala. by the Mobile R. R. & with Missi. by the Jackson R. R.—all the principles & maxims of war would then be observed.

It may be tho't that Lee could not have spared 30,000 men from Virginia for the purpose of reinforcing Bragg—he certainly could have sent him Longstreet's 20,000 men from N. C. & elsewhere who took no part in the Battle of Chancellors-

ville. With these and the 10,000 men & 7 light Batteries I sent to you at Jackson, Missi, about the beginning of May, Bragg would have had about 95,000 men with whom to attack suddenly and boldly Rosecrans' 65,000—having crushed them he could have left 30,000 to march on to Nashville & Kentucky—& have sent about 50,000 to take possession of Memphis & Fort Pillow. Keeping up his communications with them by the Memphis R. R., & with Mobile & Jackson, Miss., by the Southern R'l R'ds to those cities.

The whole of this brilliant campaign, which is only indicated here, could have been terminated by the end of June with the destruction of Rosecrans' & Grant's Armies, & the conquest of Tennessee & Kentucky.

We could then have taken the offensive in Ohio or Pennsylvania as circumstances would have best indicated.

(Signed) G. T. BEAUREGARD.

"A True Copy."

A. N. TOUTANT BEAUREGARD,
A. D. C.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT.

Milledgeville, Georgia, Feb'y. 10th, 1864.

Gen'l Joseph E. Johnston,

Gen'l.

By a letter from Maj. Gen'l Walker my attention is again called to the importance of proper provision for your transportation. I have already advised you of the heavy losses which the State Road has sustained, by the loss and destruction of its rolling stock while on other Roads under the command of Confederate officers.

You have been so kind as to offer to do all in your power to have part of our Engines and Cars returned to the Road. In this I trust you may succeed. I also hope you will continue to insist that the Cars and Engines belonging to the Tennessee

Roads be returned and placed in the service for the supply of your army.

I have written the President demanding the immediate return to the State Road of two Good Engines and forty good Cars which is less than one fourth of the number of what the Road has been deprived by the Confederate Government. I have received no reply to this request and fear that from some cause the President may neglect to comply with this reasonable request.

One of my objects in addressing you this letter is to beg you to urge upon the President's consideration the importance of this subject. Justice to the State of Georgia, to you and to your gallant army requires that Mr. Davis shall neither disregard nor neglect this requirement. When the Spring Campaign opens, if you are reinforced, as you should be, and as the country have a right to expect, it will not be in the power of the officers of the State Road to transport all your necessary supplies without more rolling stock.

Again, suppose the fortunes of war turn in your favor, as I pray God they may, and you should be able to advance into Tennessee, it will be utterly impossible with our present limited number of Cars & Engines to furnish you the stock to run on either of the Tennessee Roads. At the Commencement of the War no Road in the Confederacy had a better outfit of Rolling Stock than the State Road, but on account of its locality and its immediate connection with the Western Road, which had more limited capacity, constant calls were made upon us for Engines & Cars. We always responded to every call. The result has been our heavy losses above mentioned. And now without pretending to return even part of the rolling stock of which they have deprived us, there is a willingness at Richmond to cast all the blame upon the State authorities if there is any object in the transportation if Mr. Davis will return half of what he has taken from us we can transport any and every thing which may be offered to be carried over the State Road. If he deprives us of what we have and refuses to return any portion of it on

demand, you see at once the impossibility of our meeting the heavy drafts likely to be made upon us.

It may be thought that the State should have replaced her rolling stock taken by the Confederate Government by having new Engines and Cars made.

You will readily see the impossibility of this when you reflect that we have been unable to import such heavy material through the blockade, and that the Confederate Gov't has had control of all the iron mills and almost all the furnaces in the Confederacy. The officers of that Gov't have even refused to let us get a supply of iron from the Etowah works, near the road, for our ordinary repairs when we were hauling all the coal that kept the works going, and it has been with great difficulty that we could secure the supply. Indeed we must have failed had it not been for the action of Gen'l. G. W. Smith, whose sense of justice in this as in other matters, caused him to determine to secure the Road and the stock, which property had the highest claim upon the works of which he was president. But I will not trouble you by further remarks upon this subject. I will only add that it is a matter of imperative necessity that the rolling stock on the Road be increased before the Spring Campaign opens, and that the Tennessee rolling stock be returned before any advance movement is attempted.

I receive daily reports from the officers of the Road and they ship regularly all that your officers offer. Renewing the assurance of my determination to do all in my power to serve you, and of my high esteem, I am,

Your ob'd't serv't,

JOSEPH E. BROWN.

DAHLGREN'S RAID.

Fiftieth Anniversary of the Defence of Richmond.

By Dr. G. WATSON JAMES, Co. G, Third Battalion.

To-day is the fiftieth anniversary of the Dahlgren raid and the engagement at Hick's Farm (Glenburnie). At a private dinner, given in this city some years ago, at which were present General Bradley T. Johnson, General Wade Hampton, General Dabney H. Maury, Colonel John A. McAnerney and others, the conversation turned on the Dahlgren raid and the Hick's Farm fight, and the consensus of opinion was that the latter was one of the most important events of the War Between the States.

It was. Barring something now and then unforeseen, it saved Richmond from sack: from rapine, arson and murder by Ulrich Dahlgren's picked desperate men, and the thousands of Federal prisoners on Belle Isle the raiders purposed to release. Dahlgren's orders to his men were "to destroy and burn, with the assistance of the released prisoners, the hateful city, and not allow the rebel leader Davis and his traitorous crew to escape." Again: "Once in the city, it must be destroyed, and Jeff Davis and Cabinet killed." * * * "Pioneers must have plenty of oakum and turpentine for burning, which will be rolled in soaked balls and given to the men to burn when we get in the city."

MISTAKES IN HISTORY.

It is not necessary to the purport of this article to go into the details of the raid—to explain how Dahlgren was prevented by high water from crossing James River to the southside, in order to reach Belle Isle, and turn the prisoners loose, before entering the city. Nor is it necessary to follow his looting ride

on the northside, until he reached the gates of Richmond. Much has been written regarding his movements and acts up to that point. Much also respecting his retreat and death. However, in those several accounts the important event with which this writer has to do has been largely lost sight of, or failed of the attention and recognition it reserved. More than that, such attention and recognition as it has received has led to a great deal of misunderstanding and involves not a few "mistakes of history." The "important event" was and is the "last stand," which was made by the Third (Henley's) Battalion Troops, for local defense, almost within the shadow of the spires of the city. Against that stand Dahlgren's arson squadrons broke; by the battalion they were hurled back in utter confusion.

The night of March 1, 1864, was a moonlight night, though the moon was obscured by a heavy white cloud, from which a fine, misty rain was falling. The first resistance Dahlgren encountered was at Green's Farm (forks of the road), on the River Road. There he engaged the Armory Battalion, a much inferior force to his own, which he soon routed and pushed back demoralized towards Richmond, not, however, before he had lost several men.

Meantime, Confederate reinforcements had been coming up in the shape of the Third Battalion, some of the companies marching collectively, others detached. This part of the line of defense was under command of General Custis Lee. In order that the reader may better understand the situation and get a clear idea of the status and personnel of the battalion, two quotations, subject, however, to some explanation, one of them to correction, are here given. They are from Mrs. Davis' life of her husband, and a report of General Custis Lee, respectively. Mrs. Davis writes:

"The 'Department Battalion' was composed of the clerks from all the departments of the government, not from the Treasury Department alone, and of a company of Richmond boys under eighteen years of age, and it was this latter company that went by mistake to Green's Farm, which was not far beyond the line

of fortifications on the Northern plank road to which the 'Department Battalion' and another (Armory Battalion) were ordered; and it was this company of boys which first became engaged with Dahlgren's column, and which had the most to do with checking it, and perhaps driving it off."

REPORT OF GENERAL LEE.

General Lee says: "A short distance beyond the fortifications I met the boy company, and some, or all, of the other companies of the Department Battalion coming in; and was told, in answer to my inquiries, that the boy company had arrived first at the intermediate line of fortifications, and, not finding any troops there, had concluded that there was an outer line."

The "boy company," later reorganized "G," which marched out from the city separately, did not go to Green's Farm. It did go beyond the intermediate line of fortifications, was ordered back, and as it was the first company on the field, the battalion, it may be said, "assembled" on it. It took no part with the Armory Battalion in the affair at Green's Farm, and claimed no more credit for repulsing Dahlgren than is due the other companies, members of the Third. Mrs. Davis's error was owing to the fact, probably, that from the boy company were detailed some of the pickets of the Hick's Farm fight, and one of these was very severely wounded. General Lee's report is a detail of the assembly, after which the battalion was marched into an open field some distance in front of the "breastworks."

Having dispersed the Armory Battalion, Dahlgren pressed on, practically sweeping away everything before him, until he reached Hick's Farm. Here he felt the situation with picket firing and located the battalion, then he formed for a charge, confident of an easy mark, since his men could be distinctly heard jeering: "Ride down the d—d melish." In the absence of Major Henley, who was ill in bed in Richmond, the command of the battalion devolved on Captain John A. McAnerney, of Company A. President Davis, in his "Rise and Fall of the Southern Confederacy," in a reference to the engagement, in

which he accords the battalion credit for saving the city, says: "Captain McIlhany (a misprint, McAnerney intended), as soon as he saw the enemy promptly arranged to attack. This was done with such impetuosity that Dahlgren and his men were routed."

NEWSPAPER ERROR.

President Davis based his statement on a newspaper error of the day, in which not more than passing mention is given to the affair. Captain McAnerney did not attack. Upon becoming aware of the position of the enemy, and his preparation to charge, he ordered his men to lie down, and walking down the line, he enjoined, "Don't a man dare to fire a shot until he hears my voice. Remember, two volleys." There was something almost uncanny in the silence of those men and boys, and of that little figure moving in the gloaming from company to company, repeating his injunction and the word "steady." At last came the order from the other end of the field: "Forward, Michiganders." Still McAnerney waited. He waited until the charging squadrons, some 450 strong, rose the crest of a slight elevation in the field, thus giving him a sky-line. Then rang out the command: "Rise, attention, first rank, fire!" "and," declares a paper of the Southern Historical Society, "a better volley was rarely given by regulars; it was one volley in truth."

There was a recoil, an effort by Dahlgren to inspire his men to another charge—a second volley, and the affair was over, except to reload. It was sharp, short, decisive, taking little more time than it requires to tell the story, but it was enough. It transpired the next day that the troops off on the right, on the Brook Turnpike, which engaged a part of Kilpatrick's main body, were curious to know "what command fired those dress parade volleys?" At the best estimates, the battalion numbered about 320, rank and file. The casualties of the battalion were: killed, Captain Ellery, Company A; wounded, Lieutenant R. A. Thompkins, Company B; Privates T. Carter, S. McLean, R. B. Green, Miles Cary and Gray Doswell. The last-named was a member of the boy company, and was on the picket line.

Several men were knocked down and bruised in the onrush of Federal troopers who could not control their horses. Dahlgren's loss in killed and wounded, in the charge, was about forty. Ten or more of his men were found dead on the field in a space not more than thirty yards square the next morning. Several prisoners were taken. For its gallantry at Hick's Farm the battalion was commended in official reports, was raised to a regiment, Third Regiment Troops, for local defense, and Captain McAnerney was promoted colonel and assigned to its command.

COMPANY OF BOYS.

But the fiftieth anniversary of Hick's Farm has another interest for the people of Richmond, a continued and continuing interest, it may be said. That interest centres in the history of Richmond's boy company. Save for this company, the battalion was composed largely of men from all parts of the South, who had been retired from active service on account of wounds or other disabilities, and detailed in the departments. Captain McAnerney was among the number, and these department clerks were virtually all veterans. The battalion had no connection with the militia organizations or other reserves, nor had the regiment to which it was enlarged. Company G, as to personnel, was in a sense the successor of the "Junior Volunteers," a company of striplings formed just before the war, who were armed with "cut-off" carbines, drilled at the State armory, and whose first service was in the "Pawnee War." The carbines were "cut off" by order of Governor Wise, so as to accommodate them to the youth and size of the juniors. Company G was organized in July, 1863, and because none of its members were old enough to be subject to military duty, the government required "individual" receipts for its new arms, as the following copy from the autograph receipt paper will show:

HEADQUARTERS CO. G, THIRD B. L. D.

Richmond, October, 1863.

We, the undersigned members of Company G, do hereby

certify that we have received of E. S. Gay, Jr., lieutenant commanding, one musket and accoutrements, for which we hold and bind ourselves responsible, for the preservation and cleanliness of said articles, and hold them subject to the order of the commandant of the Company, E. S. Gay:

- | | |
|---------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 1. John I. Womble. | 32. Ro. G. Rind. |
| 2. Bev. Tucker. | 33. J. A. Peebles. |
| 3. W. T. Yarbrough. | 34. ——— ——— |
| 4. Charles M. Nimmo, Jr. | 35. Charles Brown. |
| 5. Edgar Jones, two guns. | 36. James Carr. |
| 6. Em. C. Pecor. | 37. ——— ——— |
| 7. ——— ——— | 38. C. R. Devine. |
| 8. Jas. H. Pecor. | 39. C. H. Quarles. |
| 9. R. E. Hendrick. | 40. Wm. H. Hill. |
| 10. Wm. E. Johnston. | 41. J. E. Owens. |
| 11. ——— ——— | 42. A. Dibrell. |
| 12. I. G. Wood. | 43. W. H. Page. |
| 13. G. B. Doggett. | 44. W. C. Templeman, sergeant. |
| 14. R. W. Thompson. | 45. M. Harrison. |
| 15. John P. Quarles. | 46. Lieutenant A. W. Timberlake. |
| 16. Thomas M. Rutherford. | 47. Geo. Watt, Jr. |
| 17. C. W. Bridges. | 48. Jos. K. Roane, Jr. |
| 18. John Hammond. | 49. ——— ——— |
| 19. ——— ——— | 50. W. M. Randolph. |
| 20. Samuel Taylor. | 51. G. P. Hawes. |
| 21. E. S. Cardozo. | 52. J. B. Faris. |
| 22. ——— ——— | 53. John B. Purcell. |
| 23. ——— ——— | 54. Swift Johnson. |
| 24. Richard Brooke. | 55. W. R. Cowardin. |
| 25. ——— ——— | 56. Geo. Ferneyhough. |
| 26. R. D. Chesterman. | 57. C. W. Nimmo. |
| 27. Edgar D. Taylor. | 58. S. Cullen. |
| 28. R. Gilliam, Jr. | 59. W. Sydnor |
| 29. ——— ——— | W. R. Tyree. |
| 30. G. W. James. | James Gibbons. |
| 31. ——— ——— | |

The original paper, along with others bearing on the company, has been turned over to the Virginia Room of the Confederate Memorial Literary Society. The blank spaces in the above list represent members who were not present when the arms were distributed. The boy company saw a good deal of hard service around Richmond in the fall of 1863 and the winter of 1863-4, and some months later reorganized and elected new officers. Herewith is appended one of the rolls of the new company, which is made up partially from memory, and answers very closely to an official roll on file in the State military archives:

ROLL OF REORGANIZED COMPANY G.

Officers.

E. S. Gay, Jr., captain.
J. W. Anderson, first lieutenant.
S. Taylor, second lieutenant.
W. W. Randolph, third lieutenant.
John B. Purcell, first sergeant.
W. R. Cowardin, second sergeant.
W. M. Hill, third sergeant.
William Binford, fourth sergeant.
R. G. Rind, fifth sergeant.
John B. Faris, first corporal.
George Davidson, second corporal.
Charles Williamson, third corporal.
Swift Johnson, fourth corporal.

Privates.

A. Abernethy, C. Barksdale, L. A. Battaile, George Bridges, Frank Brooke, R. Brooke, Z. T. Briggs, Ed. Cardoza R. Chesterman, Thomas Carter, T. Doswell, W. Wallace Deane, George Ferneyhough, R. Tennel, Robert Gilliam, W. H. Grayson, James Gibbons, O. Gwatkins, R. M. Goode, R. H. M. Harrison, W. Hammond, G. Percy Hawes, Richard Hill, W. Johnson, G. Watson James, Edgar Jones, Gwynn Lyell, W. Matthews,

T. Moore, Thomas Murphy, W. Newell, C. M. Nimmo, O. O. Owens, George Peters, John Quarles, M. C. Randolph, P. Robinson, T. M. Rutherford, J. Slater, G. W. Semple, Edgar D. Taylor, W. R. Tyree, W. C. Templeman, J. Taliaferro, B. D. Tucker, W. Yarbrough, James Walsh, Thomas H. Walsh, Kennon Wrenn, G. Doswell, M. Mitchell, E. A. Willis, C. H. Quarles, C. Llewellyn, B. Sheppard, Columbus Shriver, Henry Grant, C. F. Taylor, George Watt.

Many of the names on the roll will be identified with the oldest families in Richmond, and with the rebuilding of the city, materially, financially, commercially, and otherwise after the evacuation fire. Company G served to the end of the war, taking part in the operations against Butler on the southside, in those supporting Stuart at Yellow Tavern, and in the movements at Fort Harrison. The average age of its members, when the war ended, was about seventeen years. Between its organization and the end several of its members on, or before attaining military age, joined other commands.

Colonel McAnerney, in a recent letter, pays this tribute to the members of the boy company:

"One of the most interesting features of the night's work was the splendid action of a large number of the younger sons of the best families of Richmond, who, on account of their youth, were not permitted to enter the (regulars) army, and chafing under the restraint, joined my command and were in the thickest of the fight. Many of them received sabre cuts and other injuries. These young men afterwards organized (reorganized) the famous 'Company G,' under Captain Gay, and were regularly attached to our regiment, doing valiant service, and undergoing all hardships to the close of the war. Many of them are now the leading bankers, merchants and professional men of Richmond, and I always remember the courage and fortitude they displayed until the close of the war."

The writer has felt it no less a duty to other members of the battalion, and of the regiment, than to the members of his own

company, to compile this brief record of the "last stand" on the night of March 1, 1864, but for which God only knows what would have been the fate, not only of President Davis and his Cabinet, but of the women and children of the city.

CLAMOR FOR EXECUTION.

Dahlgren's address and orders to his troopers, found on his body, when in his flight with a fragment of his men, he was killed by Confederate cavalry under Pollard, in King and Queen county, tell what might have been, and that might have been, is so horrible to contemplate, that but for General R. E. Lee, the prisoners taken by Pollard would have been summarily executed. The Confederate Secretary of War, Mr. Seddon, and General Braxton Bragg urged execution; the Richmond papers and the public clamored for it. And the excited state of the popular mind over the "diabolical" scheme, as General Bragg characterized it, accounts in no small measure for failure to appreciate at the time the importance of the Hick's Farm event.

General Lee opened correspondence on the subject with General Meade, who was a gentleman as well as a soldier, and upon the latter's denial of responsibility of the Federal government for Dahlgren's orders and purposes, set his face strongly against execution. He accepted General Meade's denial and wrote to Mr. Seddon as follows:

"These papers can only be accepted as evidence of his (Dahlgren's) intentions. It does not appear how far, his men were cognizant of them, or that his course was sanctioned by the government. It is only known that his plans were frustrated by a merciful Providence, his forces scattered, and he killed. I do not think it right, therefore, to visit upon the captives the guilt of his intentions. * * * I do not think that reason and reflection would justify such a course (extreme measures). I think it better to do right, even if we suffer in so doing, than to incur the reproach of our conscience and posterity."

Some years after the close of the war President Davis, observing Colonel McAnerney in a vast crowd he was addressing, called the colonel to his side and declared to the audience: "This man commanded the Confederate troops that saved Richmond, its people and the government on the night of the Dahlgren raid." A just tribute to the man and to the battalion. The writer regrets that rolls of the other companies are not available. Though the "boy company" has received more conspicuous and special official mention than any of the other companies, its members were only a part of the thin line of battle that moved not out of its tracks in the intense and eventful crisis of the night of March 1, 1864, when all quit themselves like men.

G. W. J.

GENEALOGY OF JEFFERSON DAVIS.

By Dr. WM. H. WHITSITT, Richmond College, of Forrest's Cavalry.

I am sincerely grateful to the gentlemen of Lee Camp for the invitation extended to me to deliver an address upon some Confederate subject. It was suggested by Comrade Freeman, that I should present a tribute to the Confederate Army of the West, and speak a kind word for the soldiers of that service. I hold my comrades of the Western Army in the highest esteem and affection. They were brave and honorable soldiers, but I am not able to do justice to their memory. I held no high position among them, and I did not understand a great deal concerning the military operations that went forward before my eyes. I have learned more about these operations by reading over the dispatches in the so-called "Rebellion Records," than I was able to find out when I was on the spot, and watched the progress of them. Moreover I have never made any special study of military science, and I feel convinced that it would be out of my power to speak of the soldiers of the Western service in a manner that would be equal to the present occasion, or worthy of their skill and courage.

After some reflection I have concluded to address you on the Genealogy of President Jefferson Davis, which appears to be a worthy Confederate subject, about which very little has been said hitherto. The materials are as yet incomplete, and I shall be compelled in several places to indulge in hypothesis; but the working hypothesis is an indispensable resource. I have decided to make a beginning, in the hope that other investigators will find additional material, and clear up the points that may remain imperfect in my treatment of the subject.

The most important material consists of certain notices which Mr. Davis himself dictated a short while before his death

These were included by Mrs. Davis in the opening chapter of her Memoir of his life. The brief statements which are there set down supply an indispensable clew. It was known that the Davis family were of the Baptist persuasion, but when and where they had become Baptists was something unknown until Mr. Davis himself gave the requisite hint. We must thank him for showing us the way. It would have been impossible to turn a wheel without his assistance and direction.

The records of the Baptist Church to which his ancestors seem to have belonged, stand next in importance to the testimony of Mr. Davis. These were published in the year 1904, in two parts by the Historical Society of Delaware, who have thereby rendered a memorable service indeed. We owe much honor and many thanks to the Historical Society of Delaware. Following is the title of Paper Number XLII, issued by that learned corporation:

Records of the Welsh Tract Baptist Meeting, Pencader Hundred, New Castle County, Delaware, 1701 to 1828. In two parts. Copied from the Original Records in the Possession of the Meeting Officials. The Historical Society of Delaware Wilmington, 1904.

In quoting from this record it will be necessary to bring forward certain controversies that were raised among the brethren, but these will be employed merely as items of history. I shall endeavor strictly to observe the proprieties of the occasion and the requirements of the historic method. If I should fail to reach the ideal in these particulars, the failure will be due to defect of skill, and in no sense to defect of purpose and principle. I appeal to your generosity, and request a favorable construction.

It affords me much satisfaction to commend the example of the Historical Society of Delaware. The genealogical notices given by Mr. Davis were entirely useless to me until I was enabled to obtain a sight of the Welsh Tract Records. By comparing the one with the other many secrets were revealed, and many difficulties were removed. I trust that other learned

bodies among us will be encouraged to render assistance to historical students in that fashion. I rejoice that just now the Confederate Museum is issuing Douglas Freeman's Calendar of the Confederate Papers in its possession. This is a work of high importance, and the preparation and publication of it is a proof of the enlightened policy of that great corporation.

Jefferson Davis says, "Three brothers came to America from Wales in the early part of the eighteenth century. They settled at Philadelphia." (Memoir by his Wife, Vol. 1, p. 3). This is a pregnant sentence indeed. This led to comparisons and afforded a clew that supplied to the subject. Taken in connection with these words, the Welsh Tract Meeting and the Welsh Tract Records must acquire very high significance, and they will commend themselves in future to multitudes of people.

The opening sentences of these records describe the beginning of the church in the following words: "In the year 1701 some of us who were members of the churches of Jesus Christ in the countys of Pembroke and Caermarthen, South Wales in Great Britain, (professing believers baptism, laying-on-of-hands, election and final perseverance in grace) were moved and encouraged in our own minds to come to these parts, viz: Pennsylvania; and after obtaining leave of the churches it seemed good to the Lord and to us, that we should be formed into church order, as we were a sufficient number; and as one of us was a minister, that was accomplished and withal letters commendatory were given us, that if we should meet with any congregations of Christian people who held the same faith with us, we might be received by them as brethren in Christ.

"Our number was sixteen: and after bidding farewell to our brethren in Wales, we sailed from Milford Haven in the month of June the year above mentioned, in a ship named James and Mary; and landed in Philadelphia the eighth of September following.

"After landing we were received in a loving manner (on account of the gospel) by the congregation meeting in Philadelphia and Pennepek, who held to the same faith with us (ex-

cepting the ordinance of Laying-on-of-hands on every particular member) with whom we wished much to hold communion at the-Lords-table; but we could not be in fellowship with them in the Lords-supper; because they bore not testimony for God touching the forementioned ordinance. (Records, Pt. I., pp. 7, 8.)

* * * * *

"After our arrival we lived much scattered for about a year and a half, yet kept up our weekly and monthly meetings among ourselves: during which time it pleased God to add to our number about twenty members, in which time we, and many other Welsh people purchased a tract of land in New Castle County, on Delaware, which was called Welsh Tract: in the year 1703 we began to get our living out of it, and to set our meetings in order and build a place of worship which was commonly known by the name of, The Baptist meeting-house by the Iron-hill." (Records, Pt. I., p. 8).

* * * * *

"The names of the members who first came over were:

Thomas Griffith "minister"

Year Griffith Nicolas

1701. Evan Edmond

John Edward

Elizeus (Elisha) Thomas

Enoch Morgan

Righart (Richard) David

Elizabeth Griffith

Lewis Edmond

Mary John

Mary Thomas

Elizabeth Griffith

Shonnet (Jennet) David

Margaret Matheas

Shonnet (Jennet) Morris

James David" (Records Pt. I., pp. 11, 12.)

The Davids mentioned in the above list seem to be the ancestors of President Davis. They fulfill all the conditions of the case. They were of the Baptist faith. They emigrated from Wales and settled near Philadelphia in the early part of the eighteenth century. They retained their Philadelphia home for eighteen months and then removed to New Castle County, Delaware. So far as history informs us, there was no other Baptist family of the name of Davis, that came from Wales in the early part of the eighteenth century, and settled at Philadelphia.

President Davis speaks of three brothers, the youngest of whom named Evan was his grandfather. Richard and James David (Records, pp. 11, 12) were charter members of the church and they may have been brothers, but there is no account of Evan Davis. Shion Dafydd subscribed the Philadelphia Confession in February, 1716 (Records, p. 21), and my edition of Webster's Dictionary affirms that Evan is "the same as John," but Charlotte M. Yonge in her History of Christian Names, p. 273, expresses herself with less confidence, and is only willing to say that "Evan *may* be intended for John." If Evan was intended for John, then the Welsh Tract Records may supply the names of the three brothers. But I am inclined to doubt somewhat concerning the three brothers. Richard David seems to have been the head of the family.

Samuel Davis, the President's father, was born in the year 1756, and was an only son. Evan the grandfather may have married his wife, the Widow Williams, about the year 1755, and he is supposed to have been at least sixty years of age at that time. That is a possible construction, but it would seem more likely that Evan was born in America rather than in Wales. It is not uncommon for people to omit a generation or two, who undertake to trace their genealogy without the assistance of contemporary records.

In the year 1711 Martha Thomas was added to the Welsh Tract Church by baptism: apparently a daughter of Elisha Thomas, who later was selected as the second pastor. She was the first and only person with the Christian name of Martha

that is found in the early lists of membership. In February, 1716, Martha Thomas disappears and the name of Martha Dafs occurs for the first time. My hypothesis is that she had married, meanwhile, one of the Davis young men. In the year 1732 the case of Martha Dafs was brought before the Church, and the records give the following account of it:

"The rebellion of Martha David against the Church appeared,

(1) In opposing the truth which she one professed to the church according to the commandment of Christ and the practice of the Apostles under the ministry of the New Testament.

(2) In refusing instruction, and despising advice tho' offered many a time by the brethren in particular, and by the church in general.

(3) In breaking covenant with the church by carrying unconnected pieces of what was talked in the church to the Presbyterians to have their opinion of them, tho' the church charged her beforehand not to do so.

(4) In being so false and unfaithful in carrying her tales so that she has curtailed the truth and increased her falsehoods; and thereby hath wronged the church by her change of opinion, and putting a false gloss upon what was said to her—and putting it in the power of enemies to blaspheme—also to renew the variance between us and the Presbyterians, for which causes she was put out of the church Mar. 4, 1732.

N. B. She was President Davis's mother." (Records, p. 26.)

I have striven in vain to discover the Christian name of the father of President Samuel Davies of Princeton College. James David, whose name appears last on the list of charter members, may have been his father, but of that point we cannot be certified. According to Dr. Foote (Sketches, p. 158), the father of Samuel Davies was born in the year 1680, he died on the 11th of August, 1750, apparently in Hanover County, Virginia; but the records of that county were destroyed at the close of the Confederate War, and it will hardly be possible to obtain any further information concerning him. Richard

David died on the 16th of February, 1719 (Records, pt. 1, p. 24). His wife, Shonnet (otherwise written Janneth) was the first member of the church to pass away (Records, p. 23). She died on the 10th of June, 1701, and may have been buried at sea.

Much freedom was employed in spelling the name. The clerk of the church wrote it usually, but not invariably, David. On the 4th of Feb., 1716, many of the members subscribed the Philadelphia Confession of Faith, and here the spelling was both variant and archaic. It appears that every person wrote his own name with his own hand, and took liberty to spell it in his own way. In that place the name Richard Davis is spelled Rhichart Dafydd. Martha Davies, the mother of President Davies of Princeton, spells her name Martha Dafis (Records, p. 20). David Davis spelled it Davis (Records, p. 21), as did also Janott Davis, who subscribed in the year 1724 (Records, p. 22). President Davies appears from these Records to have been the first person of the family connection to put an "e" into the body of the name, and spell it Davies.

It was considered disorderly in the early period for young people to marry without advising with the church. (Records, p. 77.) While they were still in Philadelphia, and before the removal to Welsh Tract, one of the young fellows of the Thomas family appears to have violated that rule. His wife however, seems to have healed all the trouble, by uniting with the church. In the year 1702 her name appears as Easter Thomas (Records, p. 12), and in the year 1716 she subscribed the Confession of Faith as Estor Thomas. (Records, p. 20.) But apparently she was not content with her lot, and in the year 1733 the following entry occurs:

"At our quarterly meeting, Jun 9, 1733 Then was Esther Thomas excluded.

"She was under a kind of suspension for some considerable time before; for her lukewarmness, and negligence and for blaming the doctrine and for carrying her grand daughters to the presbyterians to be sprinkled contrary unto the will of their

father and mother while alive, which then were dead. She also left the church and joined with ye presbyterians—And was therefore excluded." (Records, p. 75.) Though her exclusion followed that of Martha Davies by fifteen months, her influence appears to have been paramount in the action of her sister-in-law. They both showed commendable filial piety in avoiding every issue until after the death of their father, Elisha Thomas, the second pastor, who passed away on the first of September, 1730 (Records, p. 25).

In the Journal of the Rev. Samuel Davies the following entry occurs under date of Monday, November 12, [1753]:

"Went to see my relations in the tract; and when I passed by the places where I formerly lived or walked, it gave a solemn turn to my mind" (Foote, Sketches, p. 237). One may wonder whether he encountered Evan Davis on this visit to his relations in the Tract. Three years later there was born to Evan his only son and heir. The Christian name of Samuel had been apparently unknown in this particular family, until it was introduced by Martha Davies. President Samuel Davies says:

"I cannot but mention to my friend an anecdote known to but few; that is that I am a son of prayer, like my namesake Samuel, the prophet; and my mother called me Samuel, because, she said, I have asked him of the Lord." (Foote, Sketches, p. 158). Evidently it was an unaccustomed name, but Evan Davies may have been so charmed by the presence of the great preacher, and by the luster of his name in Europe and America, that he elected to call his own child Samuel in honor of him. That appears at least a rational explanation of the Christian name of the father of Jefferson Davis.

The notices given by Jefferson Davis are brief, and not always distinct. He says: "The youngest of the brothers, Evan Davis, removed to Georgia, then a colony of Great Britain. He was the grandfather of Jefferson Davis. He married a widow whose family name was Emory. By her he had one son, Samuel Davis, the father of Jefferson Davis." (Memoir by his Wife, Vol. I. p. 3.)

When did Evan Davis remove to the Colony of Georgia? If his son Samuel Davis was born in the year 1756, the union with the Widow Williams must have taken place before that time. But Georgia was an unlikely place for Evan Davis to obtain any but an Indian wife prior to the year 1756. Moreover the language of Mr. Davis does not appear to certify that Evan Davis married Mrs. Williams in Georgia. He may have removed to Georgia some time after his marriage to her.

It seems possible, in fact, that Evan Davis may have obtained his wife from the communicants of Welsh Tract Church in Pennsylvania. A family of the name of William, which later came to be written Williams, was established in the Welsh Tract community as early as the year 1710, at which time Mary William from Kilcam in Wales was received as a member of the church (Records, p. 14). Shion William appears to have been the head of the family. He signed the Philadelphia Confession of Faith in 1716 (Records, p. 20), and was buried under the name of John William on the 30th of September, 1718. Margaret William was also a signer of the Confession (Records, p. 20).

During the years 1735, 1737 and 1738, quite a number of people were sent forth from Welsh Tract church in Delaware to build another church on Pedee River in South Carolina. Their names are all carefully preserved in the records (Records, Pt. 1, pp. 83-85). The new church that was established in Carolina was styled Welsh Neck, in memory of the mother church from which it had sprung. It is still an influential community, and Welsh Neck Association has grown up about it an organization of more than twenty churches, that is highly respected in all sections of the Southern country.

It seems natural to conclude that Evan Davis in traveling Southward should have called at Welsh Neck, where many people resided with whom he had been on familiar terms. Margaret William of Welsh Tract had become a member of Welsh Neck (Records, p. 84), and it does not appear a violent hypothesis that one of her sons may have married a Miss Emory

of South Carolina, and that she in the charm of her widowhood may have won the heart and hand of Evan Davis. Upon reflection it appears more likely that the Emory family in question may have belonged to South Carolina, than to Georgia or Pennsylvania.

Assuming that Evan Davis tarried for a season in South Carolina, it is pertinent to inquire after the special attraction that could have induced him to remove to Georgia. The religious sentiments of Welshmen are apt to be very profound and controlling. The Davis family seem to have been no exception to this rule. In the year 1755, when the Scotch-Irish migration was moving Southward, Shubael Stearnes and Daniel Marshall, a couple of Baptist ministers, joined the procession at Winchester, Va. Stearnes halted in North Carolina, but Marshall followed the procession all the way to Georgia, and when their work had been completed there were many Scotch-Irish Baptists in Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia.

Marshall had advanced as far as Edgefield District, South Carolina, in 1767, where he founded Horse Creek Church, about fifteen miles north of Augusta. In the year 1771 he transferred his residence across the Savannah, about twenty miles north of Augusta, where he established Kioka church, whose members resided both in Georgia and South Carolina. The fame of Kioka went abroad into every quarter of the country: it became a great center of influence. The religious magnet probably drew Evan Davis more strongly than any other. He seems to have been pleased with the temperature of the Scotch-Irish religion, and to have removed his home and membership from Welsh Neck to the church at Kioka. It is likely that he settled in Georgia before the year 1771. Samuel Davis was fifteen years old at this time, and it may be that he, too, had become a communicant of Kioka church before the outbreak of the Revolution.

Samuel Davis was nineteen years of age at the opening of hostilities. Mr. Davis reports that the young man entered the

military service, and in the course of time raised a company of infantry, which he commanded until peace was declared. It was during his connection with the Army, according to President Davis, that he met Miss Jane Cook, the Scotch-Irish lassie who became his wife and the mother of his children. This may be a correct statement, but it appears more likely that Samuel Davis, always a strict attendant upon Baptist meetings, should have met her at some session of the Georgia Baptist Association, a very large and powerful body composed of churches situated on both sides of the Savannah River. She may have been a member of one of the Baptist churches in Edgefield or Abbeville District, South Carolina, whose hospitality the Georgia Association had been thankful to accept. The Rev. Mark Cook was a valued minister of the Georgia Association, and though he resided on the Georgia side of the Savannah, it is possible that he had come from South Carolina, and that Miss Jane Cook may have been a near relative. The union of two such splendid races as the Welsh and the Scotch-Irish was auspicious in many ways. It produced a man of remarkable spirit and capacity, who became one of the foremost figures in American history.

If anybody is willing to assist in promoting this investigation, he might render excellent service by examining the records of New Castle County, Delaware, for additional traces of the Davis family from 1703 to 1775. Possibly the records of Welsh Neck Church, or of Darlington County, S. C., might produce some notices of the life of Evan Davis in the period before his removal to Georgia. President Davis affirms that his father, Samuel Davis, was elected clerk of the county court where he resided in Georgia. If search was made, in Richmond or Columbia County, for the books that were written during his term of office, it would be appreciated.

Welsh Tract and Welsh Neck were both important fanes of Baptist religion, but Kioka appears to have transcended them in power and influence. From Kioka the Baptist religion was extended all over Georgia, and likewise into portions of Middle

Tennessee and Southern Kentucky. Samuel Davis went to Southern Kentucky and settled in Christian County, where his eminent son was born on the 3d of June, 1808. Here he was connected with Bethel church, a prosperous community. In later years Bethel Association was formed around it, which became distinguished in the annals of Kentucky Baptists. It established Bethel College at Russellville, and Bethel Female College at Hopkinsville, both of which have been respectable for learning and usefulness.

Shortly before the opening of the war of 1812, Samuel Davis sought another home, and settled in Wilkinson county, Mississippi. Here also he seems to have been an active religious leader. He was probably a member of another Bethel church situated near Woodville, the county seat of Wilkinson. This church belonged to Mississippi Association, from which the Baptist religion was spread abroad in the States of Mississippi and Louisiana. He died on the 4th of July, 1824, at the age of sixty-eight years.

During the progress of this investigation I have advanced several hypotheses, and it is likely that some of them may be set aside through additional research. The main conclusion that I have reached, however, namely, that the Davis family were remarkable for religious energy and efficiency, will be likely to endure. Samuel Davies of Princeton was the incomparable ornament of their colonial period, and his namesake, Samuel Davis (provided my hypothesis will hold), was an effective religious figure of the middle period, who won a good degree in the States of Georgia, Kentucky, and Mississippi. He was always found upon the high places of the field: always at centers of large and profitable procedure.

In an address that he made at the dedication of the Baptist church in Kentucky, that had been erected upon the spot where his father's house once stood, Jefferson Davis is reported to have affirmed that his father was a better man than himself. Possibly he was referring to the punctual exercise of the cares and offices of religious life. His father may have excelled him

in that particular, because his father lived in a different age, and was more secluded from the business and conflicts of life. But Jefferson Davis possessed high religious energy and devoutness. There were pranks at school and college, but he was a sturdy and studious lad. In his public life there were many seductions and temptations, but he kept a stainless escutcheon. He failed in the greatest conflict of his life, but perhaps no other leader in the Confederacy could have come as near to success. And after defeat had claimed him for her own, he endured for many years a great burden of reproach and sorrow, with manly dignity and courage. There was displayed the excellent religion of his fathers; finer, perhaps, than any that you and I possess.

“His life was gentle; and the elements
So mixed in him, that Nature might stand up,
And say to all the world ‘This was a man.’ ”

STUART'S RIDE AND DEATH OF LATANE.

Paper Read Before Wright-Latane Camp, Confederate Veterans, Tappahannock, Va., December 21, 1896.

By Hon. WILLIAM CAMPBELL, Company F, 9th Virginia Cavalry.

At your request, I undertake, after an intervention of more than thirty-four years, to write (from memory) my recollections of Stuart's famous ride around McClellan's army in the early summer of 1862; and also of the death of Captain William Latane, of the Essex Light Dragoons, who fell in a charge made by his squadron upon the enemy near the "Old Church," in Hanover county, Va.

Captain Latane, a son of Henry Waring and Susan Allen Latane, was born at "The Meadow" on the 16th of January, 1833, and grew to man's estate surrounded by home influences not inferior to any in Virginia. After receiving such training as the surrounding educational institutions could afford, he began the study of medicine at the University of Virginia in October, 1851. Here he remained until the following summer, not offering for graduation. In the fall of 1852, for some unexplained reason, he did not return to the University, but transferred the scene of his studies to the Richmond Medical College, where he graduated in the spring of 1853. The following winter he spent in Philadelphia, taking a post-graduate course at one of the medical schools of that city, and also attending the hospital practice of the city. On returning home in the spring of 1854, he located at "The Meadow," and at once became a candidate for the practice of medicine. Here he remained until the breaking out of the war, not only attending

to his practice—which soon became extensive, in consequence of his doing a large amount of charity practice among the poor around him—but giving successful attention to his large farm; and in the management of the labor on this farm he was “without any thought of it on his part,” thus receiving preliminary training for the handling of large bodies of soldiers when the clash of arms should come upon his loved country. This would surely have been realized, had not his young life been snatched so suddenly away.

Early in 1861, when Mr. Lincoln made his call for troops to put down what he termed “the rebellion,” there was a rush to arms all over Virginia, and soon a cavalry company, called the Essex Light Dragoons, was formed, electing as their officers Dr. R. S. Cauthorn, captain; William L. Waring, first lieutenant; William A. Oliver, second lieutenant, and William Latane, third lieutenant. The company was soon mustered into the Confederate service for one year. In the spring of 1862 it became necessary to re-enlist the men and reorganize the company, and in this reorganization, by common consent, William Latane was made captain. It was about this time that your writer made the acquaintance of his captain. I found him a man of small stature and quiet demeanor, but quick to perceive the wrong and very assertive in his opposition to it. He commanded the confidence of his men by his evenhanded justice to all, and at the same time he brooked no disorder. Soon after the reorganization he was ordered to report with his company at Hick's Hill, near Fredericksburg, to become one of the constituent companies of the Ninth Virginia Cavalry, of which W. H. F. Lee, a son of General R. E. Lee, was colonel; R. L. T. Beale, lieutenant-colonel, and Thomas Waller, major. The Essex Light Dragoons became Company F of that famous regiment, and in the years that followed few of the recruits knew the company by its original name. The month of service around Fredericksburg amounted to little except picket and drill duty, but McClellan's landing on the Peninsula and his march on Richmond made it necessary for us to retire to the lines around

that city. Our regiment found a camp near Young's Millpond, and not far from the Brook Turnpike, occupying a position on the extreme left of the army defending Richmond. Nothing of special interest occurred during the following month other than the usual routine camp life.

But on Thursday, June 12th, came orders to prepare three days' rations and hold ourselves ready to march at a moment's notice. There was naturally suppressed excitement and speculation as to what we were to do or where we were to go, but no news came, and we could only indulge in speculation as to our destination. About 1 o'clock P. M. the regimental bugler sounded "saddle up," which was caught up by the company buglers and soon the camp was in commotion. "To horse" was soon sounded, and through the whole camp could be heard the command of the officers, "Fall in, men." Companies were formed and our regiment marched out of camp to participate in the most memorable and daring raid that was made during the war. We marched in the direction of Hanover Courthouse and went into camp after dark, having marched some fifteen miles. Early dawn on the following morning found us in the saddle, the Ninth Virginia in the front, and our squadron, composed of the Mercer Cavalry, of Spotsylvania, and our company being in the front of the regiment, the Mercer being in advance. Captain Crutchfield being absent, Captain Latane commanded the squadron, and, of course, rode in front, immediately in the rear of Colonel Lee and staff.

Our march proceeded via Hanover Courthouse and on toward the Old Church. The first indication of an enemy we saw was the bringing in of a Yankee by one of our scouts. Soon thereafter Captain Latane rode to the rear and ordered four of his own company to advance to the front and form the first set of fours. This had scarcely been accomplished before Colonel Lee ordered Captain Latane to throw out four flankers, two on either side, and four members of his company were at once ordered to proceed, two to the right and the others to the left, and march a little in advance of the regi-

ment. Your writer was one of those on the left. Moving forward, not seeing an enemy or supposing one to be near, I suddenly heard the command to charge, and then the clash of arms, with rapid pistol shots. Riding rapidly towards the firing, I found our squadron occupying the road and two companies of the Fifth United States Regulars attempting to form in a field near at hand, and Lieutenant Oliver urging his men to charge them. This was promptly done, and the enemy driven to the woods. Just before reaching the timber, I overtook Lieutenant McLane, of the Federals, and he, seeing the utter futility of resistance, surrendered. As I was taking him to the rear, I met Colonel Lee and was told by him of the death of Captain Latane.

He ordered me to turn my prisoner over to the guard, and then go and look after my captain. I soon found his body, surrounded by some half a dozen of his men, one of whom was his brother, John—who was afterwards elected a lieutenant in the company, and the following year he, too, sealed his devotion to his country with his life. Another of those present was S. W. Mitchell, a sergeant in the company, and, I wish to add, as gallant a spirit as ever did battle for a country.

Mitchell, being the stoutest man present, was selected to bear the body from the field. He having mounted his horse, we tenderly raised the body and placed it in front of him. John Latane then mounted his horse, and he and Mitchell passed to the rear, while the rest of us hurried to join our command on its perilous journey. I wish I could write my feelings as I looked upon the form of him who but a few moments before was the embodiment of life and duty. I wish I could describe to you the beautiful half Arabian horse that he rode, "The Colonel," and how splendidly he sat him, but I fully realize that I am not equal to the task. John R. Thompson, in his beautiful poem, "The Burial of Latane," and William D. Washington, in his painting of the same name, have, by pen and brush, so enshrined the name of Latane in the hearts of the people of our Southland that it will endure as long as men are ad-

mired for the devotion to duty and for risking their lives upon the perilous edge of battle in defense of homes and country.

I can only add that the glorious Stuart continued to ride grandly on his way, the Ninth Virginia still holding the post of honor at the front. Passing the Old Church, we hastened on toward the York River Railroad. Soon it was crossed and night came on but not halting. On we marched into the county of New Kent. All that long night was spent in the saddle, pushing our way toward the lower Chickahominy, which we reached in the early morning, only to find that the bridge over which we intended to cross had been burned. But General Stuart was equal to the emergency. He soon had his rear guarded and the men swimming their horses over, while others were tearing down an old barn, out of which a temporary bridge was constructed.

On this the artillery and the few horses that remained were taken over. The bridge was again burned, in order to prevent pursuit. Again there was an all-night march, as we hurried up through the county of James City and on to Richmond, which city we reached about midday on Sunday, June 15th, and went back to our camp that afternoon.

We brought back many trophies of our raid, consisting of several hundred prisoners and as many horses. But these went little way towards compensating the Essex Light Dragoons for the loss they had sustained in the death of their gallant captain.

As the years have crept on and I have called back to memory one incident after another of the deeds of daring and scenes of danger through which the cavalry of the Army of Northern Virginia passed in the four years of conflict, I recall none more splendidly conceived, more dashinglly executed, and showing more favorable results than Stuart's raid around McClellan at Richmond.

MORGAN'S MEN IN OHIO.

By A. C. QUISENBERRY, Hyattsville, Md.

Some months ago there was considerable indignation in Lexington, Kentucky, on account of a statement in a school history, then in use in the schools, that Morgan's raid into Indiana and Ohio—one of the most daring ventures, and, even as a failure the most brilliant raid of the war—was made "mainly for loot and plunder."

Morgan's men undoubtedly did a lot of looting when they got into the enemy's country, but it was insignificant as compared with the looting done by some other invading armies during the Civil War, and it may be well enough to inquire into the extent to which they looted in Ohio.

By act of the Ohio legislature, and in order to remunerate the citizens of the State for damages incurred during Morgan's raid, a commission was organized April 15, 1864, consisting of Alfred McVeigh, G. W. Barker, and Henry S. Babbitt, whose duty it was to examine and pass upon claims for damages inflicted by Morgan's men, and also for the damages caused by the Union troops who pursued Morgan through Ohio.

They submitted their report on December 15, 1864, seventeen months after the close of the raid. Most of the claims presented were cut down. The report says: "It was discovered that there was a general disposition to appreciate the prices of property—that the values of 1864 were being substituted for the values of 1863."

The report shows that claims for damages done by Morgan amounting to \$492,372.76 were presented, and they were cut down to \$428,168.00; and that claims amounting to \$185,541.27 for damages by the Union troops in pursuit of Morgan were presented, and were reduced to \$148,057.00.

So we must accept the fact that Morgan's men did not, in the aggregate, inflict a greater damage than \$428,168 in their raid through some twenty-five counties of the State. A great deal of this was through such absolute military necessity as is acknowledged as allowable to all armies; and was similarly done by the Union troops who followed them. Morgan had no supply trains and, in the very nature of the case, had to live off of the country through which he passed; yet every man who gave one of his troops a meal, or provisions, or forage for his horse, presented a claim for it as "Rebel damages."

The men picked fruit from the orchards, "pressed" guns, swords, ammunition, drugs and medicines, and axes and other tools for the use of their pioneer corps—and the same things were done by the Union troops who pursued them. Morgan's men took stamps and cash from post-offices, which were clearly contrabrand of war, being the public property of the United States government.

The largest items of damage done were the destruction of engines, cars, bridges, trestles, boats, etc., and the burning of two railway depots. The Union troops in pursuit of Morgan also destroyed a number of bridges, boats, etc.,—all of which is a legitimate part of the game of war, especially in an enemy's country, and can not properly be called looting. Many people put in claims for the expense of keeping horses that Morgan's men left behind them when they took fresh ones; and many others who followed up the flying column and recovered their horses when they were abandoned for still other fresh ones put in claims for the expenses incurred in the recovery.

Now, all the items enumerated above aggregated a great sum of money and reduces that \$428,168 very considerably, leaving only a moderate amount of it to be charged to looting pure and simple.

The report of the commission shows that (aside from horses) the only live-stock Morgan appropriated in Ohio was 43 sheep in Clermont county, valued at \$215, and 3 sheep in Meigs county, valued at \$9. When Sherman made his great march

from Atlanta to the sea, and thence to Weldon, N. C., it is said to have been the invariable custom of his men to kill every head of live-stock they came across, of all kinds, that they could not consume upon the spot or carry away with them.

STATISTICS OF HORSE-STEALING.

The report of the commissioners is especially severe upon "Morgan, the arch raider, and his fellow horse-thieves," for their brilliant exploits in the gentle craft of horse-stealing. It is true that Morgan's men had quite a reputation in that way, even among their best friends and warmest sympathizers in their home State, Kentucky. But the following tabulation will show that "there were others."

The tabulation shows the number of horses taken by Morgan in each Ohio county he passed through, and also the number taken by the Union troops who were pursuing him, and the data has been gathered from the report of the commissioners. It makes "mighty interesting reading."

<i>County.</i>	<i>Taken by Union troops.</i>	<i>Taken by Morgan's men.</i>
Adams	79	291
Athens	20	45
Belmont	8	3
Brown	71	135
Butler	37	...
Carroll	11
Clermont	185	271
Clinton	4	...
Columbiana	16	7
Fairfield	1	...
Gallia	46	125
Guernsey	140	75
Hamilton	172	322
Harrison	64	53
Highland	26	19

<i>County.</i>	<i>Taken by Union troops.</i>	<i>Taken by Morgan's men.</i>
Hocking	18	38
Jackson	64	190
Jefferson	66	68
Meigs	86	265
Morgan	20	32
Muskingum	29	40
Noble	14	15
Perry	9	54
Pike	60	80
Ross	3	...
Sciota	6	3
Vinton	29	116
Warren	1	1
Washington	34	2
Total	1,308	2,261

Morgan entered Ohio with about 1,800 men, so it seems that they did not average much over one remount to the man while in that State. The tabulation shows that Morgan's Union pursuers had a very pretty knack of their own in the matter of appropriating horse-flesh. And it must be remembered that these 1,308 horses here shown as taken by Union troops were never returned to their owners, who were paid for them by the State of Ohio, while the Union troops who "pressed" them, kept them.

Large numbers of Ohio horses captured from Morgan at Buffington Island and in succeeding fights were not returned to their owners, but were kept by their captors, and their owners were paid for them by the State of Ohio under the head of "Rebel damages." Deducting also this considerable item from the sum total of "Rebel damages," and it begins to make that \$428,168 "look like thirty cents."

The commissioners say in their report: "A separate column has been kept in the claims for damages by rebels of the value

of such property as has been certainly traced into the possession and use of the United States forces. The amount, \$205,552, will be seen to be ridiculously small, when it is patent to every one that of the large number of horses stolen by the rebels and not restored to their owners nearly all were recaptured by the Government forces after the fight in Meigs county, or at the surrender in Columbiana. It appears that there was very little effort made to restore such property to its rightful owners, or else the efforts of a few men were frustrated by the more designing, who hurried off the stock to the front with indecent haste."

Adding these to the 1,308 horses shown in the tabulation, it would seem that the Union troops stole more horses in Ohio during that raid than Morgan's men did.

CURIOUS "REBEL DAMAGE" CLAIMS.

Among the more curious of the "Rebel damage" claims submitted to the commissioners by citizens of Ohio were the following:

In Adams county, James M. Paul put in a claim for a stage coach taken from him. J. R. C. Brown, of Brown county, lost a "History of the Rebellion," value \$2.50. In Clermont county, Wm. Klock claimed \$1.20 for 8 pounds of cheese taken from him "per order of Col. Dick Morgan," and Peter Stroup wanted \$100 for "damages to turnpike."

The commissioners say of the claim of Mahlon Pearson that it is "trumped;" and of another man that "the claimant is a perjured scoundrel." In Guernsey county, John Collins claimed \$5 for a bonnet, and James Mott \$10 for a bonnet, apron, and silk stockings.

In Hamilton county John T. Redman, engineer, wanted pay for his loss of time from work after his engine was destroyed by the rebels. It appears that Morgan's men took 26 plows from the Jackson foundry, in Jackson county, though they certainly had no time to stop and raise a crop. In the same county Edward Rief, tanner, claimed that "the rebel occupation of the

town prevented him from attending at the proper hour to some hides he had in the vats, and they spoiled," for which he claimed \$80 damages. Hugh Scurlock claimed for "a sucking colt." In God's name, what did Morgan's men want with it? John M. Smith was allowed \$10 for "a set of teeth." In Meigs county Martin Dye, a militiaman, "pressed" a neighbor's horse to ride in pursuit of Morgan, who captured both Dye and the horse. Mr. Dye paid his neighbor \$75 for the horse, and then put in a claim against the State for its value as a "Rebel damage,"—a horse captured in battle.

James G. Maguire was allowed \$12 for a barrel of vinegar "supposed to be poisoned." David F. Pearson claimed \$10 for the loss of seven days time while he was a prisoner of war. Henry Truxell hid his horse in the woods to keep Morgan from getting it, the horse got tangled in its own halter and strangled, and Truxell put in a claim of \$109.50 as a "Rebel damage."

Thomas Lindsay, of Noble county, claimed \$5 for three brass kettles "burned" at Campbell's Station. There are instances of where men recovered their horses taken by Morgan, and, the horses dying some five months later, claims were put in for their value as "Rebel damages."

CURIOUS UNION DAMAGE CLAIMS.

Among the more curious of the claims for damages inflicted by Union troops in their pursuit of Morgan through Ohio were the following:

In Brown county Wm. M. Robbins claims for "a Black Hawk pony, 42 years old." In Guernsey Arch Shipley claimed for an ox shot on his farm during a skirmish. John Wheeler, of Harrison, got \$5 for "lodging soldiers and cleaning rooms after their use." James M. Wilkinson, of Meigs, asked \$285 for 3 horses killed in the battle of Buffington Island, which began on his farm.

In Perry county, Peter Poorman claimed "for use of horse and damages to same from distemper contracted in the service, and the value of a colt that took distemper from the horse, and

died." Lewis Beekman, of Pike, states that he "was taken prisoner by the advance guard of the Union army because he shouted for Vallandigham, and that the troops quartered on his place and did the injury charged for." William Smith, of Meigs, wanted pay for "one horse that died in the service of his country," and the commissioners say: "Claimant has not the vestige of a just claim." James Meloy, of Morgan, claimed \$20 for damages by a shell that was fired through his barn in battle.

LOOTING BY UNION TROOPS.

In their report the commissioners say: "The conduct of the State militia, as shown by this investigation, was for the most part, very exemplary, and improper demands upon the citizens were very rare; there were, however, a few flagrant exceptions to this general good behavior. The most prominent and dastardly act of wrong was, perhaps, the cowardly plundering of the house of Mrs. Misner, in Jackson county, by the militia companies of Captains James Faulkner and Nelson Richmond, of Vinton county. Evidence is wanting that the deed was committed with the advice, consent or knowledge of the officers, but it would be a source of gratification if those companies could be made to make reparation for their acts of vandalism, especially when it is known that the husband of the woman was absent from home in the service of his country. The rooms of two college students at Athens were forced and robbed while the militia were quartered in the building; besides these, similar acts were scarcely known."

The report shows that this was true enough; but there were numerous instances of petty looting by Union troops, of which the following are fair samples:

A pair of "pants" taken from L. D. Poston, of Athens county; Lewis Keethler, of Brown, had \$10 in cash taken from him. Thomas H. Wood, of the same county, claimed \$40 for one silk national banner, and a foot note says: "A silk banner bearing the inscription 'Presented to the Democracy of Sterling

township,' was lent to some members of Colonel Wolford's First Kentucky Cavalry, who promised to return same or pay for it, which they will probably do." In Clermont county James Givens lost a gold watch and a gold chain; Chaunce Haskell claimed \$75 for damages to a peach orchard; Charles M. Smith was deprived of seven fur hats and eight pounds of tobacco. A. J. Sweet's peddling wagon was robbed of "notions."

In Hamilton county James Forbes claimed \$157.75 for damages to furniture, harness, house, outbuildings, and "stealing chickens." In Guernsey George Burson lost a pair of saddlebags, and William Burt a sidesaddle. Mrs. Mary A. White, of Meigs, claimed \$315 for cash and clothing taken from her by Union troops, and damages to crops, fruit trees, house and fence. S. C. Butler, of Muskingum, claimed 75 cents for a pair of martingales; James A. Reppert, of Washington, \$40 for four silver spoons, and \$2.50 for three knives and four towels taken from his house; H. W. Lill, \$4 for 30 chickens; Isaac East, of Highland, \$20 for four sides of leather taken from him; James Weeks, of Washington, \$17 for 500 shingles; and Owen Hale \$4 for 40 chickens, \$3 for tin cups, towels, etc., taken from his house.

LOOTING BY MORGAN'S MEN.

It is a fact that Morgan's men did a great deal of outrageous and scandalous looting in Ohio. It consisted mostly in the robbing of stores in the towns through which they passed. General Basil W. Duke in his "History of Morgan's Cavalry" says:

"The disposition for wholesale plunder exceeded anything that any of us had ever seen before. The men seemed actuated by a desire to pay off in the enemy's country all scores that the Union army had chalked up in the South. The great cause for apprehension which our situation might have inspired seemed only to make them reckless.

"Calico was the staple article of appropriation. Each man (who could get one) tied a bolt of it to his saddle, only to

throw it away and get a fresh one at the first opportunity. They did not pilfer with any sort of method or reason; it seemed to be a mania, senseless and purposeless.

"One man carried a bird-cage with three canaries in it for two days. Another rode with a chafing dish, which looked like a small metallic coffin, on the pommel of his saddle until an officer forced him to throw it away. Although the weather was intensely warm, another slung several pairs of skates around his neck, and chuckled over the acquisition.

"I saw very few articles of real value taken; they pillaged like boys robbing an orchard. I would not have believed such a passion could have been developed so ludicrously in any body of civilized men. At Piketon, Ohio, one man broke through the guard posted at a store, rushed in trembling with excitement and avarice, and filled his pockets with horn buttons. They would, with a few exceptions, throw away their plunder after awhile, like children tired of their toys."

The depot buildings at Campbell's Station and Jackson Court House were burned, probably accidentally from the cars which had been set on fire at those places. It must be said to the everlasting credit of Morgan's men that among the thousands of claims for "Rebel damages" to be paid by the State of Ohio, not one was presented for the burning of a mill, a dwelling house, a barn, an outhouse, or a private house or building of any kind. There were during the war incursions into the valley of Virginia (and in other places) which left nothing in their tracks but the smoking and smouldering ruins of every mill, dwelling house, barn and outhouse that lay in the pathway of the invaders.

SPOTSYLVANIA MARKERS.

Sometime in the summer of 1902, a party of gentlemen spent a day visiting the battlefields of Chancellorsville and the Wilderness. One of the party, Mr. Samuel B. Woods, returning to his home in Charlottesville, Va., met in some business relation Mr. Thomas F. Ryan, of New York and Nelson County, Virginia. Telling of his visit to the battlefield, Mr. Wood was requested by Mr. Ryan to arrange for the erection of stone markers at points of great historic interest, Mr. Ryan cordially assuming the expense. At Mr. Woods' suggestion a committee was named which included Gov. A. J. Montague, Major John W. Daniel, Col. Wm. E. Cutshaw, Major E. D. T. Myers, Samuel B. Woods, James P. Smith and others, whose names are not now recalled.

Several meetings of this committee were held and the matter thoroughly discussed. It was proposed that the fields on which markers should be placed should include Manassas, Culpeper and Petersburg and the vicinity of Richmond. There was some correspondence and effort made to secure the counsel and aid of parties in these localities. After some delay it was determined to proceed with the work of preparing such markers and placing them in the county of Spotsylvania. The purpose was not to mark battlefields, or lines of battle, but certain points or localities that would be of lasting historic interest, and the writer of this paper, as somewhat familiar with these localities, was instructed to proceed with the work in Spotsylvania county.

A contract was made with Cartwright & Davis, of the Granite Works, Fredericksburg, Va., for the preparation of ten stones, and setting them in place, and in the summer of 1903 they were completed, hauled out to their places and under my personal direction were erected in place. Each one of these stones is about a ton in weight, and is of clear blue Fredericksburg

granite, from the Fall Hill or Taylor quarries. The inscriptions are brief, well cut, and stones and inscriptions, we believe, are imperishable and will preserve the historic interest of the locality for all time. The entire cost of these markers was \$230.00, and was fully met by the generosity of Mr. Ryan. The receipted bill of Cartright and Davis, with a list of the markers and localities are filed in the Virginia Room of the Confederate Museum, Richmond, Virginia.

The Markers in Spotsylvania are as follows:

1. Bivouac of Lee and Jackson, the night before Chancellorsville, at the Junction of the Orange Plank Road and the road to Catherine Furnace.
2. Lee turned back by Texans—on the Plank Road, Mrs. Tapp's Old Field, East of Parker's Store.
3. Jackson's Arm Buried—Northwest corner of Wm. Jones' burying ground, Ellwood, Wilderness.
4. At Salem Church, on Roadside.
5. General Lee's Field Headquarters, Battle of Fredericksburg, on Telegraph road, back of Howison's.
6. Jackson's Field Headquarters, Battle of Fredericksburg, on hill, called by Henderson Prospect Hill, near Hamilton's Crossing.
7. Lee's Headquarters, winter of 1862-3, on the Mine Road, **a mile from Hamilton's Crossing.**
8. Stuart and Pelham, on flank of Federal Army, Battle of Fredericksburg, at junction of Mine Road and River Road, front of Hamilton's Crossing.
9. General Lee at Spotsylvania C. H., in Court House grounds.
10. Chandler House, near Guinea's Station, R. F. & P. R. R. House where Jackson died, May 10th, 1863.

JAMES POWER SMITH.

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, HAMPDEN-
SIDNEY, VIRGINIA, IN THE
CONFEDERATE ARMY.

Killed in Battle, 3.

Rev. Dabney Carr Harrison, Chaplain, Fort Donaldson, Feb.
16, 1862.

Edgar Wirt Carrington, Seven Pines, May 31, 1862.

Hugh Augustus White, Captain, Second Manassas, Aug. 31,
1862.

Died of Wounds Received in Battle, 1.

James Wilson Poague, May 26, 1864.

Died of Sickness in Camp, 2.

Samuel M. Lightner, May 18, 1862.

James M. Lynch, June 29, 1862.

Chaplains.

Moses D. Hoge	H. G. Hill
Abner C. Hopkins	P. C. Morton
Richard McIlwaine	W. W. Houston
Thos. W. Hooper	H. P. R. McCoy
E. H. Harding	B. B. Blair
T. W. Gilmer	A. B. Carrington
L. C. Vass	James M. Wharey—15.
Lindsey H. Blanton	

In the Ranks.

Robert L. Dabney, Major	Arch. McFadyen
Geo. W. Finley, Captain	W. D. Morton
K. M. McIntyre	Josiah M. Smith
L. H. Yeargan	J. S. Hunter, Captain
Jno. S. Young	Jno. W. Primrose

Wm. E. Hill	J. A. Wallace
H. K. Laird	E. H. Barnett
E. C. Gordon	P. P. Flournoy
K. M. Tuttle, Captain	J. H. H. Winfree
J. A. Woods	J. K. Hitner
H. M. Anderson	Tazewell M. McCorkle
W. G. Baird	M. H. Houston
A. H. Hamilton	Edward Lane
Frank McCutchan	Geo. L. Leyburn
R. H. Fleming, C. S. Navy	J. M. McIver
Cornelius Miller	G. Nash Morton
Thornton M. Niven	W. U. Murkland
Geo. H. Denny	Jno. M. Goul
W. S. Lacy	Jas. W. Shearer
Harvey Gilmore	H. C. Brown
Daniel Blain	H. T. Darnall
S. Taylor Martin, Captain	James P. Smith, Captain
G. B. Strickler, Captain	

Killed and died from sickness.....	6
Chaplains	15
In the ranks	45
<hr/>	
Total	66

REVIEW OF GENERAL LONGSTREET'S BOOK,
"FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX."

By Colonel G. F. R. HENDERSON, of the British Army.

The reminiscences of soldiers who have seen much active service are always fascinating reading. Even if the writer played but minor part in some famous campaign, the realistic touches of a personal narrative give a life and spirit to the picture of events which is necessarily absent from more elaborate compositions. Especially fascinating are the recorded experiences of those who held high command. On this side of the Atlantic they are rare. If we except Lord Dundonald and Lord Roberts, our own great men of action have consistently ignored the curiosity of future generations. In America it has been different. With the exception of Lee, almost every single soldier of fame who survived the Civil War has written his own story of his campaigns, and General Longstreet's book is the latest addition to a most valuable series. It is not the least interesting. It embraces many of the more important battles. It commences with the first Confederate victory, and concludes with the surrender at Appomattox, nearly four years later. It is concerned with both the eastern and western theatres of war; and the author probably saw as much fighting as any soldier in either army. He was a conspicuous figure throughout the war. He had the highest reputation for tenacious courage. His men were devoted to him. For three years he commanded the First Army Corps, the right wing of the famous Army of Northern Virginia, and during part of that time he was practically General Lee's second in command. While Stonewall Jackson lived he was not the first to be consulted, but his relations with his chief were always intimate. When, on June 1, 1862, General Lee assumed command in the field, he invited

Longstreet, the next in seniority to himself, to communicate his ideas on the conduct of the campaign then in progress; and from first to last he appears to have initiated few important movements without taking the opinion of his subordinates. It was expected, then, when General Longstreet first announced his intention of committing his experiences to paper, that much would be revealed as to the working of the higher staff, the handling of the Confederate armies, the difficulties with which General Lee had to contend, and the reasons which dictated his maneuvers. These expectations have certainly been fulfilled. The general is by no means reticent as to what occurred at the Confederate headquarters; and he takes care to inform us that the crude strategical conceptions of the Confederate President were always a dead weight on the genius of the great soldier who served the South with such patient loyalty to constituted authority.

But it is not only as regards the conduct of the government that General Longstreet brings us behind the scenes. His descriptions of the various battles in which the First Army Corps played so distinguished a part are full and spirited. They do full justice to the fiery courage of the Confederate private; to the stubborn endurance of the Northerner, and to the high soldierly qualities displayed by so many of the generals. But their chief interest lies in the fact that we are admitted to the councils, which preceded the great engagements, that we learn on what information, on what estimate of the enemy, each important maneuver was based; that we stand side by side with the generals in action, and see the great game played from the first card to the last. General Longstreet hardly writes with a facile pen. But, despite a certain awkwardness of style, his battle pictures are well drawn. Nor can it be imputed as a fault that he makes no attempt to gloss over the blunders inherent in all military operations, that he gives his enemies due credit for skill and valor, and that his criticism is impartially distributed. Unfortunately, however, whenever he deals with incidents of which he was not an eye-witness, his

statements are altogether at variance with the official records—that is, with the contemporary reports of officers who were eye-witnesses. In fact, it is perfectly apparent that General Longstreet has been content to trust his memory, that he has often relied on hearsay evidence, and has made but little attempt to investigate the truth. This blemish affects both his narrative and his criticism. The former, when his own actions are concerned, can seldom be accepted without reservation; the latter is often based on false premises, and is consequently of little value.

General Longstreet has not developed the critical habit since Appomattox. Throughout the war, whatever movement was in contemplation, he had generally something better to suggest. Even when victory was achieved he was seldom satisfied.

Had his advice, he implies, been taken, success would in almost every case have been more decisive; and the most brilliant maneuvers, whatever their result, were never exactly to his mind. It is true that the majority of Confederate soldiers have never accepted General Longstreet at his own valuation. Not only on the one occasion when he held an independent command, did he miss success, but his own shortcomings when serving under Lee have been exposed with unsparing severity. His political conduct during the reconstruction of the South alienated his former comrades, and no mercy has been shown to the soldier who labors under the accusation of having lost Gettysburg, the great battle which turned the tide of war in favor of the North. The memoirs before us are practically an attempt on the part of General Longstreet to answer the charges with which he has been assailed, and his method of defense is decidedly peculiar. In reply to the criticism which has been lavished on his own conduct, he retorts by criticising with unsparing severity the conduct of Lee, Jackson and Early; and by endeavoring to show that other generals, better known to fame, committed far more glaring blunders than the commander of the First Army Corps.

We cannot think that General Longstreet consulted his own

dignity in adopting this line of defense. He would have been better advised had he confined himself to a statement of facts, and have left it to others to determine whether his military ability was equal to that of Lee or Jackson. Nor are we of opinion that his attitude towards his great commander and his former colleagues becomes his reputation as a soldier. When he discusses the question whether Lee's strategy was not overbold, whether he was not too fond of fighting, although we by no means agree with him, we follow him with interest; but, when the friend and comrade of Lee and Jackson accuses the former of deliberate misrepresentation, of favoritism, of blood-thirstiness, and of hiding his own mistakes by throwing the blame on others, and when he goes out of his way to catalogue the tactical shortcomings of the latter, we follow him with regret. Space forbids that we should deal with General Longstreet's charges against his colleagues. But we may say at once that his list of Jackson's blunders is almost ludicrously inaccurate. His statements are refuted, in many instances, by the official records; in other, a reference to any one of the surviving members of General Jackson's staff would have put him right. Moreover, in his endeavor to belittle Jackson he has been hoist with his own petard; and it is exceedingly interesting to find, after all these years, that he was the real author of the Confederate defeat at Malvern Hill—a defeat which has hitherto been considered, and with justice, the greatest blot on Lee's reputation as a tactician.

"General Lee," writes Longstreet, of July 1, 1862, "rode near Jackson's column to view the enemy on that front. Feeling unwell and much fatigued, he called me to temporary duty near him. As he rode to the left he ordered me * * * to make reconnoissance of the enemy's new position * * * and to report the feasibility of aggressive battle. * * * I thought it probable that Porter's (Federal) batteries, under the cross fire of Confederate batteries posted on his left and front, would be thrown into disorder, and thus make way for the combined assaults of the infantry. I so reported, and General Lee made

dispositions accordingly." The most important part of this plan was that Jackson should deploy 80 to 100 guns along his front, and General Longstreet still thinks it was perfectly feasible for him to have done so. Herein he differs radically from General Pendleton, Lee's chief of artillery. That officer reported that "the obstacles presented by the woods and swamps made it impracticable to bring up a sufficient amount of artillery to oppose successfully the extraordinary force of that arm employed by the enemy, while the field itself afforded us but few positions favorable for its use, and none for its proper concentration." The map itself is sufficient to prove the fallacy of General Longstreet's idea. Even in those days of muzzle-loaders, batteries could hardly have come into action within six or eight hundred yards of a strong line of artillery, heavily supported by infantry, and occupying a commanding position with an absolutely clear field of fire.

The further accusations against Jackson are even more extraordinary. He comments on Jackson's apparent inaction at White Oak Swamp, June 30, 1862, at the time when Longstreet and A. P. Hill were fighting a desperate battle at Frayser's Farm, only four miles distant. Surely he must be aware that General Lee was present at Frayser's Farm, and that if he had thought Jackson's presence desirable, it would have been exceedingly easy to call him up. The fact is that Jackson remained at White Oak Swamp, by General Lee's direction, in order to secure the Confederate left.

In his account of the action of Mechanicsville, he declares that Jackson "deliberately marched past the Federal flank half a mile or more behind the battle" without taking part in the engagement; and to support this opinion he represents on his map that Jackson moved by Shady Grove church road. As a matter of fact, Jackson himself, and the greater part of his force, moved by a road more than two and a half miles north of the Federal flank, and it was not till very late in the evening, just before dark, that he heard the sound of guns. The mishaps on June 26 were not due to Jackson at all, but to the failure of the staff

to maintain communication between columns that were widely separated in dense forest. General Longstreet, it may be noted, is the first and only soldier in all America, north or south, to accuse the fiercest fighter in either army of a disinclination to join battle.

Again, General Longstreet suggests that the great counter-stroke at Manassas, Aug. 30, 1862, made by his troops, would have been more effectice had Jackson aided him with greater energy. What are the facts? General Longstreet's troops, when the counter-stroke was initiated, were perfectly fresh—they had hardly fired a shot. Jackson's men, on the other hand, had been fighting the whole Federal army, just three times their strength, for two days, and were completely exhausted. Does General Longstreet wish us to believe that any troops in the world, under such conditions, would be capable of delivering a strong counterstroke? The wonder is that the men found strength to advance at all.

The most astonishing assertion (page 407), however, is that Jackson was at the battle of Sharpsburg only two and a half hours, while he (Longstreet) was there all day. We confess that we read this statement with amazement. The first and the most vigorous attack of the Federals, which began at 5 A. M., and which did not cease until after 9 A. M., was repulsed by Jackson. The great counter-stroke delivered by McLaws and Walker was made by Jackson's order, and when that energetic effort failed to crush the enemy the troops remained in position, not for two and a half hours, but until after nightfall the next day, and during that whole time Stonewall Jackson never left the field. One of his divisions was undoubtedly driven back, and another, which was well-nigh annihilated, was suffered to withdraw when the attack ceased; but the general himself remained with the re-enforcements, supervising all arrangements and exercising every single function of command. In fact, General Longstreet, in his anxiety to disparage his great colleague, contradicts himself. On page 257 he says that General Jackson had an interview with him during the afternoon.

But we are weary of exposing these misstatements. Stone-

wall Jackson's reputation will suffer nothing from such loose criticism; and we may turn at once to Gettysburg, for it is in the account of that momentous battle that the interest of the memoirs culminates.

General Longstreet discusses the campaign at great length, and his defense of his own conduct fills many pages. This defense, however, is by no means satisfactory. In the first place, he tells that when the invasion of Pennsylvania was first broached he assented to General Lee's plan on the condition that the tactics of the Confederates should be purely defensive; but he makes no attempt to explain on what grounds he considered himself entitled to dictate conditions to his superior officer. He had no mandate from the government to act as Lee's adviser. He was merely the commander of an army corps—a subordinate, pure and simple; and yet he appears to have entered on the campaign with the idea that the commander-in-chief was bound to engage the enemy with the tactics that he, General Longstreet, had suggested. In the second place, he does not appear to have grasped the drift of the charges which have been brought against him. The question is not whether the maneuvers suggested by Longstreet would have been more successful than those executed by General Lee, but whether the general commanding the First Army Corps did everything which lay within his power to carry out, loyally and unhesitatingly, the wishes and instructions of the commander-in-chief of the Confederate army.

The maneuvers preliminary to the battle were decidedly to the advantage of the Confederates. Lee moved with such rapidity through Pennsylvania that he was far to the northeast of Washington before his columns were threatened by the enemy's advance. On July 1 he found a Federal force on his right flank. His advanced troops forced an encounter, and two Federal army corps driven back to a strong position at Gettysburg, covering the direct road to Washington. During the evening Lee and Longstreet recommitteed the ridge occupied by the enemy. They were aware that no more than 20,000 Federals were on the ground, while 40,000 of their own men, finished with victory, were already present. Longstreet writes:

"After our survey I said: 'We could not call the enemy to position better suited to our plans. All that we have to do is to file round his left, and secure good ground between him and his capital.' This, when said, was thought to be the opinion of my commander as much as my own. I was not a little surprised, therefore, at his impatience, as, striking the air with his closed hand, he said: 'If he is there to-morrow I will attack him.' His desperate mood was painfully evident, and gave rise to serious apprehensions."

From the outset, therefore, there was a decided difference of opinion between the commander-in-chief and his subordinate. The former, finding his advanced guard had already won an important success, and that the enemy was not yet concentrated, determined to attack. The latter thought it sounder tactics to turn the Federal left, and to occupy a defensive position which, in his opinion, the enemy would be compelled to assault. Undoubtedly, although such a maneuver would have given the enemy time to concentrate, and they were stronger by 25,000 men than the Confederates, there is something to be said in favor of General Longstreet's idea. Further discussion, however, on this point would be beside the mark. The fact remains that on the morning of July 2, the Confederates had a fine opportunity of dealing with their enemy in detail. The attack, however, was deferred until 3 o'clock in the afternoon, by which time nearly the whole of the Federal army had come up. Why was the opportunity lost?

General Longstreet admits that on the evening of July 1, he was aware of Lee's intention to attack the next morning. Without waiting further instructions, he had ordered his own army corps to hasten the march, and two of his divisions and part of his reserve artillery had arrived by sunrise. But he adds that he received no orders to attack until an hour before noon.

We have not the slightest doubt that this account is literally correct. Nevertheless, General Longstreet's explanation of the delay is altogether inadequate. If words mean anything, he

implies that General Lee, and General Lee alone, was responsible for the delay. But there is a mass of evidence which goes to show that General Lee considered Longstreet responsible; and this evidence the latter has certainly not refuted. In the first place, there can be no question whatever that he was well aware that Lee expected him to attack as early as practicable on the morning of July 2. In the second place, it is certain that Lee explained his wishes, although he gave no definite orders, soon after sunrise, that he even pointed out the ground to be taken up by Longstreet's division; and that, riding off afterwards to the left, he expressed much uneasiness, shortly after 9 o'clock, when he found that Longstreet made no move. In the third place, General Longstreet himself, in a letter which he wrote some years ago to the Philadelphia Weekly Times, has cited evidence which shows that he took upon himself to resist the expressed wishes of the commander-in-chief.

Not one of these points is touched upon in the memoirs. General Longstreet is content with the assertion that until 11 o'clock he had received no definite order to attack. But it was never Lee's practice to issue definite orders to his corps commanders. He was accustomed to explain his general intentions, and to leave the execution in their hands; and if on this occasion he departed from his usual custom it was because Longstreet declined to move without explicit orders to that effect. Moreover, Longstreet had not waited for orders to call up his troops the night before; nor, as he tells us in the memoirs, had he waited for orders to make the great counter-stroke which was decisive of the second battle of Manassas. On both these occasions he acted in accordance with the wishes of the commander-in-chief, and even anticipated them. Why did he not do the same on the morning of July 2?

On that morning there can be no question but that Lee's wishes were very clearly expressed. General McLaws, commanding a division of the First Army Corps, says that he reached the field at a very early hour; that he went to Lee, who pointed out to him on the map the road across which he was to place his di-

vision, and said that he wished him to deploy without being seen by the enemy; that the line pointed out was that which he occupied when the attack began between 3 and 4 P. M., and that "Longstreet was then walking back and forth some distance from General Lee, but came up, and, pointing to the map, showed me how he wanted the division located, to which General Lee replied, 'No, general, I wish it placed just the opposite,' " and that "Longstreet appeared as if he were irritated and annoyed." It is a most significant circumstance that General Longstreet makes no allusion in his memoirs to a letter which he quoted in the Philadelphia Weekly Times. This letter, written by General Hood, one of his divisional commanders, runs as follows:

"I arrived in front of the heights of Gettysburg shortly after daybreak on the morning of July 2. During the early part of the same morning we were both in company with General Lee. * * * General Lee was seemingly anxious you (Longstreet) should attack that morning. You thought it better to await the arrival of Pickett's division—at that time still in the rear—in order to make the attack, and you said to me subsequently, 'The general is a little nervous this morning; he wishes me to make the attack; I do not wish to do so without Pickett. I never like to go into battle with one boot off.' Thus passed the forenoon of that eventful day."

In our opinion General Longstreet has failed altogether to shift the burden of the responsibility for delay from his own shoulders. He was aware that Lee was anxious to attack as early as practicable. He was aware that an early attack was essential to success. He was aware how the commander-in-chief desired his divisions should be placed; and yet until he received a definite order to advance did absolutely nothing. He made no attempt to reconnoitre his line of march, to bring his troops into position, or to initiate the attack in accordance with the expressed intentions of his superior.

His conduct on the third day opens up a still graver issue. The First Army Corps, when at length, on the afternoon of

July 2, it was permitted to attack, had achieved a distinct success. The enemy was driven back to his main position with enormous loss. On the morning of July 3, Lee determined to assault this position in front and flank simultaneously, and, according to his chief of the staff. Longstreet's Corps, supported by a division of the Third Corps, was to make the main attack on the center, while the Second Corps attacked the right. But again there was delay, and this time it was fatal. General Longstreet attempts to make some capital out of the fact that General Lee, in his official report, wrote as follows: "Longstreet, re-enforced by Pickett's three brigades, which arrived on the battle field during the afternoon of the 2d, was ordered to attack the next morning." This, says Longstreet, "is disingenuous. He did not give or send the orders for the morning of the third day, nor did he re-enforce me with Pickett's brigades for morning attack." And yet, a few lines further on, he writes: "He (Lee) rode over after sunrise and gave his orders. His plan was to assault the enemy's left center by a column to be composed of McLaw's and Hood's Divisions (Longstreet's Corps), re-enforced by Pickett's brigades. I thought it would not do." Passing by the fact that it was never Lee's plan to assault the center only, but both center and flank simultaneously, we may note that, according to Longstreet's own testimony, the order was given soon after sunrise; and yet, although the Second Corps, attacking the Federal right, became engaged at daylight, it was not till 1 P. M., eight hours later, that the artillery of the First Corps opened fire, and not till 2 P. M. that the infantry advanced. Their assault was absolutely isolated. The Second Corps had already been beaten back. The Third Corps, although a division was ready to move to any point which Longstreet might indicate, was not called upon by him for assistance. Two divisions of his own corps, posted on the right flank, did absolutely nothing; and, after a supremely gallant effort, the 15,000 men who were hurled against the front of the Federal army, and some of whom actually penetrated the position, were repulsed with fearful slaughter.

General Longstreet is of opinion that, even if his assaulting column had been composed of 40,000 men, success was impossible. Taking into consideration the conditions under which the attack was made, he is possibly correct. But he altogether ignores the fact that Lee intended his assault to be made in combination with the attack of the Second Corps. Why did the combination fail? Shortly after sunrise on July 3, Lee committed the management of the attack on the Federal center to the officer commanding the First Army Corps. Did that officer do all within his power to insure combination and to deal a vigorous and decisive blow? These are the questions which General Longstreet has failed to answer. That his tactics were indifferent seems abundantly clear. Why did the divisions on his right make no energetic demonstration? It is true that they were confronted by superior numbers; but a semblance of attack would in all likelihood have sufficed to distract the enemy's attention from the assaulting column. Why did he not call upon the division of the Third Corps, which had been placed at his disposal? He had been reluctant to attack on the second day "with one boot off;" why did he display less caution on the third day. If, however, it was only his tactical judgment that was at fault, he hardly deserves reprobation. Greater generals than he have committed more glaring blunders in less difficult circumstances. But the crucial question is this: Why did he delay his attack for eight hours, during which time the Second Corps, with which he was to co-operate, was heavily engaged? If he moved only under compulsion, if he deliberately forbore to use his best efforts to carry out Lee's design, and to compel him to adopt his own, the case is very different. That he did so seems perfectly clear, and it is impossible for any sane soldier to justify such conduct.

General Longstreet defends himself by reflecting on the conduct of the commander-in-chief. Not only, according to his account, was General Lee "excited and off his balance, and laboring under that oppression (sic) until blood enough was shed to appease him," but he did not "give the benefit of his presence

in getting the troops up, posting them, and arranging the batteries." Lee, however, had the whole field to supervise, and it was not his custom, when once he had indicated the object to be attained, to interfere with his subordinates. No man, indeed, could post troops or arrange batteries with more skill than Longstreet, and Lee no more thought of interfering with his dispositions at Gettysburg than he had with his dispositions at the second battle of Manassas. Nor will such arguments, however they may be taken, mitigate the following: "General Lee said that the attack of his right was not made so early as expected, which he should not have said. He knew that I did not believe that success was possible; that care and time should be taken to give the troops the benefit of positions and the ground; and he should have put an officer in charge who had more confidence in his plan." Here we have the whole gospel of subordination according to General Longstreet: If an officer does not believe success possible, he is not to be expected either to come up to time or to use his best endeavors to carry out his orders, and his want of confidence shall be held as sufficient excuse for inactivity and bad tactics. We need hardly say that such a dogma is absolutely incompatible with the demands of discipline. Discipline exacts something more than a literal obedience to orders. It evacts ungrudging support, untiring effort, and complete self-sacrifice. "I would follow General Lee blind-folded" were the words of Stonewall Jackson, and it was for this reason, if for no other, that Lee declared that had Jackson been with him Gettysburg would have been a Confederate victory. "Such an executive officer," he said of Jackson, "the sun never shone on. I have but to show him my design, and I know that if it can be done it will be done. No need for me to send and watch him." In General Longstreet he had a subordinate of very different character to deal with. It is little wonder that the Confederate commander-in-chief displayed impatience at Gettysburg, or that his mood was such as to create the impression that his judgment was in some degree disturbed. We need look no further for the cause than the stubborn opposition and slow

movements of the officer commanding the First Army Corps; and if Lee was to blame at all in the Gettysburg campaign, it was in taking as his second in command a general who was so completely indifferent to the claims of discipline.

We do not for a moment believe that General Longstreet can fairly be charged with deliberate disloyalty to his superior. He set out on the campaign with a false idea of their relative positions, and when the enemy was encountered, his irritation at the rejection of his advice was such that he forgot his duty. His error was amply atoned at a later period; and had he frankly confessed that his temper got the better of him on July 2 and 3, we might easily overlook the one blot on the career of a gallant soldier. But his endeavors to clear his own reputation by assailing those of others, together with the bitterness of his re-creminations, serve only to alienate sympathy and destroy respect. General Longstreet did splendid service for the South. He has been subject to the merciless attacks of many enemies. He has been assailed with accusations which are utterly without foundation; and it may seem harsh in the extreme to criticise the veteran's defense of his military conduct. But where historic truth and great reputation are at stake it is impossible to be silent.

DEFENCE OF SPANISH FORT.

On Mobile Bay—Last Great Battle of the War.

**By P. D. STEPHENSON, Fifth Company, Washington Artillery,
New Orleans, La., (Piece Four).**

Who knows of "Spanish Fort"? Not many readers of the Herald I suspect, yet it was the scene of one of the most thrilling episodes of the war. It was one of the very last incidents, too, for we evacuated the place on the night of April 9, 1865, the day of Lee's surrender. Spanish Fort was one of the outer defenses of Mobile. It was situated about twelve miles below the city and across the bay, on the eastern shore. Look on the map of Alabama and turn to Mobile Bay. At the mouth you notice two islands almost closing the bay, having but a narrow passage. Guarding the passage and facing each other are Forts Gaines and Morgan. Further up the bay, on the eastern side, on a tongue of land not represented on the map, was Spanish Fort, and still further up nearer the city, was Blakely, another fortified place. The sole approach to the city through the bay was a tortuous and narrow channel, marked out by stakes, which ran zig-zag across to Blakely, then down to Spanish Fort and then on out to the Gulf; all the rest of the bay was filled with torpedoes and a variety of other obstructions. Early in March, 1865, the fifth company of Washington Artillery was having a "good time" in the city of Mobile. They had been detached from the veteran Army of Tennessee, and with it had just passed through the almost unparalleled hardships of Hood's disastrous Nashville campaign. Mobile was one of the protected cities of the South, one of the latest places, if not the very last, to feel the hand of war. Consequently a semblance of the ways of

peace still existed there. Coffee houses were in full blast where "coffee" could be bought for a dollar a cup, with an "ironclad" pie thrown in. Some of us had been paid and we indulged in reckless joy in boots at a cost of \$100 or so, or in "biled" linen shirts at a like fabulous sum. The band played in the city park and strenuous was the effort to get off from duty for a promenade there, or on "Government street," and truly inventive was the genius developed in the way of arranging or "getting up" toilets for the occasion.

DEFENDERS OF MOBILE.

One day orders came, to be ready to move at a moment's notice, and not long after we found ourselves on the bay, threading the channel for the Eastern Shore. The enemy were approaching Mobile by land and water. That was the occasion of our move. I remember we had a grand review in the streets of Mobile. Every one who could carry a gun was in the ranks. The artillerists were armed as infantry. I suppose there were 10,000 men under arms. The great majority of these were "odds and ends," fragments of other commands, boy militia, etc.; a few were veteran troops. Our commander was Dabney H. Maury, "every inch a soldier," but then there were not many inches of him. The soldiers called him "puss in boots," because half of his diminutive person seemed lost in a pair of the immense cavalry boots of the day. He was a wise and gallant officer. Other reinforcements accompanied us to Spanish Fort. I suppose the garrison, when attacked a few days after, amounted to 2,100 men of all arms. General Randall Gibson, since then United States Senator from Louisiana, was in command. The force at Blakley was about 2,500 men under Gen. St. John Littell.

AT SPANISH FORT.

We found ourselves in a curious little tongue of high land jutting out into the bay in a southwesterly direction. This high land broke off abruptly in bluffs on the western or water side, leaving but a narrow margin of beach, while, on the eastern or

inland side, it sloped off into a marsh, which ran around us and Blakley. Our works were arranged to resist an attack from the interior, and, beginning at the southern and lip end of the "tongue," ran in a semi-circle around the inside rim of the high land, resting at each end on the bay. Or rather, they would have done so on the north as well as south, only the marsh interfered, and we had no time to complete them. This was our weak point, and yet in a sense our strong point. We had no defences in that marsh, yet a dense jungle supplied the defect, so dense that our leaders confided in it greatly and placed only a picket line there. These "works" of ours consisted of three "forts" (of earth), one at each end and one in the center, connected by rifle-pits. The one in the center was assigned to our battery. The whole extent of our line from end to end was about a mile and a half.

WHAT SEEMED TO BE A TRAP.

We felt ourselves to be in a trap as soon as we took in the situation. If Farragut's fleet should pass Forts Gaines and Morgan at the mouth of the bay, all he would have to do would be to sail serenely up in our rear and shell us at his leisure and cut us off from Mobile, while a land force could invest us and starve us into surrender. So prominent was the thought in our minds that I remember my messmate "Tony" B— and I ("Tony" is now a staid merchant and man of family in Louisiana), sat on the parapet one afternoon soon after getting there and planned a way of escape for ourselves. Casting our eye towards the bay we noticed a chain of little, low, marshy islands, hardly above the water, which fringed our shore at a distance of six to eight hundred yards from the land, and stretched northward up towards Blakley. "If the place be taken by assault," we thought, "we might make for one of these and by swimming from one to the other, finally get to Blakely." Little did we dream that the whole command was eventually to escape from under the very clutches of the enemy by means of one of those very islands.

ADDING STRENGTH TO THE PLACE.

Several days elapsed before the enemy made his appearance. The time was spent in "planting" torpedoes all through the woody marsh in front of us, in strengthening our works and in making great "bomb-proofs" right behind our works for our wounded, our ammunition and so on. These bomb-proofs were made, some of them, on a vast scale. One I worked upon was about 16x20 feet in dimensions and 10 to 12 feet deep. We cut down great trees, rolled the trunks over the mouth, then put a layer of brush and dirt; then came another layer of heavy logs crosswise, then a layer of brush and dirt, until the roof was six to eight feet thick.

At last the enemy were in sight. Farragut's fleet appeared first. How gallantly ship after ship came up the bay and how we watched them! But suddenly the foremost was hid in a dense cloud of smoke and water. When she came to view again her bow was up in the air and she was evidently sinking. From where we were we could hear no report, but we knew that she had struck one of our torpedoes. The channel was full of them. This was why our leaders left us so exposed, apparently, in our rear. This stopped the advance for the time on the water side. But soon the pop, pop of our pickets' guns drew out attention to our immediate front; the firing grew into volleys, our men came into view through the woods, slowly falling back and finally retiring to the line already marked for them as their permanent fighting posts, the blue waves of the Federal forces circled around us and by nightfall we were invested.

INVESTED.

I think it was about the 22d or 23d of March, '65. I know we were invested seventeen days and made our escape about the 9th of April. Those seventeen days were sufficiently thrilling and eventful. Imagine our position and you can readily believe me. A force reported to be 30,000 strong, under General Steele in front, massed and crowded around our little semi-circle line, their artillery packed thick along the works they were al-

ready throwing up and the ships now drawn within easy range in our rear. The shells from one end of their line could reach the other end of ours, and "raked us fore and aft," while the guns of the fleet could send their shells plump into our backs. Every day was full of incident, and it soon got so that we had no rest day nor night. The picket fights waxed hotter and hotter. Each side had little detached pits, facing each other, with squads of four or five men in each, and constant was the effort of the one side to surprise and capture the other. We had two little "cohorn mortars" in our battery (about fifteen inches long), and Corporal Charlie Fox, especially, became so expert with them that he emptied the pits of the enemy repeatedly with his shell.

SLAUGHTER OF THE INNOCENT.

The "boy militia" referred to, mere lads many of them, from thirteen to seventeen or eighteen years of age, excited the mingled grief and admiration of us veterans. In vain did we tell them when going to the skirmish line to shelter themselves as much as possible. They thought it was "not soldierly," and they stood up and were shot down like sheep. A spring just inside of our works became a point of thrilling interest. It soon became so that we could not leave our works and run back to the rear to the usual place for water, and it was either use that spring or famish. Yet it was in full sight of the enemy. It occupied a depression in the hillside and was commanded by sharpshooters. There was but one recourse—we must go there by night. Men, strung around with the canteens of their comrades, would steal down to the ravine in the darkness. Sometimes numbers would be gathered there waiting hours for their turn to fill and leave. Alas, that spring became baptized in blood. The enemy had the range and kept up a fire, though they could not see, and many a poor fellow fell at that spring.

DEEDS OF DARING.

Artillery duels became of daily occurrence, our "head logs"

were constantly knocked down upon us, bruising and crippling us; squads of sharpshooters devoted their especial attention to our port holes or embrasures and poured a steady stream of bullets through them from early morn till dewy eve; mining and counter-mining began, and I remember one gallant fellow along the line to the right of us crept one night with a detail of men down the ravine where the spring was, out beyond our skirmish pits, into the lines of the enemy's pickets, and finding the mouth of their mine, which occupied a rather advanced position, he captured the whole batch of miners and got back to our works without a shot or losing a man.

SOME FEDERAL COMPLIMENTS.

But the end came at last. We knew it was coming. We could feel it in the air. And then, too, certain ominous indications came from the enemy. For several days we could see that they were preparing for something unusual. Suddenly one afternoon a most extraordinary fire opened upon us from three points, from the two ends of their line and from their center. It seemed to concentrate upon our battery. No doubt, we had done them mischief, and perhaps more mischief than the other forts, for our gunners had gained experience in a score of battles; but we were not prepared for such an especial compliment as this. They were shelling us with mortar shells, huge fifteen-inch bombs, so large that we could see them with the naked eye shortly after leaving the mortar's mouth; see them as they arose up into the air, describe a graceful curve and then begin hurrying with vicious impetus down full upon our helpless heads.

THE BOMBARDMENT.

They had six of those mortars, two at each point, moved, I suppose, from their ships, and from that time on, both day and night, those fearful things came down upon our heads. There was no shelter from these bombs—no defense from that fire. We had to stand and take it. Their force was terrible. They would go six feet in the solid earth and exploding tear up a

space fifteen or twenty feet square. They went through that tremendous bomb-proof, of which I have spoken, as though it was paper, and we were in constant expectation of losing all of our ammunition and provisions. Those abominable mortars were the last item in their preparations. They practiced on us to get the range, and then we "got it."

TEMPEST OF SHOT.

The last day, the day of assault, came. What a day that was! And yet the enemy's tactics were peculiar. The assault did not come until about 3 P. M. But from dawn until that time, and indeed until night they rained upon us from front and flank and rear and top, from field guns, siege guns, ship guns and mortars; such a tempest of shot and shell as defies description. Think of seventy-five or a hundred guns massed in a semi-circle thick around us; think of those huge mortars belching forth their monstrous contents down upon us; think of the fleet in our rear pouring its fire into our back? Suddenly that storm burst forth, but it ceased not for a moment through all that interminable day. The very air was hot. The din was so great it distracted our senses. We could hardly hear each other speak and could hardly tell what we were doing. The cracking of musketry, the unbroken roaring of artillery, the yelling and shrieking of the shells, the bellowing boom of the mortars, the dense shroud of sulphurous smoke thickening around us—it was thought the mouth of the pit had yawned and the uproar of the damned was about us. And it was not taking away from this infernal picture to see men, as I did, hopping about, "raving, distracted mad," the blood bursting from eyes and ears and mouth, driven stark crazy by concussion or some other cause.

DODGING THE MORTAR SHELLS.

It was utterly idle to try to return that fire. After a few rounds we did not attempt to do so. We stood around sheltering ourselves as best we could. Our works were no longer a protection to us, except against the fire in front. But that we

did not mind. Our thoughts were of the fire from the rear, and above all, of those huge descending bombs. And now occurred a strange scene. We deserted the cover of our works and went out in the space behind them. And there, exposed to the full range of all the rest of that fearful fire, we devoted ourselves entirely to the work of dodging those mortar shells. And they were dodgable.

CAPTAIN OF THE DODGERS.

There was a certain man in the battery gifted with a peculiar, accurate and rapid power of measuring distances with the naked eye. He had found out that by watching the bomb as it left the mortar and after describing the curve began to descend, he could tell pretty near where and when it would strike. His comrades found out this talent, and rallying around him, would run at his signal out of harm's way. And it was funny to see our officers (and a braver set never lived) edging near and in a nonchalant manner, say: "Sing out, S——, and tell us which way to run!" One of those bombs towards the close entered the big bomb-proof of which I have spoken, and exploded. The place was crowded with men who, in spite of warning, sought shelter there. The havoc made I know not, for it was just awhile before we left, but I shudder to think of it.

THE ASSAULT.

Night came at last. Oh, how delicious, how inexpressibly comforting is the coming of night oftentime to the soldier in war. But it gave respite only by bestowing the sweet gift of balmy sleep. The most striking and romantic of all the acts of this drama was now upon us, viz: our escape. The assault, as I have said, came about 3 P. M. But it was a very feeble affair where we were, and was evidently a feint. The main attack was on our left. They penetrated through that dense marshy jungle, which we looked upon as almost impenetrable, and pushing back the feeble picket line we had there, got to the bay between us and Blakely, thus cutting us off. There, as we

afterwards found out, they planted a battery. From that point they came on down our line driving our slender force before them until they got to the fort on our left, which they captured. It was only a few hundred yards from us and we could see them there moving about in the moonlight. Why they did not come right on and take us, too, we could never understand. It was one of those curious blunders which happened so often on both sides during the war.

THE RETREAT.

It was with their dusky outlines in full view, on the fort above us, that we made our preparations to leave and did leave. And now, as to that leaving: Not one of the readers of this article has less notion of what we were going to do, or where we were going than did we, the rank and file, as we received the whispered orders to prepare silently for departure. We were completely bewildered. "Escape! How escape?" We were completely cut off, surrounded; nay, the enemy were in our works, in sight of us. Yet we did escape, and that, too, with scarcely the loss of a man. It was a brilliant moonlight night. About 10 o'clock, after spiking our guns, we left our works and made directly for the beach. Did the enemy see us? They ought to have seen us. Why they did not I cannot tell. We got to the bluff overlooking the bay.

IN A MYSTERIOUS RAVINE.

What next? Behold, the head of the column seemed to melt gradually into the earth, and as we moved up to supply their place we understood their disappearance. The face of the bluff was precipitous, and creased with great fissures or ravines opening out upon the water. The head of our column had disappeared down one of these! Down we followed, pell mell, right down the almost perpendicular sides of the gorge, clinging to vines, saplings, the sides of the rocks: any way to keep our hold, until we reached the bottom, fifty feet or so below. And there, to our amazement, we found the beginning of a treadway.

one or two planks wide. At the word, all shoes and boots were off and we stood in our stocking or naked feet in single line upon that narrow treadway. And then, after orders to keep our guns on the off-side from the enemy, to prevent their glistening being noticed (for artillerists though we were, we still had our infantry accoutrements), and after orders not to whisper a word on pain of being shot, we went forth, literally not knowing whither we were going.

IN THE TREADWAY.

The treadway first debouched upon the beach, then turning to the right it went up the shore for quite a distance; just how far I cannot say, but I know we passed so close to the enemy's pickets stationed in the marsh that we could hear them talking, and right under the nose of their battery. Finally the treadway turned and struck out into the bay. The water was shallow and we walked just above the water's surface. Suddenly a shot came, it was from that battery. Imagine our consternation. But it was not repeated for some time. It was evident they did not see us, but were merely firing "periodically" across what they supposed to be the channel, in order to prevent any succor reaching us. The very last thing they were thinking of was our attempting to escape.

FLOUNDERING IN THE MUD.

We came to the end of that treadway at last. It ended on one of those very marshes by which my comrade "Tony" and I had planned to escape. A chain of them, as I had said, ran up the bay some six or eight hundred yards from the shore. The channel was outside of them, and when we jumped off the treadway on to the island where it terminated, there, out in the water, were the dusky forms of several gunboats waiting to carry us away. But would I ever forget those few minutes on that island? When I jumped from the treadway I sank to my waist in mud. It was a bog. Every one sank more or less deep. But our situation gave us frantic energy. There we were right under the

guns of that battery, helplessly floundering up to our middle in mud. Suppose they discovered us, and there! Forth from the shore came a confused uproar of noise—the shouts of baffled men, volleys of musketry, the deep boom of cannon. They have discovered our flight, back in our works; they have found us out. But not that battery. Periodically its shot goes down the bay, but not towards us. It is still in blissful ignorance and we are still safe.

SAFE AT LAST.

But we must be quick. Our first aim is to struggle up the island, as much out of the range of those guns as possible. All order vanishes; it is no wonder, situated as we were. Tony B—— and I had stuck together throughout. Looking out on the water we saw a yawl pulled cautiously to the shore. We looked around—no one was nigh, as we thought, no fear of swamping her. In we plunged, rushing up to our necks in water, and throwing our guns in first, pitched into the boat, head over heels, laughing, spluttering, struggling. When we had got upright the boat was full to sinking and we thought we were the only ones near it. We were soon on board of one of the gunboats, and in so incredibly short time that the whole command was off that island and sailing jubilantly up the bay. Then that battery found us out, and before we left, sent some right well aimed shots through our rigging. I remember I had curled down on deck near the boiler, for I was wringing wet, and as those shots came viciously near, the thought came, "what a shame to be sunk in this boat after what we have gone through this day." But we were not sunk. We steamed up the bay, touched at Blakely for awhile (it was stormed an hour or so after we left), went across to Mobile and in a few days evacuated the place with the rest of the troops there and surrendered shortly after at Meridian, Miss.

Secretary Staunton (page 31, of his report for '65) states that there were actually mustered into service of United States, from the 15th of April, '61, to the 14th of April, '65, 2,656,553 men. Mr. Staunton, who had free access to the Confederate

archives several years ago, states that 600,000 men in all, were put into the Confederate service during the same period, and this estimate is very nearly correct. So that the official figures show that the United States had in service more than four times as many men as the Confederacy had.

The disparity in numbers was well illustrated in the last battle of the war; 4,600 of us at Spanish Fort and Blakley fought and kept back 38,000 of the enemy 17 days, with Farragut's fleet in our rear.

DEFENCE OF SPANISH FORT.

Some Comment by the Confederate Commander on Mr.
P. D. Stephenson's Article.

By DABNEY H. MAURY, Major-General, Confederate States Army,
and Commanding Department of the Gulf.

The narrative of the defense of Spanish Fort, which appeared in a late number of the Philadelphia Weekly Times, July 26th, is a very interesting contribution to the history of the war. It is cleverly written and illustrates well the high character and education of the Confederate private soldier. I hope Mr. Stephenson will not rest content with this effort, excellent as it is, but will go on and give us other experience of the busy and arduous campaigns which closed so gloriously at Spanish Fort. Unlike many narrations this is devoid of all traces of egotism.

The defense of Spanish Fort was the last death grapple of the veterans of the Confederate and Federal armies. They brought to it the experience of four years of incessant conflict, and in the attack and defense of that place demonstrated every offensive and defensive art then known to war. It is not too much to say that no position was ever held by Confederate troops with greater hardihood and tenacity, nor evacuated more skillfully after hope of further defense was gone.

AS TO CERTAIN PRECAUTIONS.

Mr. Stephenson has been remarkably graphic and accurate in his account of the siege. But he did not know while he was fighting all of those seventeen days and nights that it was never intended that garrison should be lost. That even before the battle began the measures had been taken to withdraw them at

the last moment, which proved so happy in execution that night of April 8, 1865. These measures were well known to General Gibson and others of his officers and men, by whom they had been prepared and by whom they were executed with complete success. Before the place was invested the bridge across the marsh was constructed. It was four feet wide, was three or four feet above the marsh and one mile long. It terminated on the Appalacup river, opposite Battery Tracey, where were assembled a large number of batteaux, to be used in ferrying the garrison across the river. From Tracey, reaching out to its rear for near two miles, another bridge had been constructed, to Chocolate Bayou, on deep water range to Mobile and far beyond range of the enemy's guns. Over this bridge three days later the garrison of Tracey and Huger were withdrawn without a single casualty.

ANOTHER ROUTE.

During the siege of Spanish Fort the additional precaution had been taken to send engineer officers with several men of the Ninth Texas to reconnoitre and stake out another route across the marsh direct to Blakeley, five miles above. This completed the means of escape and while Mr. Stevenson's command and others marched out across the foot bridge a large part of the garrison was conducted by the engineers and guides directly across the marsh and safely to Blakeley. This marsh was quite practicable for infantry by that time. The flood had subsided and the ground had dried so that had the enemy known it he might have thrown troops and even placed high batteries on it, so as to annoy us with a flank fire around our left and cut off the escape of the garrison.

A VISIT TO SPANISH FORT.

On Saturday, April 8th, I took Colonel Lockett, Chief Engineer, with me into Spanish Fort that we might determine what progress the enemy had made with his mining operations and how much longer it would be safe to keep the garrison in the

place. It did not seem probable that he could spring his mines under our parapet before the ensuing Wednesday, so I instructed General Gibson to have all ready to march out Tuesday night; that a steamer would be sent that Saturday night to bring away all useless material and disabled men, and that the whole command would be withdrawn after dark, Tuesday, April 11th.

Soon after my return to Mobile, about 10 P. M., Saturday, Gibson telegraphed me that the enemy had made a lodgment upon his route of evacuation. I ordered him to withdraw his garrison at once, which was done, as is so well described by Mr. Stevenson. A few of the pickets who were close up to the enemy could not be got away in time. Except these, the whole garrison marched out without accident, in good order and in fine spirits. Most of them had expected to be captured with the position, and when they found themselves aboard steamers bound for Mobile instead of for a Northern prison, they were happy. They were the very flower of our Western army. They had made a splendid defense and they knew it.

FINE QUALITIES OF THE MEN.

The company of Washington Artillery, of which Mr. Stevenson was a member, a private, was conspicuous for fine conduct even in this fine command. After they had been holding the most advanced and exposed redoubt for more than a week of incessant action, fighting by day, fighting and working by night, I went into the works to see Captain Slocum, the commander of that company, relative to relieving them by a fresh battery from Mobile. I told him they had been overworked and needed rest, and other companies not yet engaged stood ready to take their place. He replied: "Appreciating, General, your consideration for my men, I desire to submit the question to them before consenting to our being relieved." He soon came back and said: "General, the company, grateful for your kind intention, desire to hold this position to the end. We respectfully decline to be relieved." And they held it, as Stevenson has so well told, to the very end and never expected to escape capture.

WHAT SPANISH FORT WAS.

Spanish Fort was an old earth work on the east bank of Appalachia river, which had been erected and occupied by the Spaniards more than a hundred years ago. Fearing the enemy might occupy it and from it annoy or perhaps silence Batteries Huger and Tracey, twenty-five hundred yards from it, on the west side of that river, I constructed there a heavy six-gun battery of Brooke rifles. I then threw around it as a centre a line of three redoubts connected by rifle pits, which crowned the higher ground in the rear. The whole crest was about one mile and a quarter. Its right rested on Appalachia river, its left on the great marsh which was at that time impassible. The whole line was defended by about thirty pieces of cannon of various calibre and 2,100 men, and of four of these guns the history was peculiar.

Some year or so before this battle Ross' Brigade of Texan cavalry was operating along the Yazoo river in Mississippi. With the brigade was Owens' Arkansas Light Battery. On the Yazoo lay a Federal gunboat, of which Ross had good knowledge and which he resolved to capture with his Texans. Accordingly he came upon her when her fires were down, put his field guns above and below her, knocked all her boats to pieces and drove her people from her decks, so that her colors were hauled down. There was no boat available to receive the surrender of the ship, and therefore a sergeant of the battery, with ten or twelve men, stripped and swam out, and, naked as they were, received on her deck the formal surrender. She was armed with six twenty-four pounder bronze howitzers, all of which were sent to Mobile, where their carriages were changed to suit land defence.

Four of them were mounted in the works of Spanish Fort and did good service. At every discharge they threw half a gallon of bullets.

USE OF TORPEDOES.

The garrison of Spanish Fort was 2,100 men. The besiegers

were a corps and two divisions of Canby's army, stated at 33,000 men. But for the torpedoes Farragut's fleet would have greatly embarrassed the defense. But they could only use their guns of greatest range, because all of them who ventured close in were sunk. Six or seven armed vessels, besides several transports, were sunk during these operations. Our torpedoes were of rude construction. The best were beer casks charged with gunpowder and anchored two to three feet below the surface of the water by an iron chain to a mushroom anchor. Many fuses with sensitive primers were set around the kegs and as they rolled under a passing ship one or another primers would be discharged. They usually blew out a section of the bottom eight feet by ten. The ships sunk immediately. As the water was shoal, few of the people were killed on these ships. But all the other ships were profoundly impressed and kept well away from where these torpedoes were supposed to be awaiting them. Our losses throughout the operations were fifteen to thirty daily.

THE ATTACK AT BLAKLEY.

Blakley, five miles above Spanish Fort, was under attack at the same time. It had a better line and was garrisoned by 2,600 men. After Spanish Fort was evacuated the enemy, greatly disheartened, attacked Blakley Sunday evening, April 9th, with his whole army, now 50,000 strong, and carried it about 5 P. M., just as Lee's army had surrendered at Appomattox. I could not have brought away the garrison of Blakley till after dark on the 9th, and the enemy had been so very cautious I was not anxious about waiting one day longer. Colonel Lockett was right in fixing the date for evacuation at Tuesday night, the 11th of April. The reports of the enemy show that its earlier execution was the result of an accident. One of the general officers, while rectifying his line during the fierce bombardment on the evening of the 8th, occupied the extreme left of our parapet. This being unintended, and the enemy not knowing the importance of the point gained, failed to press his advantage, while Gibson was enabled by the promptness of his

movements and the discipline of his command, to march his forces away before the enemy found they were gone or how they went.

GENERAL GIBSON'S COMMAND.

General Gibson displayed great courage and capacity during this brilliant operation. Some days before the battle ended he received a sharp wound, but did not go off duty nor let his name go in the report of wounded. The troops under his command represented every State of the Southern Confederacy. They had been more than four years in active service. They fitly closed the career of the Confederacy by an action so brilliant that had it taken place two years sooner it would have greatly exalted the prowess of the Confederate troops. A careful study of its details will be of interest to military men.

SERVICE OF THE MORTARS.

Cohorn mortars were freely used and after the enemy's sharpshooters had closed in they frequently cleared them out of their pits. The water approaches were guarded by submarine torpedoes and the approaches by land by sub-terra shells. I had about forty Cohorn mortars cast in the foundries of Mobile for this defense, and also wooden mortars made of gum stumps, hollowed out to eight and ten-inch calibre. They were hooped with iron and lined with sheet iron. They were only available at short range and with very small charges. We used here for the first time in the war, sand-bag embrasures for the men in the rifle-pits. They were very convenient and gave great security to the sharpshooters.

NOTES OF OPERATIONS.

Our cannon embrasures were effectually closed by muntlets of steel plates. The enemy's sharpshooters plastered them thick with lead, but only one of them was injured—a three-inch shot cut a clean hole through it, but did no further damage.

We expended daily from twelve thousand to thirty-six thousand rounds of rifle cartridges; our supply was not great. The enemy poured a constant stream of lead into our lines, and Gibson gave every man who would bring in so much lead paroles of twenty-four hours to visit Mobile. A number of enterprising fellows eagerly pursued this traffic and greatly enjoyed the reward. This garrison, with those of Tracey, Hunger and Mobile were included in the general capitulation of the department.

We evacuated Mobile on the morning of April 12. The mayor of the city was sent with a white flag out to the fleet to say that Mobile was ready for their peaceable occupation without any injury to person or to property. We marched to Meridian, where the band of Gibson's Louisiana Brigade, then the only Confederate band in the world, on the night of May 13, gave me their last sad serenade. Many officers of the regiments which had been serving with me waited on me in a body and gave me their last farewell.

Next day we scattered over our own Southern country seeking our homes, and at once addressed ourselves to those peaceful duties which have regenerated the Southern States and crowned the Confederate name with honors even more noble than any we had won in war.

Charlottesville, Va., August 6, 1894.

A BISHOP'S VISITATION IN THE FIELD
OF WAR.

From the Annual Address of Bishop JOHN JOHNS at the Seventieth Annual Council of the Protestant Episcopal Church in Virginia, St. Paul's Church, Richmond, Va., September 20, 1865.

In compliance with the canon I proceed to state that—during the past year my visitations were frequently interfered with by interruptions of the lines of travel and other causes connected with the war. All my appointments for May, 1864, were thus frustrated, and my services were necessarily confined to the servants of the plantation on which I resided, and others in the vicinity.

July 2.—I preached in the Church in Danville in the morning, and in one of the hospitals in the afternoon.

July 10.—I preached in St. John's, Halifax C. H., confirmed 18

July 17.—I preached in Christ Church, Halifax, and confirmed two.

July 24.—I preached in St. Paul's, Richmond, in the morning, and in the evening in Grace Church, and confirmed seven.

July 26, 27.—My appointments were at Chaffin's Bluff, to preach and administer the rite of confirmation; but the military movements in anticipation of an immediate engagement prevented the services.

Understanding that the lower part of the valley was now accessible, I immediately proceeded by way of Staunton to Winchester, where on the 31st of July I preached and confirmed three persons. The two following days were occupied in visiting the families of the congregation.

August 3.—I preached in the Church at Millwood and confirmed five.

August 4.—I preached at White Post.

August 5.—I preached in Grace Church, Berryville, and confirmed 12, three of whom were from Wickliffe Parish.

August 6.—The Rev. Mr. Perkins, who travelled with me, and rendered me most acceptable service, being disabled by sickness, the Rev. Mr. Jones accompanied me for a few days. It was our intention to visit Charlestown; but as we approached, we learned that the Federal forces were then entering the town. We therefore left it to our right and passed on to Middletown. Here we were kindly received by Dr. Nelson, at whose residence I had, in the evening, the privilege of uniting in social worship with some of the congregation, who assembled there on hearing of our arrival. This parish had, for more than a year, been without a minister, and as the good people there were desirous of an opportunity to unite in the services of the Church, I readily consented to officiate for them on my return.

The next morning (Sunday) we made an early start, and proceeded through a desolated and apparently deserted country to Shepherdstown, into which, as we could obtain no information by the way, we entered with some anxiety, uncertain by which army it was occupied. We found it in the possession of a few Confederates, but as the Union troops in large number were known to be only a few miles distant, and their advance expected, it was suggested that we might be interrupted in our proposed services, and subjected to inconvenient detention. We concluded, however, to venture upon the experiment. The bell was rung, and the congregation assembled. The Rev. Mr. Jones read prayers. Whilst I was preaching a note was handed to the Rector informing him that the Federal forces were approaching the town. I was not willing to leave the Church without confirming those who were desirous to ratify their baptismal vow. Descending to the chancel and calling them around me, I administered the apostolic rite to ten persons. The service was of peculiar interest, and I am sure will not soon be forgotten by those whom it specially concerned, or by those by whom it was witnessed.

To return by Smithfield, as we intended, was now deemed impracticable. My appointment there was necessarily, though very reluctantly, abandoned, and we made our way round by Bunker's Hill to Winchester, where we arrived at 10 o'clock P. M., and so ended the labors of a day of much excitement and fatigue, but of very deep interest.

As we drove out of Shepherdstown we were accosted by a gentleman on horseback, who introduced himself as one of those just confirmed. He kindly invited us to accompany him to his house, where we werè abundantly refreshed by the generous hospitality of his excellent wife and self, and then conducted to a road and furnished with directions, which enabled us to accomplish the rest of our journey without deviation.

In passing through Bunker Hill, I was pained to see that the neat little Church in which, on former visitations, I had officiated, had, like many others, been much damaged by occupancy for military purposes. I trust that those accustomed to worship there will be encouraged and aided in making the proper repairs, and that the clergy to whom it is accessible will favor them with occasional services, till they can be supplied with stated ministrations.

August 8.—We returned to Millwood, where I found the Rev. Mr. Perkins still too much indisposed to travel.

August 10.—A funeral service at the Stone Chapel brought together a number of the parishioners, and at the request of the Rector I preached to the congregation in that venerable building, consecrated by the faithful and successful services of my loved and lamented predecessor. Here he commenced his ministry, labored steadily for many years, and to the close of his life, though it had been left by the congregation for a building of larger size and better location, he continued to visit it annually to preach to a new generation the precious gospel, which, in his youth, he had proclaimed so acceptably to their parents.

That afternoon the Federal forces advanced toward White Post, and we unexpectedly found ourselves within their lines.

About sundown a squad of cavalry rode up to the parsonage near Millwood, and carried off the horse, which a fortnight before, I had purchased in Winchester, to enable me to reach the different parishes which I proposed to visit. Happily when the seizure occurred I had completed my tour, and the gratification which it afforded, fully compensated for the loss at its close. To this I should not advert, but that I may record my gratitude for the prompt and generous relief rendered by Mr. George Burwell of Carter Hall, who, as soon as he heard of our loss, placed at our disposal a valuable horse, with which I performed, without any detention, the journey to my distant home in Halifax county.

August 13.—We forded the Shenandoah and crossed the Blue Ridge, without hindrance, to Paris. I was very desirous to visit Upperville and Middleburg, and pass around by the Plains to Warrenton, but being advised that, in the disturbed state of the country, this route might not be safe, we kept along the foot of the mountain to Markham Station, and made our way to Major Thomas Ambler's. The next day was Sunday. The church in the vicinity having been too much damaged to be used for worship, notice was circulated throughout the neighborhood that divine service would be conducted at Major Ambler's residence, and at the usual hour a congregation assembled.

The Rev. Mr. Perkins read prayers, and I preached.

August 15.—In Rappahannock county, at the residence of Mr. John Lane, I administered the Lord's Supper to his venerable mother, confined to her home by loss of sight, and other infirmities of age, but abiding in the light of truth, and sustained by precious faith in an all-sufficient Saviour.

August 18.—I passed at Culpeper C. H. with the Rev. Mr. Cole, who has labored diligently and endured much during the disturbances to which that section of the Diocese has been peculiarly exposed. A constant and heavy rain prevented our having service in the church, and even deprived us of the satisfaction of visiting from house to house; but left us far more

leisure for profitable counsel concerning the great interests of our sacred mission.

August 24.—I preached in Columbia, and confirmed five.

August 27.—I preached to the sick and wounded soldiers in a hospital in Richmond.

September 4.—I preached in Christ Church, Halifax, and the same evening reached home, after an absence of more than six weeks.

September 11.—In Christ Church, Halifax, after a sermon by the Rev. Dr. Minnigerode, I addressed the congregation, and in the afternoon preached to the servants at my own residence.

September 18.—I again preached to the servants.

October 2.—I preached in Emmanuel Church, Henrico, and confirmed two. At night I preached in St. Paul's, Richmond, and confirmed five.

October 3.—In the morning I preached in St. Paul's, Petersburg, and confirmed fifteen. At night in Grace Church, and confirmed twenty-three.

October 4.—On the lines near Chester, I preached in the woods to a part of Kemper's Brigade.

October 5.—I preached at Manakin Town, and confirmed two.

October 6.—I preached in St. Luke's, Powhatan, and confirmed four.

October 7.—I preached in Emmanuel, Powhatan, and confirmed eight.

October 8.—I preached in the Church at Genito, and confirmed two.

October 9.—I preached in the Church at Grub Hill, and confirmed seven.

October 11.—I preached in Trinity Church, Chesterfield, and confirmed five.

October 16.—I preached in the Church at Charlotte Courthouse, and confirmed five, and administered the Lord's Supper.

October 23.—In Christ Church, Halifax, I preached, and baptized Alice Wales, daughter of the Rev. Wm. H. Meade.

October 30.—I preached in the Church at Catawba.

November 10.—I preached in the Church at Clarksville, and confirmed five. At night in the Church at Boydton, and confirmed ten.

November 14.—I preached in St. Andrew's, Mecklenburg, and confirmed one.

November 16.—In the Church at Warrenton, North Carolina, I addressed the congregation after a sermon by the Rector.

November 27.—In Christ Church, Halifax, I admitted to priests orders, the Rev. William H. Meade and the Rev. P. Doddridge Thompson. Prayers were read by the Rev. Geo. Woodbridge, D. D. Sermon by the Rev. Joshua Peterkin. The candidates were presented by the Rev. John Clark, who all united in the imposition of hands.

November 27.—In the same Church I addressed the congregation, after a sermon by the Rector.

December 11.—I preached in the Chapel of Gen. Stuart's Brigade, and confirmed four. In the afternoon I preached in a spacious barn near Port Walthall Junction, and confirmed thirteen. The next day I preached in the Chapel of Gen. Corse's Brigade, and confirmed sixteen.

For three months from this date I was confined to my chamber by a painful affection, which disabled me for all official duty.

March 19.—I resumed my public services by officiating for the servants on the plantation of Mr. John Clark, at Wilna.

March 19.—I preached in Christ Church, Halifax, and confirmed ten.

April 16.—I preached in St. John's, and on the 23d in Christ Church, Halifax. As soon as I received reliable intelligence of the entire failure of the painful and protracted struggle for the independence of the Confederate States, and the re-establishment of the Federal authority, I felt it incumbent upon me to prepare a brief circular, addressed to the Clergy and Laity of the Diocese of Virginia, recognizing the duty of prompt and honest obedience to the existing government, and the obligation to pray for "those in authority." For this purpose, I had no hesi-

tation in recommending the use of that form to which we had long been accustomed, and from which any deviation now might be liable to the suspicion of unbecoming subterfuge.

VETERAN GUNNERS FIRE OLD BATTERY.

Inspiring Scene at Virginia Military Institute.

LEXINGTON, VA., May 10, 1913.

One of the most inspiring military spectacles imaginable was witnessed at the Virginia Military Institute to-day, the fiftieth anniversary of the death of General Jackson. The cadet battery was escorted and trooped by the corps of cadets in a novel and interesting manner. Colonel William T. Poague, who commanded these guns as captain of the Rockbridge Artillery throughout the first two years of the War Between the States, commanded the battery in person in the ceremony, with eight of his surviving gunners on the limbers. Marching in rear of the battalion, to the tune of the "Bonnie Blue Flag," the battery passed to the right, then down the front of the corps, executed "action right" opposite the centre of the line, with the veteran cannoneers at their posts. The sight of the gallant Poague mounted on a fine-going chestnut charger, with the gray-haired soldiers at the pieces, was a thrilling one.

Colonel J. C. Wise, commandant, then read the order, giving the history of the guns. After reading this order, so full of history, the commandant brought the corps to present arms, and said:

"Colonel Poague, the corps of cadets salutes you, the former commander of this battery, and those of your men now present, than whom no more gallant gunners ever pulled a lanyard. Since you were the first to lead this battery into action, it is fitting that you should cause it to fire its last salute in honor of its first commander, the immortal Jackson, "whose spirit wraps yon dusky mountains, whose memory lingers o'er each fountain. The meanest hill, the mightiest river rolls mingling with his fame forever."

Colonel Poague then in the highpitched voice of age, but with a note of clearness which carried across the great parade, commanded "Battery load, first piece, first platoon fire," and so on until each of the four guns was wreathed in smoke, while the veteran cannoneers wielded their staffs at his commands as of old.

Captain D. E. Moore, of Lexington, who fired the first gun in the Valley campaign, was one of the gunners to-day.

"To the colors" was then shouted, and the colors dipped, after which Colonel Poague ordered "rear piece, right wheel," and passed on beyond the left of the battalion to the stirring strains of "Dixie." Columns were then formed with Colonel Poague and the battery at the head, the tactical officers of the battalion marching beside the horses, the veterans on the cinders, and the corps of cadets following. The leading caisson, which bore the body of Jackson to his last resting place, now bore a handsome floral piece. The procession moved through the town to the Lexington Cemetery, where it was formed in line before Jackson's famous statue, beneath which his remains lie.

Dr. Charles Manly then delivered the benediction, which was rendered at the great soldier's funeral, followed by a quartette of women who sang Jackson's favorite hymn. The corps presented arms; again "To the colors" was sounded; again the colors dipped and silently the procession moved away from the grave, leaving thereon its floral tribute, while many a soldier's heart, both young and old, throbbed with emotion beneath the gray jackets of the Confederacy.

The whole ceremony was witnessed by a great concourse of people, including the faculties both of the Institute and Washington and Lee University, the student body of the latter and many residents of Lexington. As the corps passed and re-passed the chapel in which Lee's body lies, it rendered the traditional salute.

In Lexington, the atmosphere of which is saturated with memories of America's three greatest soldiers, Washington, Lee and Jackson, the traditions of the great Virginians are as green as the laurels which fame has entwined about their brows.

MEMOIR OF RICHARD H. ANDERSON, C. S. A.

By EDWARD N. THURSTON, Charleston, S. C.

Richard Herron Anderson was born on the 7th October, 1821, near Statesburgh, in Sumter District, South Carolina, where his father, Dr. W. W. Anderson, planted and practiced medicine. His early school days were passed at Edge Hill Academy, in that District. He entered the United States Military Academy July 1st, 1838, and graduated July 1st, 1842, when he was appointed Brevet 2d Lieut. 1st Dragoons. While at West Point he was universally a favorite, having many friends and no enemies.

After graduating, he was sent first to the Cavalry School for Practice, at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, where he remained until 1843, when he was ordered to Little Rock, Arkansas, on frontier duty, thence he was stationed at Fort Gibson and was with the command which marched to Fort Washington, Indian Territory, escorting the Indian Agent to Red River. After his return he remained until 1844, and was then ordered to Fort Jessup, Louisiana. In 1845-46 he was with the troops occupying Texas, thence he was ordered on recruiting service, but was engaged at the siege of Vera Cruz, in March, 1847, was in the skirmish at La Hoya, June 20th, and with the Army of Gen. Scott, which marched on the City of Mexico, being engaged in the battle of Contreras, 19th August, and in the skirmish of San Augustine, 20th August, and in the battle of Molinodel Rey, 8th September. He was brevetted 1st Lieutenant for gallant and meritorious conduct in an affair with the enemy at San Augustine, Mexico, was engaged in the operations preceding the capture of the City of Mexico, September 12 and 14th. After the Mexican War he was on recruiting service, 1849, and then to the Cavalry School of Practice, at Carlisle, Penn. Again on recruiting service, 1850-52. He was then ordered to Fort Gra-

ham, Texas, 1852-53, thence to Fort McKavett, New Mexico, 1853-54; thence to San Antonio, Texas, and back to Fort McKavett, 1855, and was sent to Fort Riley, Kansas, 1856, and aided in quelling disturbances there until 1857. Thence he was again sent as Instructing Officer to the Cavalry School of Practice, and in 1858 was ordered on service, conducting recruits to Utah; was with the Utah Expedition, 1858-59, and thence was sent to Fort Kearney, Nebraska, 1859-60. His letter of resignation is dated 16th February, 1861. For most of the foregoing, I am indebted to Cullin's Register.

The State of South Carolina had passed the Ordinance of Secession, some of her sister States had followed, and it was evident that Civil War approached, Anderson deemed it his duty to follow the fortunes of his native State and to do her bidding; accordingly he tendered his services to Governor Pickens and was immediately appointed Colonel of the 1st Regular Infantry State Troops. Barnard E. Bee was Lieut. Colonel and John Dunnoyant, Major. His regiment was posted on Sullivan's Island during the bombardment of Fort Sumter. Shortly after the surrender of that Fort, Gen. Beauregard, who had commanded the forces C. S. A. around Charleston, was ordered to Virginia, and Col. Anderson assumed the command. He was appointed Brigadier General, 20th July, 1861, and about the 1st September following, was ordered to report to Gen. Bragg, at Pensacola; his Brigade occupied that town and the Navy Yard. On the night of the 8th October, 1861, he commanded a detail of ten men from each company of Bragg's Army, in all about 1,100 men, in an attack on the encampment on Santa Rosa Island; his command embarked at night, made a successful landing, burned the camp and many valuable stores, captured Major Vogels and some twenty prisoners and returned without material loss. In this affair Anderson's arm was broken.

In February, 1862, he received orders to report to Gen. J. E. Johnston, commanding C. S. forces in Virginia, and was assigned to a brigade composed of the 4th, 5th, 6th and 9th South Carolina Volunteers and Stribling's Battery; with this

command he accompanied the Army to Yorktown and its vicinity. When Gen. Johnston retired up the peninsular, Anderson's Brigade relieved his rear guard on the night of 4th May, and occupied the redoubts near Williamsburg. Early on the morning of 5th May, his pickets were driven in, a bloody engagement followed, during which Anderson commanded Longstreet's Division, consisting of Brigades of Wilcox, Pryor, A. P. Hill and Pickett, and his own.

This was the first battle of any consequence in which his command was engaged. The troops soon learned to admire the cool yet daring gallantry of their commander and to value his distinguished ability as a leader; the survivors of his old brigade retain to this day their admiration of him as man and soldier.

Next followed the battle of Seven Pines (or Fair Oaks); here, too, Anderson had a conspicuous part; with his brigade he forced back Casey's Division and gained possession of his camp, and received the congratulations of his commander for the admirable handling of his troops.

Soon followed the battles around Richmond. At Gaines' Mill he won new laurels; late that afternoon his Division Commander approached him and said: "My part of this work has not been accomplished, and I have nobody to do it with but you," referring to the hard duty already performed by the brigade. The reply was, "Well, General, what is it you want done;" and the answer, "The enemy must come off that hill before night," and his cheerful response, "If any one brigade in the army can do it, mine can," and it was so handsomely done that Gen. Lee, who was an eye-witness, congratulated him the next morning. So at Fraur's Farm, Anderson commanded three brigades, and again did well the part allotted to him. At Malvern Hill his brigade was in reserve and took no especial part in that bloody battle. Early in July, 1862, he was made a Major General and assigned to the command of the division formerly known as Huger's, composed of the brigades of Mahone, Armistead, Wright and Martin. The last was left at

Petersburg, Virginia; with the others he marched towards Manassas and occupied Warrenton Springs, making a demonstration against Pope, whilst Gen. Lee, with Longstreet's corps, pressed through Thoroughfare Gap to relieve Jackson at 2nd Manassas. Anderson reached that field on the night of 30th August, and took part in the battle of the next day.

When Gen. Lee moved into Maryland, Anderson, with McLaws, was sent to complete the investment of Harper's Ferry. After the fall of that place Anderson rejoined Gen. Lee at Sharpsburg, marching all night, and in the battle near that village, was severely wounded in the thigh, but retained his command until the emergency had passed and then fell fainting from loss of blood. His wound healed in time for him to command his Division at Fredericksburg, now composed of the brigades of Mahone, Wilcox, Wright, Featherston and Perry; it was posted on the left of the Plank Road, supporting McLaws, whose left rested on Marye's Hill. Here his infantry was not materially engaged, but his artillery did good service.

During the winter he remained near Fredericksburg, where two of his brigades were encamped, one holding Bank's Ford, and the remaining two were posted at United States Ford. With these two, supported by one of the brigades (Wright's) from Fredericksburg, he met Hooker's advance on Chancellorsville, and retiring slowly, disputed every inch of ground until the arrival of Jackson's troops; then Hooker was forced back on Chancellorsville, and while Jackson's brilliant flank movement was being executed, Anderson held Lee's centre, his right resting on the Plank Road; he joined Jackson's attack on Chancellorsville and aided in driving the enemy thence. Then he was ordered to Salem Church, to meet Sedgwick, who was advancing on Lee's rear from Fredericksburg. Sedgwick was driven across the Rappahannock and Anderson returned to the neighborhood of Chancellorsville.

About the 30th May, 1863, his division was transferred to A. P. Hill's corps; with it he crossed the Potomac and fought at Gettysburg on the 2d of July. His splendid division was

ordered to charge the Cemetery Hill in conjunction with Longstreet's advance. His troops did well their part, but against such a deluge of shot and shell, no troops could long hold the position which he carried and about dark he withdrew his command to the line it occupied before the assault. On the 3d only one of his brigades was engaged.

With the Army of Northern Virginia, he recrossed the Potomac and was engaged at Bristow Station. In December of that year he was ordered to the neighborhood of Mine Run, to meet General Meade's advance, but Meade retired without an engagement.

When Gen. Grant advanced to the Wilderness, Anderson's division did not move to meet him with the rest of the corps. It was left to guard the Fords, on the Rapidan, until the Confederate calvary had reached Stevensburg; thus he had no part in the action of May 5th, but on the morning of the 6th his command arrived at a most opportune moment and took an active part in the bloody events of that day. Longstreet was severely wounded and Anderson was transferred to the command of that corps, leaving his division under the command of Mahone; and a few days after, he received a Lieutenant General's commission. With this corps he marched to Spotsylvania to check Grant's movement in that directions. He succeeded perfectly and received in an autograph letter Gen. Lee's thanks for the masterly handling of his troops. With characteristic modesty this noble soldier published to his corps, the clause relating to its gallant conduct and refrained from referring to that portion which named his own distinguished services.

He commanded Longstreet's corps in the numerous and bloody battles of the summer and autumn of 1864, attending Grant's advance on Petersburg. Early in the winter of 1864, Longstreet returned to duty and Anderson relieved Gen. Beauregard in command of his corps, consisting of Hoke's and B. R. Johnson's divisions. Pickett's was afterwards added, and covered the lines immediately in front of Petersburg, until February, 1865, when he was relieved by Gordon and moved to Gen. Lee's

right flank, near Hatcher's Run, where Gen. Grant pierced the lines at Petersburg. Anderson's left rested on the Run. He struck Grant's advance at Gravelly Run and gained some success, but was eventually forced to retire. At Church Crossings a part of his corps under Pickett was badly cut up.

The retreat from Petersburg had now commenced. On the 6th of April, 1865, Anderson fought for the last time; the surrender of Lee's Army at Appomattox followed on the 9th.

From early in 1862 to the end of the war Anderson's career was so large a part of that of the Army of Northern Virginia that to tell of it in detail would involve the necessity of writing a history of that grand army. He had a place in all of the important events of those memorable campaigns and the responsible and arduous duties devolving on him were always so discharged as to add lustre to his fame and glory to his country's banner.

After Gen. Johnston's surrender Anderson returned to his old home and began life as a planter. He did not succeed, and eventually was made Agent for the South Carolina Railroad at Camden in that State. This was distasteful to him and in fact he was not suited to the position, still his needs were pressing; his resources exhausted and his family dependent; he was thankful for even this.

A few months before his death he was appointed State Inspector of Phosphates. This was more congenial to his taste and habits and promised to yield him some comfort in his declining years. At least the people of his native State appeared to realize that they owed to one who had sacrificed so much for them some recognition of his great worth and valuable services and better provision for his old age was contemplated and doubtless would have been made, but the wires flashed the news that on the 26th of June, 1879, R. H. Anderson had departed this life suddenly in the town of Beaufort, S. C. He had fallen in all his vigor, instantly without notice; yet those who knew him best know that for him the messenger, Death, had no terrors and that he rests from his labors. He was in the

58th year of his age. His body is buried in the yard of the Episcopal Church at Beaufort, South Carolina.

Anderson was twice married, first to Miss Gibson, of Carlisle, Pennsylvania, whose son and daughter still survive, and within a few years to Miss Milette, of Sumter County, South Carolina, who has outlived him. By the second marriage there were no children.

LECTURES OF CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS ON
"OUR AMERICAN CIVIL WAR."

By Col. DAVID GREGG McINTOSH.

These lectures delivered by the Honorable Charles Francis Adams, before the University of Oxford, in 1913, and published under the title of "Trans-Atlantic Solidarity," have been recently delivered with some enlargement, by the distinguished author before the Johns Hopkins University, in Baltimore.

Mr. Adams' position as a man of letters and wide culture insured him at the latter place large and appreciative audiences. The liberal views which he was known to entertain respecting the American Civil War, and the kindly and eulogistic sentiments which he had already expressed for the character of the great Southern leader in that War; his previous declarations that if he, Mr. Adams, had been placed in 1861, in General Lee's position, with the heredity and environment which surrounded Lee, he would have done just as Lee did have predisposed the people of the South to accept not only with respect, but with a large degree of confidence Mr. Adams' opinions connected with the war. When, therefore, in the course of these lectures he announced his purpose, to tell us how and why the recognition of the Southern Confederacy had been deliberately determined on by the English Cabinet, and then suddenly withheld, curiosity was stimulated with the idea of having new light thrown upon the canvass, and the problem which had vexed and disappointed so many Southern souls, illumined and set at rest. The gravity and the magnitude of the issues then impending are strikingly set forth by Mr. Adams. Not the least interesting thing which he tells us is, that after all, the issues of the war were settled "not on the banks of the Potomac, as generally assumed, but in Downing street, London." Mr. Adams leads up to the subject by portraying with great skill and much dramatic effect

the industrial and political conditions which existed in England at that time, and the different factors which stood for and against the Confederacy. He marshalls what he calls the "two arrays."

"In aid of the defiant, slaveholding Confederacy came, first, the great British and Continental, commercial, financial and other cotton spinning interests, with other far reaching political influence; next the supporting textile operatives, not only of Lancastershire, but wherever throughout other countries cotton was woven into cloth—they numbered millions; third, the entire governing classes, as they then were, of Great Britain, including the great landed interest. These last also were voiced, and most persistently, as well as powerfully voiced by the London Times, known as 'The Thunderer,' at the acme of its great and remarkable career. Finally, the French Emperor, for Napoleon III, now at the height of his prestige, for reasons of State, was disposed to put forth on behalf of the Confederacy, all the influence which he could exert. A powerful combination, it was one in a worldly and political sense, well nigh irresistible.

"Opposed to it was an array, so apparently meagre as to be almost pitiable; and if the alliance of force I have just described recalled Homer, that set over against it was not less suggestive biblically—it was David again confronting Goliath. Strange, well nigh inconceivable when now asserted in the full light of the event, that opposing array consisted of John Bright, the tribune in England of political and industrial Democracy, and behind him 'a little bit of a woman,' as she at that time described herself, 'just as thin and dry as a pinch of snuff,' holding in her hand a book: but the woman was Harriet Beecher Stowe, and the book was entitled 'Uncle Tom's Cabin,' or 'Life Among the Lowly.'"

A book which he declares "exercised a more immediate, considerable and dramatic world influence than any other book ever printed. * * * Uncle Tom hit the world, so to speak, between wind and water. * * * This was not only so in America, but throughout Europe. Generally, mankind was asserting or ready to assert man's claim for recognition as man. The

word had only to be spoken and it chanced to Harriet Beecher Stowe to speak it."

Mr. Adams' disposition to create dramatic situations leads him to overlook in this connection the effect of other publications of that period. He takes no account of the systematic effort of the Northern papers to prejudice the people of Great Britain against the South. The anti-slavery poems of Whittier and Longfellow, the lectures of Emerson, the letters and speeches of Motley and Everett, which were reprinted by hundreds and sown broadcast over the British Isles, as well as the political speeches of Sumner and Stevens in Congress, and the bitter denunciations of Wendell Phillips, Lloyd Garrison and others, all of which were calculated to influence British sentiment, and create a feeling hostile to the South, seem to have escaped him. These in lesser degree, perhaps, helped to thrust the slavery question to the foreground, and to place "the freedom of the slave before Europe as the motive which had aroused the philanthropic North to action."

While Mr. Adams assures us he is not given to exaggeration or to the picturesque, he could not truthfully say that he does not delight in figures of rhetoric. In elaborating his array of opposing forces, he treats us to many historical incidents combined with economic statistics, and caps them all with invocations to the muses and to fiction. He calls to his aid the *Iliad* and Locksley Hall, and he appeals for illustration alike to Shakespeare and to Dickens.

The "array" of these forces is preliminary to the main point of discussion, which is, why, with such a powerful combination in favor of the Confederacy, and so apparently meagre and almost pitiable an opposition, the Southern Confederacy failed to obtain recognition. That is the question Mr. Adams undertakes to answer. If he is able to do so he will have furnished an important contribution to history, and will have justified the selection of a subject which his friend, Mr. Bryce, advised against, as one which had fallen into oblivion, and would no longer excite general public interest.

Mr. Adams proceeds to point out that military operations from the Union point of view in the fall of 1862 had for some time been going steadily from bad to worse. The Confederacy was on the field of battle, distinctly getting the best of it, when Lord Palmerston, on September 14th, wrote to Earl Russell, suggesting that the time was now come "for us to consider whether, in such a state of things, England and France might not address the contending parties, and recommend an arrangement upon the basis of separation." That Russell replied, "I agree with you that the time has come for offering mediation to the U. S. Government, with a view to the recognition of the independents (Sic) of the Confederates. I agree further, that in case of failure we ought ourselves to recognize the Southern States as an independent State. For the purpose of taking so important a step, I think we must have a meeting of the Cabinet. The 23d or 20th of October would suit me for a meeting."

A Cabinet circular was accordingly sent out, and when Gladstone, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, was consulted, he gave the suggestion his approval. Mr. Adams continues, "the special Cabinet meeting was called for the 23d October; to all outward appearance, and in all human probability, that was the fateful day. The ordeal must then be passed. The order of exercises was arranged. The day came and passed. Upon it nothing happened—what had taken place? * * * It is a curious story; in diplomatic annals scarce any more so. It was it will be remembered—for dates in this connection are all important—the 23d October that had been assigned for the special Cabinet meeting, now it so chanced that sixteen days before, on the 7th of that month, Mr. Gladstone delivered himself of that famous Newcastle speech, still remembered, in which he declared that Jefferson Davis has 'made a nation' and that the independence of the Confederacy, and dissolution of the American Union, were as certain as any event yet future and contingent could be."

To that speech Mr. Adams attributes the change in the programme and the failure of recognition. He says it "saved the

situation." Mr. Adams points out that it was bad form for Mr. Gladstone to have foreshadowed a ministerial policy, and thinks it must have offended Palmerston, and that the latter in consequence "called him down," and that as a result, when the Cabinet meeting came off, the subject was quietly ignored or indefinitely postponed. This, in short, is Mr. Adams' solution of the question, upon which hung, in his judgment, the fortunes of the Confederacy. The solution is so marvellously simple, it seems most remarkable it should never have occurred to any one before. Mr. Adams gives us no hint of what took place at the meeting. His researches into State papers and the correspondence of the period, do not disclose the presence of anything of an irritating nature, as occurring on that occasion, nor does he find such in the contemporaneous press. If so, he has not told us of it. Mr. Adams had the fact to deal with that a Cabinet meeting was called to discuss or decide upon a recognition of the Confederacy, and that meeting was done. He thereupon frames a theory to fit the facts. But we are constrained to think Mr. Adams' theory will not bear examination. In the first place, it is inconceivable that if Lord Palmerston, Earl Russell and Mr. Gladstone, the three leaders of the Cabinet, were in thorough accord on the subject, and had maturely considered and agreed upon a line of action, they would have been diverted from following it up, especially in so grave a matter, by anything so trivial as that suggested by Mr. Adams. For Palmerston to have suffered a momentary fit of spleen towards Gladstone to upset and thrust aside a settled policy of the Government is to do the greatest violence to his record and his reputation as an astute, able, and experienced Statesman.

It is true that Mr. Adams does suggest, that while the postponement of the subject at the Cabinet meeting of October 23d, in consequence of Gladstone's Newcastle speech, and while Palmerston waited, anticipating more decisive military results in America, something did occur, not as Palmerston anticipated, "but of a wholly unexpected character, by the merest chance as to time," which did affect the situation, and that was Mr.

Lincoln's emancipation proclamation, "and from that time the success of the Union cause meant the freedom of the slave."

But this hypothesis does not help Mr. Adams in interpreting Palmerston's motives; for the emancipation proclamation was made public on September 22d, a month before the Cabinet meeting, and Mr. Adams proceeds to tell us, that "at first in Europe and more especially in Great Britain, the proclamation was not taken seriously. * * * On the contrary, it excited scorn and derision." We are told that Beresford Hope, an M. P., characterized it as a piece of "weak, yet demoniacal spite, the most unparalleled last card ever played by a reckless gambler." Another member of Parliament at a great popular demonstration in October, declared the proclamation was not worth the paper it was written on, and "was one of the most devilish acts of fiendish malignity which the wickedness of man could ever have conceived." So that Mr. Adams himself furnishes the refutation of that suggestion that the proclamation had anything to do with the action of the Cabinet.

We are compelled, therefore, to look further for some explanation of the sudden change of program on the part of the Cabinet. Now, with great deference to the distinguished lecturer, we venture to suggest the existence of a potent influence which had everything to do with the action of the Cabinet, and that was the influence of England's Queen. Mr. Adams does say there is no *record* of her having exerted any influence, but no record should be expected. The influence of the Crown was oftentimes felt when there was no articulate expression of it. There are many reasons which induce us to think that Mr. Adams is mistaken in failing to take the Queen's influence into account.

It is quite safe to say, that as a rule the heads of Monarchical governments do not wish to see the established order of things broken up. They are naturally averse to the disruption of existing government. They look with disfavor upon revolutions. Napoleon III was as much possessed of this feeling as any Crown head of the time, but in this instance he was willing to forego it, because of the situation in Mexico, and his belief

that the dismemberment of the United States would aid him in that quarter. With Queen Victoria it was different. Her humanitarian sympathies were appealed to. Her husband, the Prince Consort, was a Hohenzollern, and the idea of the unification of Germany was then beginning to take shape. Looking forward to a solidified Germany, and apprehensive of the growing spirit of democracy, it was impossible for the Prince to look with favor upon a war which might disrupt an existing government and the consequences of which it was impossible to foresee. It is well known that the Prince was none too popular with the British Cabinet, but the Queen reposed in him the utmost confidence, and he was in fact her privy councillor. Neither of them liked Palmerston, and often differed with him upon questions of State policy. Sir Theodore Martin, in his life of the Prince, has given us what the Prince put on record in the shape of a memorandum, as to an interview between Palmerston and himself which occurred August 17th, 1850, in the following words:

"The Queen had often, I was sorry to say, latterly almost invariably differed from the line of policy pursued by Palmerston. What she had a right to require was, that before a line of policy was adopted or brought before her for her sanction, she should be in full possession of all the facts and all the motives operating. She felt that in this respect she was not dealt with as she ought to be. She never found a matter 'intact' nor a question in which we were not already compromised before it was submitted to her." See volume 2, page 308.

When the affair of the "Trent" took place, in 1861, and Mason and Slidell, the Confederate Commissioners, were forcibly removed from aboard a British steamer by Captain Wilkes, commanding a war vessel of the United States, it produced, as is well known, the greatest indignation in England, as an insult to her flag, and a flagrant breach of international law. For the instant, war seemed imminent. A demand for reparation couched in peremptory language was drawn up by the British Government, to be sent to the Government at Washington, but

before it was sent, it was submitted to the Queen, who handed it to the Prince Consort. The Prince revised the draft, adopting more temperate and conciliatory language, which was forwarded to Lord Lyons to be handed to Mr. Seward.

Seward told Lord Lyons before the copy of the dispatch was placed in his hands, that everything depended on the wording of it, and begged to be allowed to read it before it was communicated to him officially. Mr. Seward was then pleased to say that "Captain Wilkes had acted without instructions and that the four persons taken from the Trent should be cheerfully liberated." When intelligence of this reached the Queen, she said: "Lord Palmerston cannot but look on this peaceful issue of the American quarrel as greatly owing to our beloved Prince, who wrote the observation upon the draft to Lord Lyons." Palmerston's note upon the affair was, "There can be no doubt that, as your Majesty observes, the alterations made in the dispatch to Lord Lyons contributed essentially to the satisfactory settlement of the dispute."

This brief glance at the attitude of the Queen and her insistence upon being advised as to important State matters, is sufficient to show that so important a matter as the recognition of the Southern Confederacy could not have been determined or acted upon without her being apprised of the situation.

Now, if we revert to the condition of things at the time of the Cabinet meeting referred to by Mr. Adams, he states that his father, the American Minister to Great Britain, "got an inkling of what was on foot, and was sorely disturbed." Anticipating just such an emergency, he had written home for further instructions, which in due time were supplied by Mr. Seward. Armed with these, the elder Mr. Adams had an interview with Earl Russell, and the son bravely adds, with no one who knew him can doubt, "that in that hour of darkness, defeat and discomagement, he bore himself in a way of which his country had cause to be proud." The instructions from Seward to Adams and by the latter communicated to Russell, are in part as follows:

"If," the letter runs, "contrary to our expectations, the British Government, either alone or in combination with any other government, should acknowledge the insurgents, while you are remaining without further instructions from this Government concerning that event, you will immediately suspend the exercise of your functions. * * * I have now in behalf of the United States, and by authority of their Chief Executive Magistrate, performed an important duty. Its possible consequences have been weighed, and its solemnity is, therefore, keenly felt and freely acknowledged. This duty has brought us to meet and confront the danger of a war with Great Britain, and other States allied with the insurgents, who are in arms for the overthrow of the American Union. You will perceive that we have approached the contemplation of that crisis with the caution which great reluctance has inspired. But I trust you will also have perceived that the crisis has not appalled us."

It would seem as if Mr. Adams, in attributing the inaction of the Cabinet on the 23d of October to Mr. Gladstone's Newcastle speech, had underrated the effect of this letter of Mr. Seward's, backed up by the fiery zeal of his father. But, however that may be, it is morally certain, in view of the requirements of the Queen, that before a line of policy was adopted she should be in possession of all the facts, that the contents of Mr. Seward's letter and the proposed Cabinet must have been laid before her, and it may be said with equal confidence that she disapproved the programme if such really existed. When the open threat of Mr. Seward was made known to her that recognition meant war, can there be a doubt that she set the seal of her disapproval upon it? This we think furnishes the clue to the non action of the Cabinet. It must not be forgotten that at no time was the British Government disposed to provoke a *casus belli* with the United States. There were many considerations against it, not the least of which was the position of Canada, the possession of which it was thought would be a great bait to the North in case the Union was finally dismembered.

As to the manner in which Mr. Adams marshalls his "arrays," and the positions assigned to members of the Cabinet, we are inclined to think that he has not only been led to overlook the influence of the Crown, but he has given his picture a setting which needs to be toned down to be recognized by some of those who were on the spot and most familiar with the trend of events.

Of course we must assume that in the correspondence between the members of the Cabinet in the fall of 1862, brief extracts of which Mr. Adams has given us, he has not been misled as to the authenticity of the documents referred to, or in the force of the expressions used as affected by the context, but they are in some respects at variance with the belief generally accepted as to the position occupied by Earl Russell. Among those on the spot and one of the most intelligent and reliable observers of events, was Captain James D. Bullock, the Naval representative of the Confederate States, who contracted for the construction of vessels for the Confederacy, and some years after the war published a book in two goodly volumes, entitled "Secret Service of the Confederate States in Europe." The success of Captain Bullock's projects depended upon his being posted at all times upon the disposition of the British Cabinet and particularly the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and this of course involved the relations between the latter and Mr. Seward, and he records his impressions of the attitude of the Cabinet towards the South, and especially of Lord Russell, as follows:

"I shall not be guilty of the indiscretion of classifying the Cabinet by name, but I may say that it was a common belief among the representatives of the Confederate States that two members of the ministry at least were very favorable to the South, and that still another would have been disposed to give some support to certain members of the House of Commons who wished to bring in a motion for the recognition of the Government at Richmond, if he had not been impressed with the belief that the separation of the States was final and that

it would be both unnecessary and impolitic for the Government to give undue offence or encouragement to either of the combatants."

Elsewhere he says:

"Earl Russell, as the Foreign Secretary, was necessarily the active member of the Cabinet in carrying out its neutral policy, and is not to be held individually responsible for what either Federal or Confederate may have thought objectionable in that policy. In saying that his sympathies were with the North, I merely give currency to the impression commonly held by the representatives of the Confederate States in England during the war, and I can give no other grounds for the impression than the opinion to the same effect, which was often and I may say unanimously expressed by those politicians and other frequenters of the London clubs and London society, with whom we were brought in contact. * * * The duty of replying to the long argumentative dispatches of Mr. Adams and the perusal of the numerous consular affidavits which accompanied them, must have been a very serious labor, and it is only fair to remember there was no recognized Confederate agent who could address him officially and freely, and thus modify the effect of the statements of the other side, or set before him the reasons for non-interference. The radical element within the Liberal party, if not actually within the Cabinet, was only a strong and active force, always exercised to check the Government in any apparent concession to the South, and ever striving to nullify the benefit which the Confederate States might obtain from their recognized position as belligerents."

The conclusion formed by Captain Bullock upon the English situation was that the leaning towards either side in the American Civil War was not due to any well defined party tendencies in Great Britain. He says again:

"I have the strongest possible reasons for believing that if the conservative party had been in power, their policy would have been strictly neutral, and the Confederate Government would not

have been recognized. But at the same time, I believe that the advanced Liberals, or Radicals, as they are commonly called, and who are generally supposed to have Republican tendencies, were favorable to the North. These advanced Liberals had persuaded themselves to regard the Government of the United States as 'a government for the people, by the people,' and they feared that a final dissolution of the Union would be considered a failure of the Republican form of government and would check, if not destroy, a more democratic system in Europe.

* * * There were some strong men of the above type in the Counsels of the Liberal party, if not in the Cabinet, at the time of the Civil War and the ardor with which they supported the Federal Government, and the violence with which they denounced the Southern leaders and the Southern people are still fresh in the memory of those representatives of the Confederacy who survive."

Without prolonging these quotations, they are sufficient to show that Mr. Adams' alignment of the forces at work for and against recognition of the Confederacy is open to question. Captain Bullock agrees with Mr. Adams, however, in expressing the view that the Union of 1787 was virtually dissolved in 1861, and a new Union formed in 1865 by the military power of a majority of the States compelling the minority to accept their views of the national compact. That while the former was a confederation of States and a federal republic, the latter is founded upon a fusion of the whole people into one nation, with a supreme centralized executive and administrative government, and is no longer a Federal, but an Imperial Republic.

The effect of Mr. Seward's letter of instruction to Mr. Adams can be better understood by glancing for a moment at the position assumed at the very outset of the war upon the questions of blockade and belligerency. After Mr. Lincoln had issued his proclamations of blockade of the Southern Ports, and Mr. Davis had issued a counter proclamation, Lord Russell, in the House of Commons, on the 6th of May, 1861, stated "that after consultation with the law officers, the Government had come to the

conclusion that the Confederacy must be treated as belligerents," and on the 14th of May Her Majesty's Proclamation of Neutrality was issued which acknowledged the existence of a Civil War and therefore recognized the Confederate States as belligerents. The example of Great Britain was shortly followed by France and other maritime powers. The legal effect of the proclamation of blockade was thus stated by Justice Grier, of the Supreme Court of the United States:

"The proclamation of the blockade is itself official and conclusive evidence to the court that a state of war existed, which demanded and authorized a recourse to such a measure under the circumstances peculiar to the case. The correspondence of Lord Lyons with the Secretary of State admits the fact and concludes the question."

Nevertheless, Mr. Seward violently resented this action of the Powers, and especially that of Great Britain, claiming that the "so-called Government at Richmond" merely represented a "discontented domestic faction." His dispatches to Mr. Dayton and Mr. Adams claimed that it was erroneous "to suppose that any war exists in the United States * * * Certainly there cannot," he says, "be two belligerent powers where there is no war."

This position of Mr. Seward the Foreign Powers declared untenable. In a letter to Mr. Adams, from Lord Russell, the letter asks, "What was the first act of the President of the United States?" He proclaimed on the nineteenth of April, 1861, the blockade of the ports of seven States of the Union. But he could lawfully interrupt the trade of neutrals to the Southern States upon one ground only, namely, that the Southern States were carrying on war against the Government of the United States; in other words, that they were belligerents. Mr. Seward never receded from his position, however singular it may appear, and his resentment towards England never cooled. He continued to assert that the Confederate States should never have been recognized as belligerents and this entered largely into the subsequent discussion before the Geneva Tribunal. The

violent tone of Mr. Seward's dispatches, while it did not convince Lord Russell as to what constituted "belligerency," nevertheless had its effect on the subsequent course of the English Government. Mr. Seward played what might be called a "bluff hand." And it was this hand which was exhibited to Queen Victoria when Mr Adams submitted to Russell his instructions from Mr. Seward.

DAVID GREGG McINTOSH.

March 30, 1914.

MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE WASHINGTON
CUSTIS LEE.

A Paper read at the Annual Meeting of the Virginia Historical Society
February 24, 1914, by the President, W. GORDON McCABE.

Only a single "Life Member," General George Washington Custis Lee, has been lost to us since our last report, yet is the loss one that has brought such poignant sorrow to kinsmen, comrades and friends, that, despite the fact that he had passed fourscore and finally fell on sleep full of honors, revered and loved by all who knew him, we scarce can measure in words our unaffected grief at the passing of so noble a life, though well we know such "Life is perfected by Death."

Outside his immediate family, few people, perhaps, might claim to know him intimately, yet, reserved as he was, with a nameless touch of aloofness due to innate shyness, such was the compelling charm of his old-fashioned courtesy, his ready sympathy with distress, his almost quixotic generosity to those in need, that men and women instinctively came to love this grave and silent gentleman, whose simplicity and kindness unconsciously won their abiding confidence and regard.

Probably, if the dead concern themselves at all with things of earth, he himself would prefer that his name should be passed over in silence and that no public utterance should vex the eternal quiet of "the keyless house."

So long had he lived the life of a recluse, so persistently, in his later years, did he guard his seclusion from the outer world, that it is not improbable that few of the general public, outside his native State, knew that he was still alive.

Yet, in his unobtrusive way, had he done much good service to nation as well as State, and, had fate willed that he should have been rated according to his great talents and varied accomplishments, had fortune, in homely phrase, "given him his

chance," certain it is that his place in the world's eye had been a very high one, and that his name would have been linked for all coming time with the greatest of that noble stock from which he sprung.

But the hard truth is, that the malice of fortune *did* deny him his full "chance"—his "heart's desire"—"most just and right desire" (in Shakespearian phrase)—and though many "honors," as the world counts "honors," came to him in his long life—professor in Virginia's famous military school—president of a great university—degrees in plenty and honorary fellowships from universities and learned societies at home and abroad—who of us that often looked upon the sweet austerity of that patrician face, touched with gentle melancholy and tranquil dignity—who of us that did not divine that he himself, modest as he was touching his own abilities and deserts, felt in his "heart of heart" that his life was, what the French in pregnant fashion term, "*Une vie manqué!*"

In the contemplation of his career, one cannot, indeed, escape the constant suggestion of the touch of tragedy, despite the lofty reflection of England's greatest laureate that the path of duty, firmly trod, is ever the way to real glory.

Consider: he came of a great race—his name was the synonym of all that was highest and noblest, not in Virginia alone, but in the nation—he was a soldier of soldiers, and, despite the fact that he was heir to a great estate, bequeathed him by his maternal grandfather, Washington's adopted son, he had deliberately chosen the stern profession of arms as the calling closest to his heart—no strange choice for the son of Robert E. Lee and the grandson of "Light Horse Harry."

In June, 1850, when not quite eighteen, he entered the United States Military Academy at West Point, and, after four years of severest study (during which time he received scarce a single mark of demerit, so punctilious was his observance of all rules of discipline and duty), in June, 1854, was graduated first in his class. Just twenty-five years earlier, his illustrious father had graduated there second in his class, though it must be al-

lowed that the class of '9 was far more distinguished for ability than the class of '54. For seven years thereafter he served with marked distinction in "the Engineers," the *corps d'élite* of the army, receiving repeated commendation from his superiors for skill in the construction of forts from the Atlantic coast to the Pacific, and especially for his able work in river improvement—all of which led to his assignment to duty in the "Engineer Bureau" at the seat of government.

Then came the Secession of the Southern States, when every Southern officer of the Army and of the Navy must needs meet the question whether to adhere to the Union, or to draw his sword against his native State.

His father left him absolutely free of all influence of his to decide the momentous question. "Custis," he writes to his wife, "must decide for himself, and I shall respect his decision, whatever it is."

But that decision was never for a moment in doubt, for there was bred in his bone the feeling of his grandfather, "Light Horse Harry," who exclaimed, when the "Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions," foreshadowing Secession, were under discussion in the Virginia Legislature in 1798—"Virginia is my country; her will I obey, however lamentable the fate to which it may subject me."

When, on May 2nd, 1861, the die was cast, and, resigning his commission in the army, he resolved to offer his sword to his mother State, it is safe to say that all those who knew him best (including his father, ever temperate in his estimate of the abilities of even his own sons) entertained no shadow of doubt that a brilliant military career lay open before him in the conflict impending between the sections.

He was then in the very flower of his young manhood (not quite twenty-nine) and of high and imperturbable courage, as was to be expected of one of his "valiant strain." He had received, as we have seen, the severest professional training, was as cautious of judgment as he was sparing of speech, and even those comrades, who were resolved to oppose him, reckoned

him, so we now know, as ideally equipped for the great business of war.

Thus he came to Richmond in May of '61, eager to give proof, in a cause he held most righteous, of "the mettle of his pasture," and almost at once (oh! malicious fortune!) was assigned duty in Richmond, as *aide-de-camp* to President Davis, with the rank of colonel of cavalry.

Had the assignment lasted but a single year, it had been hard enough to a young soldier, who had inherited the old fighting Berseker blood, and who, though modest, was yet but mortal, and could be conscious of his fitness to share with kinsmen and classmates the glories of that immortal army that was destined to write its name so often in the very "Temple of Victory."

He had looked for command in the field, but "*Dis aliter visum*," and Mr. Davis saw fit to retain him at the seat of government during the whole of those four eventful years. We do not know positively that the silent young *aide* ever uttered one word of formal complaint.

His habitual reticence was never pierced, save, perhaps, by one, and that one his father.

But is it not all easy to divine by those who know the temper of his breed?

Consider, again, what it must have meant to him to attend day by day confidential conferences at the Executive Mansion, while those, knit to him by blood or youthful friendships, were yonder "at the front," winning high rank and dazzling a world with deeds.

For the rank he cared no whit; for we have Mr. Davis's explicit statement that he repeatedly offered him promotion (long before he finally consented to accept it), and that he as steadily refused it. "The only obstacle to be overcome," writes Mr. Davis, "was his own objection to receiving promotion. With a refined delicacy, he shrank from the idea of superseding men who had been actually serving in the field."

It was said at the time, and is still constantly repeated, that he spoke to his father on the subject, requesting most earnestly

field-assignment, and that the latter told him that his highest duty was obedience to the will of his superior.

The story is, probably, as apocryphal as the letter alleged to have been written to him by his father when Custis Lee was a cadet at West Point, in which occurs the oft-quoted platitude—"Duty is the sublimest word in our language"; a letter spurious beyond question, yet one that, having caught the popular fancy, is as hard to "kill" as the myth of "Barbara Frietchie" and destined, no doubt, to as long a tenure of popular credence.

True, he rendered eminent service in the position he held, and the President bears emphatic testimony to the great weight he attached to his sagacious counsel. Above all other members of his staff, Mr. Davis entrusted to him delicate missions (of a nature too confidential to be set down in writing) to his father and to other generals commanding in the field. Much of highest import to the future historian he could have told, after the war, touching these inside shapings of events, but as might have been surely predicted of a man of his temperament, he would neither talk nor write about them, and their secrets died with him.

But the position at best was a trying one, and no one but a soldier can fully understand what this enforced duty meant, as the heroic years went by, to a man of high spirit and consummate military equipment.

While, as said already, he cared little for the rank his classmates and kinsmen were steadily winning, Custis Lee was too good a soldier not to care immensely for what that rank signified. Above all, it must have been well-nigh intolerable to him that, all question of rank and "glory" apart, he should not be allowed to share their hardships and to brave with them the chances of honorable wounds and noble death.

Of "the class of '54," whose highest honors he had achieved, the records show, allowing for deaths and resignations, that twenty-four espoused the Union side, of whom four fell in battle, the first to fall on either side being Lieutenant John T. Greble, U. S. A., who, at the early age of twenty-seven, died a soldier's

death at Big Bethel, fighting his guns to the last. Fourteen of that class, including Custis Lee, cast their fortunes with the South. Of these fourteen, four served on the staff and rose only to "field rank," while ten became general officers.

Of the ten, *eight* (think of it!) yielded up their lives for hearth and home and country.

'Tis a glorious roll, and we, the lingering few, whose humbler part it was to follow where these captains led, like Harry's veterans on "St. Crispin's day," still "stand a tip-toe" when that roll is called.

"Jeb" Stuart, of Virginia, barely thirty-one, yet Major-General and Chief of Cavalry of the "Army of Northern Virginia," mortally wounded yonder at Yellow Tavern, while staying with a handful of troopers the enemy thundering at our gates.

William D. Pender, of North Carolina, Major-General, though still in "the twenties," mortally wounded, while leading in, with all the fire of youth and skill of age, the "Light Division" on the third day at Gettysburg.

John Pegram, of Virginia, "as full of valor as of kindness, princely in both," commissioned Major-General, though the commission had not reached him when he fell at the head of his Division at "Hatcher's Run" in '65.

James Deshler, of Alabama, Brigadier, who died in the van of his cheering Texans on Chickamauga's crimson field.

"Archie" Gracie, born in New York, but adopted son of Alabama, Brigadier, who ever held his front with grim tenacity, instantly killed in the trenches of Petersburg.

Horace Randall, of Texas, Brigadier, whose "vigor, energy, and daring" (to quote the words of Dick Taylor's official report), were everywhere conspicuous, mortally wounded in the battle of Jenkins' Ferry, Arkansas.

John T. Mercer, of Georgia, Acting Brigadier, who died sword in hand at the head of his stormers in the victorious assault on Plymouth, N. C., in '64.

One other name there is—that of John D. Villepigue, of South

Carolina, Brigadier, but already marked out for higher rank—who, ill, yet refusing "sick leave," stuck to his men and died of exposure at Port Hudson, at the close of '62, yet not before his sword had been forged to heroic temper by fire of battle at Fort Pillow, at Corinth, at Shiloh, and elsewhere.

Of the two survivors of these ten, both were of the same name—allied, indeed, in spirit, but not by blood—Custis Lee and, his junior by a year, Stephen D. Lee, who, like "Edward Freer of the 43rd," "could count more combats than he could years," and who, "with all his honor-owing wounds in front," closed his brilliant military career as Lieutenant-General and Corps Commander.

Of Custis Lee's close kinsmen, his younger brother, William Henry Fitzhugh, became Major-General of cavalry before he was twenty-seven, while his first cousin, gallant "Old Fitz," Stuart's "right-bower" (as the latter loved to call him), became Major-General before he was twenty-eight.

Such were the classmates and immediate kinsmen of Custis Lee, who assuredly, had fortune given him his "heart's desire," had proved himself the peer of any of them.

In June, 1863, Custis Lee himself consented to become Brigadier, having been placed in command, in addition to his staff duties, of the troops garrisoning the "Defences of Richmond." These "Defences" he greatly strengthened with trained engineering skill, and so improved the discipline and general efficiency of the "heavy artillery" under his control, that, later on, in Oct. '64, he was raised to the rank of Major-General and assigned active command of all the outlying troops about the city, including the forces at Drewry's and Chaffin's Bluff.

During the autumn and winter of that tragic time, when Lee, with his handful of veterans of confirmed hardihood, was still confronting the cruel odds of Grant with unabashed mien, Custis Lee was repeatedly under fire, and bore himself with the serene courage of his race.

But the bitter end was fast approaching; and when Richmond was evacuated on the 2nd of April, 1865, and her garrison

troops, under Custis Lee, taking the field as a skeleton Division in Ewell's skeleton Corps, joined the gaunt remnant of the "Army of Northern Virginia" on the "Retreat," the hope of a successful issue of the desperate venture was, in truth, but the forlornest of "forlorn hopes."

But his constancy shone out as brightly in the gloom as did his daring, and, though it was the irony of fate that his first battle should be his last (and that battle a combat rather than a pitched fight), he fought his Division in the disastrous affair at "Sailor's Creek" with such skill and audacity as drew from Ewell (dear "Old Dick," hero of a hundred fights!), in his official report, most emphatic and enthusiastic commendation.

There, on April 6th, 1865, just three days before "the Surrender" at Appomattox C. H., Ewell's force of 3,000 was literally surrounded by about about 30,000 of the enemy's infantry and cavalry, and, after a stubborn resistance, in which the garrison troops behaved with great steadiness, was forced to surrender—Ewell, Custis Lee and four other general officers being among the prisoners.

This ended the military career of the young soldier, who, we must allow, had tasted but bitterly of the meagre "chance" given him by fate, or fortune, or call it what you will.

Of his civil life, it is needless to speak, save in briefest fashion. In the autumn of 1865, he was made "Professor of Civil and Military Engineering and Applied Mathematics" in the Virginia Military Institute. Here, possessed of notable powers of lucid exposition, he taught successfully for five years, resigning his chair at the beginning of 1871 to accept the Presidency of Washington and Lee University, to which he had been elected on the death of his father in October, 1870. This high position he held for over a quarter of a century, evidencing executive ability of the first order: and when, in 1897, owing to ill health, he resigned the headship of that institution, he carried with him into retirement the profound respect and deep affection of the whole academic body, professors and students alike.

He was, by reason of his training, a strict disciplinarian, yet was this strictness so tempered by tact and kindly sympathy that he became the idol of the students, who constantly carried to him their little troubles and perplexities, assured beforehand of ready understanding and wise counsel.

Removing to beautiful "Ravensworth," the old Fitzhugh estate in Fairfax County, where lived the widow and sons of his brother, General W. H. F. Lee, he spent the remaining years of his life in scholarly seclusion, and it was there that he gently fell asleep on the 18th day of February, 1913.

It may be added here that, during the long years when he had a house of his own at Lexington, and, indeed, afterwards at "Ravensworth," he was the ideal host, full of delicate, unobtrusive provisions for the comfort and entertainment of his guests, charming them all, despite his habitual reserve when not under his own roof-tree, by his gracious manners, his quiet humor, and the modesty of his genial talk, which ranged over a wide field of intellectual interest, and evidenced a literary taste and critical perception most unusual in one whose life had been so persistently devoted to scientific pursuits.

Though it is not unlikely that the recollection of the untoward stroke of fate, that, in his younger days, had shattered his dream of military distinction, never faded from his mind, casting in no mean measure a shadow over his whole life, such was the inimitable sweetness of his disposition that he never became embittered, nor could the snows of eighty winters ever chill the generous impulses of a noble heart. As Sheridan said of Warren Hastings, "his noble equanimity, tried by both extremes of fortune, was never disturbed by either," and, in contemplating the sacrifices imposed upon him by duty and patriotism, which he accepted with the unquestioning "humility of a high spirit," surely we may say with Lear,

Upon such sacrifices
The gods themselves throw incense.

We have dwelt thus long upon his career, because we hold it a part of the business of this Society to perpetuate, so far as

may be allowed us, the names and virtues of its members as they pass away, and because we hold Custis Lee justly entitled to take high place beside the best and noblest of our "Virginia Worthies"

Owing to his inbred shrinking from publicity of every kind and to his almost impenetrable reserve, which not even the most persistent "interviewer" ever pierced, these few poor remarks will probably constitute the sole memorial of him, though, of course, his name will live, in some measure, in the memoirs of his contemporaries, and especially in the intimate domestic letters of his father, in many of which, still unpublished, there is (as some few of us know, who have had the privilege of reading them), constant mention of him.

As we salute him with this halting "*Ave atque vale*," we are sustained by the abiding remembrance that, from "the prime of youth" to "the frosty, yet kindly, winter of his age," he kept inviolate the chastity of a pure and stainless life, and that with "soft invincibility" he remained to the very end "the Master of his fate, the Captain of his soul."

W. GORDON McCABE.

THE JEWS IN THE CONFEDERACY.

By Mrs. TOWNES RANDOLPH LEIGH, State Historian
Alabama Division, U. D. C.

The Jews in earliest times, as owners of Palestine, were acknowledged as furnishing much of the sinews of war, though after Jerusalem passed into alien hands they declined in national achievements, still as individuals they performed a brilliant part in the battles of their adopted country. During the Revolutionary War more than fifty Jews were enrolled in the Continental army, conspicuous among them being Colonel Isaac Franks and Colonel David Salisbury Franks. No one gave more faithful aid to the revolutionists than Hayman Solomon, the intimate friend of Pulaski, and Kosciuszko, giving to the American cause, upon the appeal of Robert Morris, \$658,007.13. He was captured and thrown into a British prison, dying therein.

In the Mexican War, General David deLeon made a most brilliant record, being twice thanked by Congress for gallantry and ability.

During the War Between the States, the ranking United States naval officer, until his death in 1863, was Commodore Uriah Philips Levy, upon whose tombstone we read: "He was the father of the law abolishing the barbarous practice of corporal punishment in the United States Navy." To-day Major Alfred Mordecai is the authority in the military world "of application of scientific research to mechanical war uses."

At the time of the War Between the States the Jews in the United States numbered 150,000 souls, but furnished from this number of men, women and children 10,000 fighting men. This was a remarkable per cent, one to every fifteen human beings. The North has preserved these Jewish records of the 6,000 who fought under Old Glory, but the South has not as yet collected or published the magnificent heroism of her 4,000 Jewish patriots.

We are anxious to secure this data, and trust the Hebrew will not for the first time be wanting in pride of race or achievement, but will early respond to our call for assistance in collecting this information.

The War Between the States gave again to the Jews their greatest opportunity for proving their military ardor and capacity, and splendidly did they meet the occasion. Among the 10,000 to enlist, nine became generals, eighteen colonels, forty majors, over 200 captains, twenty-five surgeons, one a chaplain, Rabbi Jacob Frankel; eleven naval officers. Fourteen families alone contributed fifty-three men to the Confederate army. Among these North Carolina sent six Cohen brothers; South Carolina, five Moses brothers, George Ralph Moses and his three sons, and from Alabama; Arkansas, three Cohen brothers; Virginia, three Levy brothers; Louisiana sent the four Jonas brothers.

Alabama furnished 150 Jews to the Confederacy, leading all Southern States in enlistment of the Jews. Virginia came third, enrolling 113; Georgia, second, enrolling 140, with Octavius Cohen, quartermaster of Georgia troops. The Jews below the Mason and Dixon line served valiantly for their beloved Southland, Adolphus Meyer, of Virginia, enlisted with the first company mustered into service, serving through the entire war, holding the position of assistant adjutant general. After the reconstruction regime he was elected to the National House of Representatives, 1891, serving until his death on the Committee of Naval Affairs.

Benjamin Franklin Jonas was a Kentuckian, though enlisting from Louisiana as a private in the artillery service, later becoming adjutant of artillery Hood's Corps of the Army of Tennessee. In 1870 he became a member of Congress and served as chairman of the Judiciary Committee until his election to the United States Senate.

Isidore Strauss, one of the Titanic martyrs, enlisted from Georgia, being elected as a lieutenant of the regiment he had helped to organize. Because of his youth, after a few months' service, his commission was recalled. In 1863, however, he was sent by

the Confederate Department of State to England to secure ships for blockade service.

Max Fruenthal, of Mississippi, enlisted with the Sixteenth Mississippi Regiment at Summit, Miss., and was with Stonewall Jackson in his Valley campaigns, becoming conspicuously distinguished as he calmly loaded and fired with deadly effect, standing in the very apex of the famous Bloody Angle at Spotsylvania Courthouse.

The brains of the Confederacy is what the historian, Schuyler, calls Judah P. Benjamin, President Davis's most intimate counselor. He was first the Attorney-General of the Confederate States, later, after the resignation of Walker, accepting the portfolio of Secretary of War.

From the cradle of the Confederacy, Montgomery, we know the following Hebrews enlisted;

Charles A. Stern, who as a member of Water's Battery, and who participated in the bloodiest of all battles, Chickamauga, being captured there; A. B. Dehler, L. Lemlee, — Myers, Ben Oppenheimer, the only deaf-mute whom records show ever enlisted in any army, he saw service under General Joe Wheeler; Jacob Rupenthal, A. Saemeister, Albert Dreyspring, A. B. Stitler — Shulin, Jacob Briel and Abe Kraus.

In the giving of material aid to the Confederacy, no names stand higher than those of the beloved friends of the soldiers, Mr. and Mrs. Hausman, who will ever be held in grateful remembrance by the sons and daughters of the men who wore the gray.

In 1863, the great English Hebrew, Disraeli, came to the decision that the time had come for England to recognize the Southern Confederacy. Feeling that the move should come from the Government, he had carefully gathered the data as to our extent of territory, population, productions, what the Confederacy stood for, and her victories, in order to prepare his speech advocating recognition. Disraeli had prepared the speech to be delivered July 6, 1863, but just before that date news was received in England of the surrender of Vicksburg and the defeat at Gettysburg, and Disraeli's speech in our favor was never made.

The Jews have always shown themselves willing to stand by their convictions, and are to-day as ready to live and die for Dixie, their adopted land, as their ancestors were to suffer and perish for the faith of their fathers.—*Montgomery Advertiser*.

STRANGER THAN FICTION.

Capture of United States Steamer Maple Leaf, Near Cape Henry, Half a Century ago.

By W. B. BROWNE.

Many persons in this vicinity are perhaps not aware that nearly a half century ago there occurred one of the most thrilling episodes of the Civil War near Cape Henry, almost at the gate of the city of Norfolk, distant about fifteen miles as the crow flies. I refer to the capture of the United States transport Maple Leaf by Confederate prisoners of war en route from New Orleans to Fort Delaware.

To go back about one year in history will say that early in 1862 the Confederate forts at the mouth of the Mississippi River had been captured, and New Orleans was occupied by quite a large force of Federal troops with one General B. F. Butler, "l'avoocat general," as dubbed by an admiral of the French navy, in command. On the 10th day of May, 1862, Norfolk was evacuated by the Confederates, and a few days after occupied in force by the Federals under the command of General Wool, with Suffolk on the west and Elizabeth City on the South, as outposts. In the early days of June, 1863, the United States transport Maple Leaf left New Orleans with seventy-five or eighty Confederate prisoners of war (all officers) on board. This steamer touched in at Norfolk, and twenty-six additional prisoners (officers) were taken on board at Fort Norfolk and proceeded to sea. A plot appears to have been laid and worked out to the finest detail while coming up the coast to overthrow the guard and crew and capture the steamer and make a bolt for freedom.

The officers taken on at Fort Norfolk, not sick or incapacitated by wounds, were requested to join the plot, to which they readily assented. I copy from the diary of Lieutenant A. E. Asbury, now living at Higginsville, Mo., and Colonel J. J. Green, of Covington, Tenn., who died in 1906, to whom I am indebted for the greater portion of this article. The plan was a detail of three men to be at or near each sentinel on duty talking or chaffing with him. Another party under a leader were told to be near when the relief guard had stacked their muskets, and still another to be in readiness to assemble quickly to overawe the crew. The signal was the ringing of the steamer's bell, and so quickly and quietly was the plot executed that scarcely had the sound of the bell died away before the Confederates were in possession of the steamer.

Colonel Green says within one minute the capture was effective. Lieutenant Asbury, who was sick and lying down in the hold of the steamer with many others, says the first intimation of the melee on the upper deck was a captain coming among them and stating in no uncertain sounds that they had charge of the ship. A jollification was held, and such a rebel yell rang out over the waters of the Chesapeake Bay as will never be heard again. Captain Fuller, captain of the C. S. gunboat "Star of the West," one of the prisoners, was placed in command, and a council of war held, and the first intention was to run the steamer into Nassau. The supply of coal, however, was found to be insufficient, and it was finally decided to make for the beach somewhere south of Cape Henry and take chances. The landing was made after nightfall, most probably ten miles south of Virginia Beach. When all of the officers not too sick or severely wounded were transferred to the beach, the steamer was given back to her captain, under oath, to care for the sick and wounded prisoners left on board, proceed to Fort Delaware, and there report. This oath he faithfully kept (?) by steaming as rapidly as possible to Fort Monroe and there reporting the little incident or accident that had befallen him on his journey. Major-General Dix, U. S., in command at Fortress Monroe, in his report states that the

United States transport *Maple Leaf*, passing out June 10, 1863, at 1:30 P. M., with rebel prisoners on board, had returned, the captain stating that the rebels had overthrown the guard, captured the steamer and landed somewhere south of Cape Henry. General Dix says that some thirty prisoners refused to join in the plot and had returned on the steamer. I much fear my readers will have to accept the statement of the general with a few grains of salt. The truth is that every soul able to travel landed on the beach. That doughty sailor warrior, Captain Fuller, prize master, ringleader, who had so recently seen carried to a most successful issue the plans that his brain had conceived, was compelled by reason of severe wounds to remain on the steamer, and was promptly placed in irons upon arrival at Fort Monroe.

Small courtesy that, to a man who prefers remaining a prisoner of war to joining his comrades on the beach and making a bold dash for liberty. One can easily read between the lines and see that General Dix was in no calm and peaceful frame of mind when his report was penned, and doubtless the officer in charge of the overthrown guard enjoyed a most uncomfortable quarter of an hour, when called into the presence of the old general who requests in his report that he be summarily dismissed from the service. (See War Record, Vol. XXVII, Series I, pt. 2, p. 786.)

The first business on landing on the beach, says Colonel Green, was election of a leader, and Captain Semmes, son of Admiral Raphael Semmes, of Alabama fame, was chosen by acclamation, with Captain Holmes, of a Louisiana regiment, as second in command. The next thing was to find their bearings. Seeing a light in the distance as showing from a house, a scout was sent out, who quickly returned, reporting the house occupied by a lady and children, and that her husband was in the Confederate army; that they were in Princess Anne County, Virginia and would be comparatively safe if they could get to the swamps of North Carolina, but to do so would be compelled to cross Currituck Sound, and the only boats available were nearly thirty miles south on the beach, where some persons had come over

from the mainland to boil salt. This march was undertaken at night, and at early breakfast the boats were at their service. In crossing Currituck Sound the prisoners stopped at the south end of Knott's Island, where supper was given them. I had recently a very pleasant visit to a most charming matron, now living in Norfolk, who recalls most vividly as a little girl these prisoners being at her father's home; that the boats were crowded, and after supper he took many of them in his boat, and all went to the mainland, landing near Currituck Courthouse; that the next morning early the yard was full of Federal cavalry.

The father, Mr. White, in the meantime had returned, but most judiciously had taken to the tall timber. Her mother, not strong from the excitement of the night before, had taken to her room. The Federal cavalry were bent on arresting any and everything they could find—the boat and sails were quickly burned and this little maid of less than ten summers was actually arrested by these valiant soldiers and brought a prisoner to Norfolk, charged with the awful crime of aiding and abetting the escape of rebel prisoners.

Upon reaching the mainland near Currituck Courthouse a guide was found, who soon took them to the adjacent swamps, where they felt they were at least in hiding and would be cared by the Southern people near. After a few days, says Colonel Green, a guerrilla captain from Camden, hearing of their presence, came to them, and finding him possessed of all the information needed, they accepted his guidance. The Pasquotank River was crossed near Elizabeth City, the Perquimans River near Belvidere, and the Chowan River about Murfreesboro; thence to the Seaboard Railroad about Boykins, Va. reaching there about nightfall: supper in Weldon, N. C., and then via Atlantic Coast Line Railroad to Richmond, and breakfast at Spottswood Hotel. Colonel Green says that after a hasty toilet they reported to General Winder, provost marshal, who enjoyed hugely their escapade, had his quartermaster pay them and after a day's sight-seeing in Richmond, they took the train for their respective commands.

This reads more like a page from the "Arabian Nights" than the truth, but what I have written are the bare facts, attested by official reports and diaries of participants, but of such stuff as this was the Southern soldier made.

ARMISTEAD AT THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.

Extracts from Letters Written by Dr. R. W. MARTIN to
Rev. JAMES POINDEXTER.

When Armistead's Brigade was in line of battle a short time before the advance was ordered, the general marched up and down in front of his troops encouraging them in every way and said these words: "Men, remember what you are fighting for. Remember your homes, your firesides, your wives, mothers, sisters and your sweethearts."

When the signal guns were fired Armistead instantly called attention, and instantly every man was on his feet. After a few words he walked to the front of the Fifty-third Virginia Regiment, his battalion of direction, and address the color bearer, "Sergeant, are you going to put those colors on the enemy's works over yonder?"

"Yes, general, if mortal man can do it."

He then exhorted the men to follow their colors and to remember the brave words of their color bearer.

When the advance commenced Armistead placed himself in front of the colors of the Fifty-third Regiment, and from that point watched and directed the advance until within a short distance of the enemy's line. When approximating the advance line General Kemper rode up to him and said, "General, hurry up, my men can stand no more."

He quietly turned to the officer commanding his battalion of direction and said, "Colonel, double quick." The double quick soon quickened into a run, the run into a charge, Armistead all the time in front of his line of battle, and when the desperate effort came and the final rush for the rock fence was made he drew his sword, put his hat on the end of it, called upon his men to follow, rushed over the rock fence and was shot just as he

reached the enemy's guns between the two lines in the bloody angle, thus sealing with his life's blood the high water mark of the rebellion.

As Armistead was carried from the field he met Hancock as he was hurrying to the front. They recognized each other, and Hancock dismounted and grasped his hand and told him how sorry he was to see him wounded. Armistead returned his kindly expression and told him the wound was mortal and that he had on his person some things that he wished to entrust to him to be returned when opportunity presented to his people in Virginia. Hancock accepted the commission and tried to persuade Armistead to look upon the bright side, that he probably was not so seriously hurt as he feared, excused himself by saying he was compelled to hurry to the front, left Armistead, promising to see him next day. In a short time he was wounded himself and they never met again.

This was related to me as I lay on the ground back of the battle line where hundreds of wounded were carried after the fight, by one of Hancock's staff, who rode up just about dusk and found a number of men congregated about me. When he found I was a badly wounded "Johnny Reb" Colonel he dismounted, drove everybody away that I might have fresh air, and commenced a conversation.

When he found that I was of Armistead's Brigade, he said, "Armistead, Armistead. I have just left him, he is mortally wounded," and then related the above, and said, "I will have you taken care of," etc.

Armistead lingered through the 4th and died on the 5th, leaving an example of patriotism, heroism and devotion to duty which ought to be handed down through the ages.

Here's my heart and hand.

Sincerely and truly,

R. W. MARTIN,
Pittsylvania Tribune.

[See Vol. XXXVII, p. 144.—ED.]

THE TWO ARMIES.

By HENRY TIMROD.

Two armies stand enrolled beneath
The banner with the starry wreath;
One facing battle, blight and blast,
Through twice a hundred fields has passed;
Its deeds against a ruffian foe,
Stream, valley, hill and mountain know;
Till every wind that sweeps the land
Goes glory laden, from the strand.

The other, with a narrower scope,
Yet led by not less grander hope,
Hath won perhaps, as proud a place,
And wears its fame with meeker grace,
Wives march beneath its glittering sign,
Fond mothers swell the lovely line;
And many a sweetheart hides her blush,
In the young patriot's generous flush.

No breeze of battle ever fanned
The colors of that tender band;
Its office is beside the bed,
Where throbs some sick or wounded head;
It does not court the soldiers' tomb,
But plies the needle and the loom,
And by a thousand peaceful deeds,
Supplies a struggling nation's needs.

Nor is that army's gentle might
Unfelt amid the deadly fight;
It nerves the son's, the husband's hand,

It points the lover's fearless brand;
It thrills the languid, warms the cold,
Gives even new courage to the clod,
To its own lofty trust in God.

When heaven shall blow the trump of peace,
And bid this weary warfare cease,
Their several missions nobly done,
The triumph grasped and freedom won;
Both armies from their toils at rest,
Alike may claim the victor's crest.
But each shall see its dearest prize
Gleam softly from the other's eyes.

DIXIE BATTERY AT THE SECOND BATTLE
OF MANASSAS.

Letter to General James Longstreet and His Endorsement
on the same.

ATLANTA, GA., August 27th, 1887.

GEN'L JAMES' LONGSTREET,
Gainesville, Ga.

Dear Gen'l.

I have long thought of asking you as a matter of justice to the officers and men of my battery (Dixie Artillery, from Page Co., Va.), as well as to myself and for the truth of history, to set aright the matter as to whose battery it was that broke up the charge of Fitz John Porter's corps at the second battle of Manassas—just twenty-five years ago.

For some unaccountable reason, history does not give the name of the battle referred to in the official reports of yourself and Gen'l C. M. Wilcox, as the one which first opened fire under your immediate eye, in front of Whiting's brigade of Hood's division, on the left of the Gainesville and Alexandria turnpike, at 3:30 P. M., on the 30th August, 1862.

Gen'l Long, in his "Memoirs of Robert E. Lee," in writing of this battle says, on page 198, "At the critical moment when the fate of Jackson's corps was trembling in the balance, Col. Lee dashed with his artillery into a position that enfiladed the Federal right wing and hurled upon it a storm of shot and shell. At the same moment Longstreet's infantry rushed like a tempest against Pope's left, driving everything before it. This assault was irresistible and speedily decided the fortune of the day. Pope's left wing gave way before it at every point and his

right, being assailed in flank and threatened in rear, relaxed its efforts and began to retire."

In the painting by Phillipitean of this battle, which has been on exhibition at the "Cyclorama of the Second Battle of Manassas," in Washington, D. C., for twelve months, it is there represented that the artillery commanded by Col. S. D. Lee opened the attack on and broke up the charge of Fitz John Porter's corps, from a position on the left of Wilcox's division, while the battery referred to by yourself and Gen'l Wilcox is not represented, and the positions from which it fired is left a blank on the canvas, as far as batteries are concerned. In your report published in "Official Records of Union and Confederate Armies," Series I, Vol XII, part II, page 565, you say: "At 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon, I rode to the front for the purpose of completing arrangements for making a diversion in favor of a flank movement then under contemplation. Just after reaching my front line I received a message for reinforcements for General Jackson, who was said to be severely pressed. From an eminence nearby, one portion of the enemy's masses attacking Jackson were immediately within my view and within easy range of batteries in that position. It gave me an advantage that I had not expected to have, and I made haste to use it. Two batteries were ordered for the purpose, and one placed in position immediately and opened. Just as this fire began I received a message from the Commanding General, informing me of General Jackson's condition and his wants. As it was evident that the attack against General Jackson could not be continued ten minutes under the fire of these batteries, I made no movement with my troops. Before the second battery could be placed in position the enemy began to retire, and in less than ten minutes the ranks were broken and that portion of his army put to flight. A fair opportunity was offered me and the intended diversion was changed into an attack. My whole line was rushed forward at a charge. The troops sprang to their work, and moved forward with all the steadiness and firmness that characterized war-worn veterans. The batteries

continuing their play upon the confused masses, completed the route of this portion of the enemy's line, and my attack was therefore made against the forces in my front. * * *

In the report of Gen'l C. M. Wilcox, published in the same volume, page 559, he says: "About 3:30 P. M., the enemy's infantry were seen emerging from a road, upon an open field in line of battle, the wood and field being in front of Jackson's extreme right and to the left and near Featherston's brigade, this field about 500 yards wide, terminating 150 yards from Jackson's line, the ground here rising rather steeply for a short distance and then back to the railroad, behind the embankment of which, at this point, were Jackson's men. Seeing this advance of the enemy, I repaired at once to the interval between Pryor's and Featherstone's brigades. From this point there was an excellent view of the field and not more than 400 yards distant. The first line of the enemy advanced in fine style across the open field. There was but little to oppose them. They were fired upon by our pickets and skirmishers, but they continued to advance, and, ascending the rise above referred to, came within full view of Jackson's line, and were here received with a terrific fire of musketry at short range. They hesitated for an instant, recoiling slightly, and then advanced to near the embankment. Twice did I see this line advance and retire, exposed to a close and deadly fire of musketry. Seeing a second line issuing from the woods upon the field, I was in the act of ordering a battery to be placed in position to fire upon them, when a battery was directed by the major-general commanding to fire upon them, this battery being near the turn-pike in an excellent and commanding position. The fire of this battery was most opportunely delivered upon this advancing line of the enemy. They were caught in the open field. The effect of every shot could be seen. A rapid fire of shot, shell and spherical case, delivered with admirable precision, checked their advance. As shells and spherical case would burst over, in front and near them, their ranks would break, hesitate and scatter. This artillery fire alone broke regiment after regiment and drove them back into the woods. * * *

I will relate incidents connected with this matter which you will probably remember:

Between the hours of two and three o'clock, on the evening of the 30th, I had ridden to the position occupied by Featherstone's brigade, to which brigade I had been assigned for this campaign, and while at the highest point occupied by it, we could see the enemy's infantry, about a mile distant, moving in large bodies to the left and disappearing in a body of woods in front of Jackson's right wing. I hurried back to my battery, which was on the left of the turnpike, about fifty yards from it, and immediately behind Hood's division. I had only reached there a few minutes when I saw you, accompanied by some of your staff and orderlies, passing along the turnpike to the front. Believing that if you passed through the skirt of woods in front of us you would discover these movements of the enemy and need batteries, I directed my men and drivers to be ready to move. My recollection is that hardly five minutes had elapsed before a messenger, whom I took to be Col. Manning, came back at full speed, saying that Gen'l Longstreet wanted batteries. Being ready, we moved instantly, and at a gallop, soon reached the point where you were, on the left of the turnpike, fifty or one hundred yards from it, and in front of Whiting's brigade of Hood's division. We went into position where you indicated and commenced firing at a heavily massed body of infantry on our left, not more than 400 yards distant. You remained several minutes watching the effect of the shots and asked me if I had any grape shot. I fired from this position until their ranks were broken and driven back and I moved toward Groveton and took a position in an old apple orchard, from which we fired at the retreating infantry about thirty minutes and afterwards changed to positions at and beyond Groveton. The firing from their batteries at us while in the orchard was terrific while there the horse I was riding had both hind legs carried away by a cannon ball, and while at Groveton the second one was killed by a shell which exploded in front of me.

I would thank you to make such an endorsement upon this letter as you deem proper in the interest of the truth of history and in justice to the officers and men of my battery.

Very respectfully,

W. H. CHAPMAN,
Late Capt. Dixie Artillery.

GENERAL LONGSTREET'S INDORSEMENT.

GAINESVILLE, GA., 28th Aug., 1887.

The statements herein made are true and correctly narrated.

As I rode to his front on the occasion referred to, I recognized Riley's battery of six guns. Upon seeing the opportunity of opening with artillery an enfilade and reverse fire upon the Federal masses attacking Jackson, orders were given Colonel Manning, of the staff, to send me two or three batteries as soon as possible, and included in the order Riley's, who had six guns, as I now remember. Without noting the particular battery first reporting, I was left under the impression that it was Riley's and have so stated on several occasions. This is clearly a mistake and it is equally as clear that Chapman's was the first battery to open on the Federal lines, in the awkward position in which they were exposed, and this battery, by its fire alone, broke up the attack on Jackson, which at the moment, was about to break through Jackson's position. The field of vision and of fire was so clear there is no room for claims of others to the credit of this part of the fight. After the attack was broken and the Federals were retiring and attempting to reform, they came in view of other batteries, those sent in addition to Chapman's, as well as those in position, between the right and left wings of the army, when all joined in the fire against the retiring foe.

Very respectfully,

JAMES LONGSTREET,
Lieut-General, C. S. A.

SPOTSYLVANIA COURTHOUSE ON MAY 18, 1864.

Address of Colonel WM. E. CUSHAW, before Lee Camp, Richmond,
Virginia, January 20, 1905.

In accepting your kind invitation, I beg to refer to the dates of the several battles and engagements in the neighborhood of Spotsylvania Courthouse that the distinct points of this address may be clearly brought forth, without confusion or mixing with those of other dates.

After the battles of the Wilderness, the army of the Potomac, under General Grant, moved to the left towards Spotsylvania. The army of Northern Virginia, under General Lee, also moved and confronted the Northern army, and, on the 8th of May, had an engagement with it near Spotsylvania Courthouse. On the 10th of May portions of the Confederate lines were attacked by the Federal army and repulsed. On the 12th of May the centre of the Confederate lines was assaulted and broken by the Federal army at what was known as the Salient, or Bloody Angle, threatening a great disaster to the Confederate army. On the 13th of May the Confederate lines were moved back to a revised position, nearly a mile in rear of the former Salient, and these new lines were assaulted by an early morning attack of May 18th by very nearly the same Federal troops that were engaged on the 12th. It is this attack and repulse that makes the subject of my paper. Both the army of the Potomac and the army of Northern Virginia had seen service in the field for nearly three years, and in every essential were, indeed, veteran soldiers. It is doubtful if the courage and the endurance of any soldiers in any army was surpassed by that of the Confederate soldier, and his example, either in attack or resistance, is not surpassed by the armies of the world, impelled as he was

by the purest patriotism under unexampled Christian leaders to do his duty, with none of that fatalism characterizing the reckless fighting of Mohammedans, Hindoos and Japanese.

The field of this engagement is embraced between the Po and the Ny Rivers, branches of the Mattapony, a rolling, undulating, well-wooded country, intersected by small branches from these streams, which are sometimes low and marshy. The map herewith presented is an enlarged one, taken from one of the War Record's office, and shows, marked in red and black, the lines of the works occupied by the troops of both armies engaged in the several battles in this neighborhood. The positions of the armies on May 18th, 1864, were as follows:

CONFEDERATE ARMY.

Longstreet's First Corps (Anderson commanding), on the extreme Confederate right, composed of:

Kershaw's Division, Field's Division, Pickett's Division (absent), with the artillery of this corps. Not in action as far as known.

Anderson's Division, Heth's Division, Wilcox's Division, with the artillery of this corps. Infantry not in action, but Third Corps guns replying to Warren's.

Ewell's Second Corps, next on the extreme Confederate left, composed of:

Early's (Gordon) Division, perhaps slightly; John's Division, partly in action; Rodes' Division (possibly), slightly, with the artillery of this corps. Firing in a desultory manner from the works, with infantry, but with 20 guns vigorously in action also firing from works, and as follows:

GUNS.

Second Howitzers (Jones'), Third Howitzers (Smith's), Powhatan Artillery (Dance's), Salem Artillery (Griffin's). 15

Orange Artillery (Fry's), with men of other batteries;	
Staunton Artillery (Garber's), with men of other bat-	
teries.	8
Guns from either Braxton or Nelson.....	6

 29

FEDERAL ARMY.

Warren's Fifth Corps, on the Federal left, composed of:

Four Divisions—24,423 April 30th, and 19,321 June 1st. Infantry not in action, but 26 guns were, as a diversion in front of Hill's Corps.

Hancock's Second Corps, next to Fifth and to the right of it, composed of:

Four Divisions—27,007 April 30th, and 28,327 June 1st. Barlow's and Gibbons' Divisions in the assault, with 166 guns in action. (1st New Hampshire, 1st Rhode Island, 4th U. S., and 1st New York.)

Wright's Sixth Corps, next to Second and to its right, composed of:

Three Divisions—23,165 April 30th, and 20,390 June 1st. Getty's and Russell's Divisions in the assault, assisted by Hancock's guns.

Burnside's Ninth Corps, next to Sixth and on the extreme right, composed of four divisions—19,840 April 30th, and 18,147 June 1st. Potter's and Crittenden's Divisions in the assault, with sixteen guns in action. (2nd Maine, 14th Massachusetts, 7th Maine, and 24th New York.)

The above numbers are from the official returns of these dates and Gibbons' report (10,734) is for his division on May 16th. No numbers in the field returns are given of the Confederate army about this period, and of the Federal army, with the exception of Gibbons' Division of May 16th, are for April 30th and June 1st, 1864.

Taking Gibbons' Division at	10,000	} out of 27,000
Barlow's Division at	3,500	
Getty's division at	3,000	} out of 20,000
Russell's (Wheaton's) Division at	3,000	
Potter's Division at	3,000	} out of 18,000
Crittenden's (Ledley's) Division at	2,500	
Total,	25,000	

we may safely assume that 25,000 infantry were in the charge of the assaulting columns of the Federal army, supported by the fire of 32 guns, and that 20 rapidly served guns, together with a light desultory infantry fire on the Confederate side, were ready to meet it.

With these forces engaged, the action commenced early on the morning of the 18th, with the retirement of the Confederate pickets and skirmishers, and the advance of the Federal infantry in the several formations referred to in the reports. That this was a matured plan, settled upon by Generals Grant and Meade, and attempted in execution in a determined manner to carry the Confederate works on Ewell's front, the following quotations from the published official records fully establish:

Major-General Humphrey's, Chief of Staff to General Meade, page — of his book, says:

"It had been suggested by Major-General Wright, and also by myself, that, after the lapse of a few days, a return by night to the enemy's left, which would probably be abandoned, or very much weakened by our concentration on his right, might afford a good opportunity to attack there. General Wright's suggestion was for his corps only to undertake it; but it was concluded to send both the Second and Sixth Corps, and on the 17th Generals Hancock and Wright were ordered to move their troops in the night to the works captured on the 12th, and attack the enemy's new intrenchments there at daylight on the 18th, the Sixth Corps on the right of the Second. General Burnside was directed to attack in conjunction with them, and

General Warren to open his artillery at the same time and be prepared for the offensive. The Second Corps, being nearest to the point of attack, led, the Sixth Corps following. The troops were in the position designated before daylight, and at 4 A. M. Gibbon and Barlow moved forward to assault, their troops in lines of brigades. Birney and Tyler were held in reserve. The artillery was posted in the first line of works at the apex of the salient, firing over the troops. The Sixth Corps advanced on the right of the Second. But the enemy was on the alert, and the new intrenchments across the base of the Salient were of the most formidable character, being concealed on their right by woods, and having on that part of their front a heavy slashing, and on their left front, which was in the open ground of the Harrison farm, lines of abatis. As the troops approached, they were met with a heavy musketry and artillery fire which completely swept the ground in front; but, notwithstanding, they passed forward to the slashing and abatis, and made several gallant attempts to carry the enemy's lines, but without success.

"Upon its being reported to General Meade that there was but little probability of the enemy's lines being carried, he directed the attack to be discontinued, and the troops were accordingly withdrawn.

"General Burnside made the attack directed on the morning of the 18th, with the Divisions of Crittenden and Potter, and all his artillery, uniting on the right with Hancock, but could not carry the enemy's intrenchments. The artillery of the Fifth Corps also opened and continued its fire for several hours."

Mr. Chas. A. Dana, in his report, pages 72 and 73 of records, to Secretary Staunton, says: "The report of General Wright, who had reconnoitered the ground over which our proposed attack upon the enemy's right was to be made, caused General Grant to change the plan detailed in my dispatch of last evening. Instead of attacking on our left Hancock and Wright have made a night march to our right flank and attacked at daylight upon the same lines where Hancock made his successful assault

on Thursday last. We have as yet no news of the result. Warren's guns opened a heavy fire upon the Rebel lines at the Courthouse at 4:30, and Hancock and Wright made their attack this morning in good style, forced the first and second lines of Rebel riflepits, and for a time were confident that at last they had struck the lair of the enemy, but advancing through the forest each corps presently found itself confronted by heavy interior works, protected, especially in Hancock's line of advance by impassible abatis. Barlow's division of Hancock's corps attempted in vain to charge through this obstacle, and held their ground before it for an hour or more under a galling fire of canister. The difficulty of storming the Rebel intrenched camp on that side being evidently of the most extreme character, and both corps having artfully, but unsuccessfully, sought for a weak point where they might break through, Grant at 6 o'clock ordered the attack to cease.

"Warren maintained a vigorous artillery duel with the Rebel batteries around the Courthouse until 11 o'clock, when both parties ceased firing. Our losses by the morning's work are reckoned by General Meade at 500 killed and wounded."

Medical Director McParlin, page 232 of Records, says, "On the morning of the 18th the Second Corps moved to the right and attacked the enemy's works; 552 wounded were the result, and the character of the wounds were unusually severe, a large proportion being caused by shell and canister."

Major-General Hancock, page 337, says, "On the 17th, Tyler's division of heavy artillery, Brigadier-General R. O. Tyler commanding, and the Corcoran Legion (infantry) joined the Second Corps, making in all a reinforcement of 8,000 men. The Corcoran Legion was assigned to Gibben's division. I had received orders during the day to move my command to the works I had captured on the 12th, and to attack the enemy at daylight on the 18th, in the intrenchments he then held in front of that position. The Sixth Corps was directed to form on my right and assail the enemy's line at the same hour. Before daylight on the 18th, the troops were in the position designated and the

preparations for the attack completed. At 4 A. M., Gibbon and Barlow moved forward to the assault, their troops in line of brigades. My artillery was posted in the first line of works, firing during the action over our troops in front. Birney and Tyler were in reserve. The enemy held a strong line of intrenchments about one-half mile in front of and parallel to the works we had stormed on the 12th. His position was concealed by the forest and protected by heavy slashing and abatis.

"As our troops approached his line they encountered a severe fire of musketry and artillery, which completely swept his front, making great havoc in our ranks. They pressed forward however, until they arrived at the edge of the abatis, which with the heavy fire, arrested their progress. Many gallant attempts were made by our troops to penetrate the enemy's line, but without success. Finding that I was losing quite heavily, and there was but little probability of my being able to carry the enemy's position, I communicated the state of affairs to the major-general commanding, and was directed by him to discontinue the attack. Accordingly at 10 A. M., I withdrew my troops and occupied the line of works in front of the Landrum House."

General Hancock, page 361, of Records, says, "May 17, 1864, 8 A. M., Tyler's division, about 8,000 strong, mostly heavy artillery, joined the Second Corps, which will re-enforce us sufficiently to make up our losses at the Wilderness, the Po, and Spotsylvania. The division massed near the Fredericksburg road.

"No movement of the Second Corps until dark, when we marched back to the works we had captured on the 12th, instant, at which point it is determined again to assault the enemy tomorrow morning.

"4:10 A. M., Barlow's and Gibbon's divisions having been formed in front of the captured works moved forward to assail the enemy in the lines he had occupied after the battle at this point on the 12th. Tyler's division in reserve in rifle-pits running from the Landrum House to the Salient. Birney's division still remaining with General Burnside. Gibbon's and Barlow's

divisions now traversed the same ground which we had fought so desperately on six days since; and as but a portion of the dead of that day's contest had been buried, the stench which arose from them was so sickening and terrible that many of the men and officers became deathly sick from it. The appearance of the dead who had been exposed to the sun so long, was horrible in the extreme as we marched past and over them, a sight never to be forgotten by those who witnessed it.

"At 4:10 A. M, Gibbon and Barlow moved forward to the assault, their troops in line of brigades. My artillery was posted in the first line of works, firing during the action over our troops in front.

"As soon as our lines came within range we were received with a most destructive fire of musketry and artillery from the enemy, who was snugly fixed in heavy intrenchments protected by abatis. Our men gallantly rushed on until they came to the edge of this abatis, which was so heavy and firm that they could not penetrate it under the fire, and our lines stood at that point delivering their fire until 10 o'clock, when we were withdrawn, it being found impracticable to carry the position and our losses were heavy in this assault in killed and wounded. The Sixth Corps attacked at the same time with us on our right, with the same result."

General Francis C. Barlow, page 369 of Records, says, "Attacked the enemy's left May 18th."

General John R. Brooke, of Barlow's division of Hancock's Corps, page 411 of Records, says, "At 4:10 A. M., moved forward in support of Second and Third Brigades, which were ordered to attack the enemy. Occupied the position taken on the 12th, and remained there. No fighting done by my brigade, though exposed to a heavy artillery fire throughout the day, losing heavily in officers and men. The assault made on our part of the line was not successful."

Major-General John Gibbon, of Hancock's Corps, pages 431 and 432 of Records, says, "At daylight on the 18th, the division was in position at the breastworks taken on the 12th, ready for

another assault on the enemy's interior line. The Corcoran Legion, Colonel Mathew Murphy, Sixty-ninth Regiment, New York National Guard Artillery, commanding, had the day before joined the army and been assigned to my division as the fourth Brigade, and Colonel Thomas S. Smyth, First Delaware Volunteers, and Colonel H. B. McKeen, Eighty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers, reported to me for duty, and were assigned to the command of the Third and First Brigades, respectively. The division was formed in two lines, the first line composed of McKeen's and Murphy's Brigades (First and Fourth), in line of battle connecting with Barlow's division on the left, and the Sixth Corps on the right, and supported by the second line. Owen's and Smyth's brigades (Second and Third) formed in the line of battalions en masse. Directly in front of the center of my line was a thick, heavy wood, which prevented any considerable portion of the division from being seen from any one point. The troops moved to the assault at 4:30 A. M., and gallantly carried some of the enemy's works in their front, when the second line was ordered forward in support. We soon, however, came upon the enemy's main line of works well manned both with infantry and artillery, and protected in front with abatis, from which the fire was so heavy that the troops made no headway against it and were forced to retire."

Colonel Thomas A. Smyth, of Hancock's Corps, page 449 of Records, says, "I assumed command of this brigade by order of Brigadier-General Gibbon, May 17, 1864, the army then being in the vicinity of Spotsylvania Courthouse. About 10:30 P. M., I was ordered to mass the brigade in front of the Landrum House, and near the vacated line of the enemy's intrenchments, before daylight, which was accomplished, the brigade being in column of battalions between the Landrum House and the road. Subsequently it was deployed into line by battalions in mass, and I was ordered by Brigadier-General Gibbon to move forward in support of the Corcoran Legion. At daylight the Legion moved forward and I followed at short supporting distance. The first line was repulsed, and my brigade taking a position in a ravine

covered their retreat. I at once deployed a line of skirmishers and held this position until 12:35 P. M., when in obedience to orders from General Gibbon, I withdrew to the second line of intrenchments."

Colonel John C. Tidball, Chief Artillery, Hancock's Corps, page 510 of Records, says, "May 18th moved from Harris' house to the deserted house, and Roder, Adams, and Rickett's to Landrum's. Sent Edgall's battery to Colonel Tompkins. Brown, Roder and Ames, in first line, silenced Rebel battery; 12 M. still in position. Clark and Ricketts moved down to works on extreme right. Edgall already there with Birney's division."

General G. K. Warren, page 542 of Records, says, "May 18, 1864, whole army had moved off to our right to make an assault on the enemy, and I commenced a cannonade at daylight with 26 guns, as a diversion. This occasioned a brisk artillery duel between myself and Hill's Corps. Our forces found the enemy prepared and strongly posted on the right, and made no serious attack."

Colonel Charles S. Wainwright, Chief Artillery, Warren's Corps, page 644 of Records, says, "May 18, 1864. Second and Sixth Corps having returned to the right of the general line, and so uncovered the left, Hart's Bigelow's and Walcott's batteries of light 12 pounders were posted in the neighborhood of the Anderson house to protect that flank, should the enemy attack there. Before daylight Rittenhouse's battery was pushed forward on the pike to our advanced works, 1,400 yards from the Courthouse, and was joined by Taft's (Fifth New York Independent) battery of six 20 pounder Parrotts, which had temporarily joined the brigade the night before, and Sheldon's battery, making 14 guns, under command of Major Fitzhugh. At the same time Captain Cooper, with his own, Breck's and Phillips' batteries, making 12 three-inch guns, was posted on a sharp knoll to the front, and some 1,400 yards to the left of Major Fitzhugh's line, making an angle of about 60 degrees with it. The position of all these batteries was excellent. The

first was protected by fair works, and the rapid descent of the knoll from the rear to Cooper's afforded excellent shelter for the limbers. The enemy had 20 pieces behind their lines, in front and to their right of the Courthouse. At the time the Second Corps advanced on the right the batteries on both sides opened. The engagement was brisk for near three-quarters of an hour, and the practice on both sides was very accurate. Fire was kept up at intervals during the day without any express object, and with no perceptible result, except the silencing of the enemy's guns."

General George W. Getty, of Wright's Corps, page 679 of Records, says, "On the night of the 17th, (May, 1864), the division moved back to the angle, and having formed in columns of brigades in the following order from front to rear, Wheaton's (First), Edward's (Fourth), Bidwell's (Third), and Grant's (Second), in conjunction with the Second Corps and the remainder of the Sixth, made an attack at daylight on the enemy's position on the right and front of the angle. The attack was not successful, and the division was withdrawn."

Gen. Frank Wheaton, of Wright's Corps, pages 685 and 686 of Record, says, "Remained in the camp until May 17 (1864), when at 8:30 P. M., the brigade moved with the rest of the division to the extreme right of the army opposite the angle, mentioned May 12, and the scene of the obstinate fighting of that day, and formed at 3:30 A. M., May 18, on the right of the Second Corps. At 4:30 A. M., in conjunction with the Second Corps, on the left, we moved forward to assault the enemy's position, a quarter mile beyond his works vacated the 13th. The advance was conducted in good order, notwithstanding the many natural and artificial obstacles in the vicinity of the enemy's old line of pits, until we arrived within 300 yards of their new position, when they suddenly opened with canister and musketry. The brigade line extended from left to right in the following order: One Hundred and Second Pennsylvania Volunteers, Ninety-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, Ninety-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers, Sixty-second New York Vol-

unteers, One Hundred and Thirty-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers. The other brigades of the division were in successive lines in rear. The fire of the enemy was mainly directed to the One Hundred and Second and Ninety-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, as they were exposed through a large opening in the woods. At this point also the line was at right angles with an interior line of works, which had been vacated by the enemy and was untenable to us. The traverses and abatis in rear and front of these works and the severe artillery fire which enfiladed them rendered it impossible to keep the line connected, and the Ninety-third Pennsylvania Volunteers was moved by a flank in rear of the Ninety-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers. As the Second Corps had been checked in its advance and its right had fallen back, leaving my flank exposed, and nothing as yet had formed on my right, I deemed it unsafe to advance farther, and the brigade was halted where the above separation occurred—the One Hundred and Second Pennsylvania Volunteers on the left and the balance of the brigade on the right under cover of the woods. The enemy continued to shell both positions for an hour, the brigade and the lines in support losing many men and officers therefrom. At 8 o'clock the brigade of Colonel Smith, of the Third Division formed on the right. At 9 o'clock a staff officer of the division commander came for the first time to learn the situation of affairs, to whom I represented the impracticability of a farther advance. A short time after I received orders direct from the corps commander to withdraw, which was done successfully under cover of the woods."

General L. A. Grant, of Wright's Corps, page 696 of Record, says, "At daylight on the morning of the 18th, both corps charged the enemy's position. This brigade was formed in two lines of battle, the old regiments in front and the Eleventh Regiment constituting the second line. Three brigades, each formed in one line of battle, were in our front. An advance of about half a mile was made under a heavy artillery fire. This brigade (constituting the fourth and fifth lines), came up

on the first line in the advance and halted. No farther advance was made, and the troops in our front retired. After holding the front line for some time, the whole command was ordered to retire, which was done in good order. Our loss, though not so heavy as in other engagements, was considerable, principally from artillery."

General D. D. Bidwell, of Getty's division, Wright's Corps, page 720 of Records, says, "On the evening of the 17th (May, 1864), we moved to the position in front of the angle, where on the evening of the 18th, the division was formed in four lines of a brigade each. We were in the third line, and it getting light the advance was made without waiting for the Third division to complete their formation. Upon advancing, the Second Corps gave way on our left, and the two front lines obliquing to the left, brought us in the front line, and the Third division failing to advance exposed us to an artillery fire, which took us in reverse, on the flank (and) in front. The line on our left halting, our line was halted where we remained until withdrawn by orders. In this engagement our loss was heavy and most from artillery."

General A. E. Burnside, pages 910 and 911 of Records, says, "On the morning of the 18th (May, 1864), a general attack was made on the enemy's line, and after two or three charges by the divisions of Generals Crittenden and Potter, which resulted in considerable loss, it was concluded that it could not be carried by assault. Some ground, however, was gained which commanded parts of their line. This attack was well supported by the artillery, particularly by the batteries of General Wilcox's division."

General J. H. Ledlie, of Burnside's Corps, pages 917 and 918, of Records, says "On the 18th of May (1864), I received orders to advance upon and feel the enemy's position. I pushed forward my brigade, composed of the Fourth and Tenth U. S. Infantry, Thirtieth, Fifty-sixth, Fifty-seventh and Fifty-ninth Massachusetts Volunteers, which moved up in admirable style, and reached the abatis in front of them, and it being impossible

to penetrate this, I ordered the brigade to fall back and did so, receiving a terrible fire from the enemy. The officers and men behaved with great gallantry, and deserve much credit."

General R. B. Potter, of Burnside's Corps, page 920 of Record, says, "The usual skirmishing and artillery firing continued till the morning of the 18th (May, 1864), when we attacked the enemy with vigor all along the line, made three charges on his works and met with considerable loss. We did not succeed in carrying his works, but gained some important ground, rendering parts of his line untenable."

General W. N. Pendleton, General Lee's Chief of Artillery, pages 1054 and 1056, of Records, says, "(May 12, 1864), Major Cutshaw was assigned to the command of Hardaway's battalion and Major Page put in command of the combined remnants of his own and Cutshaw's battalions.

"On the morning of the 18th, the enemy again attempted to carry the line still held by the Second corps, near the scene of the former conflict. This time, however, he met guns in position to receive him. His heavy force was allowed to get within good range of our breastworks. There the guns under Colonel Carter (Hardaway's battalion commanded by Cutshaw and Page's reorganized), opened upon him a murderous fire of spherical case and canister, which at once arrested his advance, threw his columns into confusion, and forced him to retreat in disorder. Heavily as he suffered on this occasion, our loss was nothing, and this was accomplished against a force of 12,000 picked infantry by twenty-nine pieces of artillery alone, but well handled."

General R. S. Ewell, page 1073 of Records, says, "As it was unadvisable to continue efforts to retake the salient with the force at my command, a new line was laid out during the day by General Lee's chief engineer, some 800 yards in rear of the first and constructed at night. After midnight my forces were quietly withdrawn to it and artillery placed in position, but his efforts and losses on the 12th seemed to have exhausted the enemy, and all was quiet till May 18 (1864), when a strong

force advanced past the McCool house toward our new line. When well within range General Long opened upon them with thirty pieces of artillery, which with the fire of our skirmishers, broke and drove them back with severe loss. We afterwards learned that they were two fresh divisions, nearly 10,000 strong, just come up from the rear."

General A. L. Long, Chief Artillery, Ewell's Corps, pages 1087 and 1088 of Records, says, "Everything remained quiet along the lines till the morning of the 18th (May, 1864). The enemy about 9 A. M. advanced a heavy force against our new line. He was allowed to come within good canister range of our breastworks. Carter's division of artillery then opened a most murderous fire of canister and spherical case-shot, which at once arrested his advance, threw his columns into confusion, and forced him to a disorderly retreat. His loss was very heavy; ours was nothing. This attack fairly illustrates the immense power of artillery well handled. A select force of 10,000 or 12,000 infantry was broken and driven from the field in less than thirty minutes by twenty-nine pieces of artillery alone."

This account given in the published reports of each side seems somewhat at variance, looking at it from opposite sides as we do. It may not, therefore, be out of place to speak of the actions as it must have appeared to the Confederates. They were quietly posted in the new line of works on Ewell's front and had been there nearly six days with scarcely a picket fire on their immediate front. On this morning the troops had finished their simple breakfast and were standing around waiting events of the day. None were aware that a movement by the enemy was going on beyond the old line of works, and certainly the Confederates had no knowledge that he had started at daylight a real attack of our lines. If these movements took place at 4 or 4:30 A. M., they must have been in marching to and over the old abandoned works which he terms "capturing" the first and second lines, and for the purpose of getting into positions and arranging for the assault when it did take place. The old works were abandoned and deserted days before and needed

no capture, and no Confederate works with troops behind them were captured this day. About 8 A. M., attention was attracted to the commotion of the enemy in and near the old deserted works, apparently about to advance, and the pickets and skirmishers of the Confederates were called in. All were astonished at this and could not believe a serious attempt would be made to assail such a line as Ewell had, in open day, over such a distance. Every one on the Confederate side felt that such an attack was reckless, and hopeless in the extreme. So when it was found that a real assault was to be made, it was welcomed by the Confederates as an opportunity to pay off old scores. The Confederate artillerymen were ordered to take their places at the guns and to fire on those troops first with solid shot through the woods and with shells through the cleared openings. Soon the enemy's guns opened on ours, but scarcely a response was made to them from us on this front, his purpose with the masses of Federal infantry in view showing clearly where our fire should be concentrated. This infantry in the column formations as they are described in the reports, stepped out rapidly, with their muskets at a "right shoulder shift," in successive lines, apparently several brigades deep, well aligned and steady, without bands, but with flags flying, a most magnificent and thrilling sight, covering Ewell's whole front as far as could be seen. As this host got well under way orders were given to change fire to case shot (Schrappnel) and shells. By this time the assaulting columns increased their gait to a double quick, and on they came, shells and case (Schrappnel) shot tearing great gaps in their ranks, the roaring guns and wavering lines of Federal infantry still advancing, the scene was wonderfully inspiring to the Confederates.

Orders were given to be ready with canister, the enemy still advancing, but shaky. Soon his front columns came within canister range, and under this fire of combined canister and case (Schrappnel), he could not stand, and broke in confusion, leaving the field in disorder and his dead in front of our works. As soon as the Federal infantry had been driven from the

field, orders were given to "cease firing," to save ammunition, not knowing if this or other Federal infantry would repeat the assault. The enemy's artillery still continued firing at our lines as they had done throughout the assault. As the Confederate guns had repulsed the Federal infantry, it was unnecessary to waste ammunition at long range in practice of artillery against artillery. Probably this is why some of the reports speak of silencing the Confederate guns. Not a gun was struck or even temporarily disabled during this action.

It is impossible to conceive that any such dramatic scenes took place in this assault of infantry lines standing in front of the slashings and abatis delivering volleys into our works, as some of these reports indicate. No matter what orders for retreating had passed to the rear of the assaulting columns, those in front were absolutely routed.

That a hopeless undertaking was imposed on brave, veteran, soldiers, the very flower of the Federal Army in this effort, there can be no doubt, but the task was impossible and they did all that brave men could do.

Some of the finest officers in the Federal Army were there in that assault, many since distinguished in both military and civil life—Lieutenant-General Miles, Major-General Brooke, Governor Hartranft, and others were there.

There should be no reflection on these brave men, though in greater numbers, any more than on Pickett's men in a similar effort at Gettysburg.

The recital of this engagement brings out prominently three points of great interest and especially to soldiers of an artillery organization:

1st. The repulse of the heavy assaulting columns of the enemy, was practically by the destructive fire of artillery alone.

2nd. That this mass of infantry charging over the gradually rising, partly open, plateau for over half a mile in extent in the face of intrenched, well posted, and well served artillery, could not hope to carry such a position as Ewell's Corps held.

3rd. That the meagre published accounts of the affair by the

commanding generals on either side, illustrates, as is often the case, the overlooking of important and effective work of the artillery branch of an army.

EDITORIALS.

THE SOUTHERN HISTORICAL SOCIETY.

On May 1st, 1869, a number of gentlemen in the city of New Orleans, formed themselves into an Association under the style of *The Southern Historical Society*—Gen. Braxton Bragg, Chairman. The autograph signatures of the forty-five distinguished gentlemen present is an interesting possession of the Society, preserved in the first volume of the Society's records. On motion of General Harry T. Hays, the Rev. Dr. B. M. Palmer was unanimously elected President, Gen. Braxton Bragg, Vice-President, and Joseph Jones, M. D., Secretary and Treasurer. The object of the Society was "the collection, classification, preservation and final publication of all the documents and facts bearing upon the eventful history of the past few years, illustrating the nature of the struggle from which the country has just emerged, defining and indicating the principles which lay beneath it, and marking the stages through which it was conducted to its issue. It is not understood that this association shall be purely sectional, nor that its labors shall be of a partisan character."

To accomplish the ends in view it was planned that the parent Society, with its seat and archives in New Orleans, should be aided by affiliated societies to be organized in all the States favorable to the object proposed. The Vice-Presidents, representing the States, were headed by General Robert E. Lee, for Virginia, and included Vice-President Stephens, for Georgia; W. W. Coreoran, for the District of Columbia; S. Teakle Wallis, for Maryland, and others of like distinction.

The Society entered upon the work of gathering official reports and historical papers and collecting funds, and held monthly meetings in the rooms of the Howard Association. On August 14th, 1873, a Convention was held at the Montgomery White Sulphur Springs, Virginia, called by the Southern His-

torical Society, and that Society was reorganized, with its seat in Richmond, Va. The following officers were elected: President, Gen. Jubal A. Early; Vice-President, Hon. R. M. T. Hunter, and Secretary and Treasurer, Col. G. W. Munford.

The first meeting of the Society, as reorganized, was held October 29, 1873, in the Senate Chamber of the Virginia State Capitol, General Early, President, in the chair. Addresses were made by General Wade Hampton, Dr. J. L. M. Curry, Dr. Moses D. Hoge and Major Robert Stiles. It was not until January, 1876, that the Society began the publication of its papers, under the direction of the Rev. J. Wm. Jones, D. D., as Secretary and Editor.

The first number contained "The Origin of the late War," by the Hon. R. M. T. Hunter; "The Botetourt Resolutions" of Judge John J. Allen; "The Inaugural Address of President Davis," and the Address of Congress to the people of the Confederate States, great fundamental papers, the bedrock of principles which imperishably vindicate the Confederacy of the South.

For several years the Society issued its papers in monthly numbers, and later embraced them in quarterly volumes. Since 1888, the Papers have been published in annual volumes, of which there are now, from the first in 1876, thirty-eight volumes.

It is impossible to estimate in words the value to just and faithful history the work this Society has accomplished. The material collected and preserved has been the production of the good and true men who were themselves eye-witnesses and participants of what they write, and the generation has nearly passed away from earth. The widest range of observation and reflection has been given by writers of all parts of the section specially concerned and of all ranks and points of view. Printing, "the art preservative," has multiplied the copies and secured their preservation for ages to come. The distribution of these volumes has placed them not only in many private libraries, but on the shelves of the great public and university libra-

ries throughout this continent and in other lands. Each passing year adds testimony to the value and importance of the publications of the Society.

The London Saturday Review says: "They contain a mass of information relative to the late War, *without a careful study of which no librarian, however limited his scope, should venture to treat any fragment of that most interesting story.*"

The New England Historical Register says, that "no library, public or private, which pretends to historic fulness, *can afford to be without these volumes.*"

Dr. J. Wm. Jones, the very intelligent and efficient Secretary, was succeeded in that office by Mr. R. A. Brock, who continued most faithfully the collecting and editing the papers through the thirty-eighth volume, which was published in 1910. On account of Mr. Brock's impaired health, no volume has been issued since that year.

The Southern Historical Society, in November, 1913, elected the writer as Secretary, and directed him to resume the preparation of the volume, New Series, Vol. I, which we now present to the members of the Society, to the people of the South and to the readers and students of history throughout the world.

JAMES POWER SMITH,
Secretary.

ROBERT ALONZO BROCK.

THE SOUTHERN HISTORICAL SOCIETY, with sincere regret and profound respect, has to announce the death of Mr. Brock, for a number of years its Secretary and Editor, which occurred at his home in Richmond, Virginia, on Saturday, July 11, 1914, in the seventy-sixth year of his age.

Mr. Brock was born in Richmond on March 9, 1839, the son of Robert King and Elizabeth Mildred (Ragland) Brock, of Hanover county. Though possessed of antiquarian tastes from childhood, Mr. Brock was bred to mercantile pursuits, and

went into the employ of uncles, who were extensive lumber merchants. Later he engaged in business on his own account, but when the War Between the States broke out he shouldered a musket to answer the call of his State. The war over, from 1865 to 1881, he carried on a lumber business with success. Meanwhile, he had been made secretary of the Virginia Historical Society. In 1881 he retired from business to give himself unreservedly to genealogical study and research. Eleven volumes of the reports of the Virginia Historical Society will perpetuate his name to students of Virginia history. In 1887 he was elected Secretary of the Southern Historical Society, and prepared for publication a number of its invaluable volumes of Southern history. He was also historian and registrar of the Virginia Society of the Sons of the American Revolution. He was a member of the William and Mary Chapter of Phi Beta Kappa. He was a frequent contributor to the press and magazines, and was one of the editors of the *Richmond Standard*, a family paper containing departments of science, history and genealogy, occupying this position from 1879 to 1882. He also contributed to standard reference works, and prepared various statistical and historical papers for the United States government.

In the War Between the States, Mr. Brock served with Company F, made up of Richmond men, which shared the fortunes of the Army of Northern Virginia. A few survivors banded themselves together afterwards, and Mr. Brock was at one time secretary and historiographer of the organization. He was also a member of R. E. Lee Camp, Confederate Veterans.

Succeeding the Rev. Dr. J. Wm. Jones, twenty long years the Secretary of this Society, Mr. Brock, with his wide intelligence, his personal ardour in the study of Confederate history and his rare experience in literary work, accomplished a work for the Society, and for history that is beyond estimate. Only because of impaired and declining health was he allowed to retire from the service he rendered us with so much fidelity and success.

The *News-Leader*, of Richmond, Va., pays this just tribute to the work and memory of Mr. Brock:

"Than Robert Alonzo Brock, no man had done more to preserve Virginia traditions, history and genealogy. That labor had been a passion and a sacred duty with him, and to it for over a generation he had devoted himself unremittingly. As Secretary of the Southern Historical Society, and for some years occupying the same position with the Virginia Historical Society, and as genealogical editor of the *Richmond Standard* and contributor to various outside historical publications, Mr. Brock put into enduring form a wealth of material of incalculable value to future constructive historians. He has been most justly termed a yeoman of Virginia history and a master of annotation. Some of his achievements in this latter field are unexcelled for accuracy and laboriousness."

BOOK REVIEWS.

The present volume of the Papers of the Southern Historical Society, *New Series, Vol. I.*, has been collected with care and discrimination by the Secretary, with the approval of the Publishing Committee—Captain W. Gordon McCabe, Col. Archer Anderson and the Hon. George L. Christian. The papers are all of historical value. Some of them have been in print, in pamphlet or newspaper form, with limited and local circulation, and are now given a place in this volume, where they will find a permanent, wide and accessible place in literature. The Society is not responsible for statements made or views expressed, but offer these papers to the public as the materials of history, attesting to the reliable character of the authors. With the continued support of its members, the reading public and the libraries of the world, the Society will continue the publication of its annual volumes. Much of valuable material remains to be collected and preserved. Our readers are requested to aid the Society by committing to our care such papers or furnishing information as to where they may be found.

Virginia State Library Bulletin—quarterly, July, October, 1913.
An Author and Subject Index to the Southern Historical Society Papers, Vols. I-XXXVIII. Compiled by Mrs. Kate Pleasants Minor, Reference Librarian. pp. 139.

This complete index of the large historical and biographical material embraced in the thirty-eight volumes of our Papers is of the greatest value to readers and students, making the material immediately accessible. It is a revelation of the amount of story and discussion which we have preserved for all time.

The Index will be sent, postpaid, for the cash payment of one dollar, from the office of the Society.

Recollections of a Maryland Confederate Soldier and Staff Officer—under Johnston, Jackson and Lee—1861-1865. By McHenry Howard. Octavo. pp. 423. Illustrations and Maps. \$2.00. William J. Wilkins Co., Baltimore, Md.

This latest narrative of experiences in the War period, 1861 to 1865, comes from the press in this year of 1914. It is one of a class of books on the war which we deem of the greatest value and interest, the personal recollections of one who served in the field from the beginning to the close of the struggle for Southern Independence. The author is a professional man of the widest intelligence, who writes with his own diary and notes before him, and with the use of the resources of all the accumulated literature, official and personal, which a half century affords. And these are the recollections of an ardent Confederate soldier whose position was that of a Brigade Staff officer, in the very line of battle on the many fields of the Army of Northern Virginia. It is of what he saw with his own eyes that he tells, not from the distance of a General, but with the close, personal, participation of one who went with the lines into the fire and smoke of the battlefield. Again and again he was wounded, and twice from the front he was taken away to the privation and sufferings of a prisoner of war, in Fort Delaware, and worse than that, on Johnson's Island.

It is distinctively a history of the Maryland contingency in the Southern Army, of which the State that was ground between the upper and nether millstones, will never be ashamed. Major Howard was the youngest son of a family of distinction in Maryland history, the grandson of a revolutionary hero, Col. John Eager Howard, and of Francis Scott Key, author of "The Star Spangled Banner." From his own Baltimore home, his father, Charles Howard, was taken to prison in Fort Warren, and six sons, with the loving consecration of the mother, went into the army that followed Robert E. Lee. Among general officers Maryland gave Trimble and Elzey and Winder and Stuart and Bradley Johnson. And following were Herbert and Goldsborough and Snowden Andrews and Murray; and the Mc-

Kims and a great company of men of the best blood and breeding Maryland had to give. There were no better soldiers in that noblest of armies. Separated from their homes, anxious and troubled for those who were left at home, leaving all behind them, there were none who made greater sacrifice, and none who endured privations more patiently or faced the perils of the field more courageously, or went more persistently to the end.

Major McHenry Howard has accomplished a good work in these later years of his life in giving to a lasting preservation his valuable book, which he has prepared with accuracy and fidelity to historic truth. It is throughout a thrilling narrative, wholly reliable and most engaging in interest from beginning to end.

The Confederate Cause and Conduct in the War Between the States. Octavo. \$1.50. L. H. Jenkins, Publisher, Allison and Broad Streets, Richmond, Va.

This is a collection of papers, reported to the Virginia State Camp of Confederate Veterans by the late Dr. Hunter McGuire and Judge George L. Christian, of the History Committee. They are vital and vigorous presentations of some of the greatest subjects connected with the character and life of the Southern Confederacy: on Slavery Not the Cause of the War, the Right of Secession, the Treatment and Exchange of Prisoners, on the Responsibility for the War, and other fundamental matters. To these papers are added Dr. McGuire's address on Stonewall Jackson, and his narrative of the facts of his wounding. This book is one of the most effective contributions to the defense of the South that has been given to the world. It is warmly commended and will have a permanent place in the literature of the great debate that is by no means ended.

Official Record of the Union and Confederate Navies. Series I, Volume 26. *Naval Forces on Western Waters—March 1, to December 31, 1864.* Published under the direction of the Hon. Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy.

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The Southern Historical Society, organized in 1869, has had a long and useful existence, gathering and publishing thirty-eight annual volumes of papers of inestimable value in the preservation of history and the memoirs of heroic men in an heroic time. It is proposed to issue a New Series, and the volume now published will be a valuable addition to this literature, containing papers of importance hitherto unpublished.

Membership is secured by the payment of three dollars and a copy of the Papers for the year is sent to each member. The Papers of past years will be sent unbound on the payment of two dollars for each year. A few numbers are out of print, but with these exceptions, a complete set will be sent on a cash payment of thirty-five dollars. A complete Index of the thirty-eight printed volumes has been prepared under direction of the Virginia State Library by Mrs. Kate Pleasants Minor, Reference Librarian, copies of which will be sent on the payment of one dollar.

Members of the Society are requested to renew their membership for 1914 by the payment of the annual fee of three dollars.

JAMES POWER SMITH;

Secretary.

2304 West Grace St., Richmond, Va.